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THE PRAXIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: ASSOCIATIONAL LIFE, THE POLITICS OF 
CIVILITY, AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC 
 
This dissertation analyzes the efforts to develop a pluralistic political culture and 
democratic practices of governance through the training of democratic leaders in 
Germany's first school of public affairs, the German School of Politics. The investigation 
of the thought-leaders that formed this school illustrates two main points. First, through 
the prism of the School, I detail the efforts to develop a conception of civil society that, 
by being grounded in civility, could retie social bonds and counter the brutalization of 
politics characteristic of the post-World War One years. By providing practical 
knowledge, courses in public affairs could not only free Germans from the blinders of 
ideologies, but also instill in them an ethos that would help viewing the political enemy 
as an opponent with an equal right to participate in the political process. Secondly, I point 
to the limits of trans-national philanthropy in supporting the development of civil society 
in young democracies. By analyzing the relationship between U.S. foundations and the 
School, I focus on the asymmetry that existed between American ideals of democracy 
and the realities of the German political system. This study thus focuses on the dynamics 
between the actions of institutions and organizations, and the broader social behaviors 
that constitute public life. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The Weimar Republic is a paradigmatic case of young democracies’ difficulties to 
transcend their authoritarian pasts and to set foot in societies with allegedly weak 
democratic traditions. Scholars have traditionally used the Weimar Republic in 
asymmetric comparisons aiming to analyze the challenges facing societies while 
transitioning from authoritarian to democratic systems of government.1 Indeed, the 
Weimar experience may point to the uneven path to democracy in long-term analyses that 
view post-1945 Germany as the result of a long historical process started at the turn of the 
twentieth century. Conversely, Germany’s first democracy may also confirm the fears of 
the “ballot democracy” with the electoral successes of Adolf Hitler’s National Socialist 
Party.     
For scholars of civil society, the case of the Weimar Republic is of relevance 
because it provides a vantage point for the study of civil society in the context of young 
democracies and in the processes of democratization. Scholars who normatively define 
civil society see confirmed the interdependence of civil society and democratic forms of 
governance in the case of Weimar,2 whereas scholars who root civil society in 
associational life may view the Weimar Republic as a classical example of civil society’s 
democratic “neutrality.”3 Germany’s first democracy is therefore a fertile ground for 
investigations of civil society’s role in modern societies.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See for example Sheri Berman, “The Promise of the Arab Spring,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 92, no. 1 (2013).  
2 Bernd Reiter, “Civil Society and Democracy: Weimar Reconsidered,” Journal of Civil Society, vol. 5, no. 
1 (2009), 21-34.  
3 Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” World Politics, vol. 49, no. 3 
(1997), 401-429 and Omar G. Encarnación, “Tocqueville’s Missionaries. Civil Society Advocacy and 
Promotion of Democracy,” World Policy Journal, vol. 17, no. 1 (2000), 9-18.  
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German intellectual elites beheld with angst the collapse of the authoritarian state 
in the fall of 1918 and the communist uprisings in the winter of 1918-19. Nonetheless, 
the crisis of the times radically broke with the past and spurred critical analyses of the 
social, economic, and political causes of the crisis. Hence, it opened possibilities of 
action projected into the future. The crisis of the times heightened the sense of individual 
responsibility toward the community. In this sense, the crisis became a critical historical 
juncture that allowed for conceptualizations of new forms of societal organization. 
Conceptions of civil society offered the theoretical means to bridge individual and 
societal spheres of action and hence guide non-state activities that aimed to influence and 
– ultimately – mold society. German public intellectuals thus offer a fruitful vantage 
point for the investigation of social actions for the good of the commonality.  
The intellectuals at the center of this study did not remain isolated in the cloudy 
world of abstract ideology. Rather, they actively participated in public debates and aimed 
to influence public policy by using extra-political avenues such as political clubs, 
associations, press, and educational institutes. Education was at the core of their efforts to 
shape socio-political transformations. Intellectual elites had to address key questions such 
as the transformation of the individual into a citizen, the emergence of a pluralistic public 
opinion, and the tense relationship between private interest and the common good in a 
modern society. Political education thus gave both liberal and conservative intellectuals 
the possibility to influence social developments and transform contrasting forms of 
societal organization into reality.     
These intellectuals’ pragmatic and practical approach led them to focus on the 
praxis of civil society. They aimed to develop a democratic political culture and 
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democratic practices of governance through the training of democratic leaders in 
Germany’s first school of public policy and public affairs, the German School of Politics 
(Deutsche Hochschule für Politik). The development of this school in the 1920s and its 
leadership’s efforts to influence public policy serve as an example of one of the most 
promising attempts to establish a civil society during Germany’s first democracy. I 
analyze these efforts against the background of the rise to power of the Nazis.   
American philanthropic foundations supported the German School of Politics 
because they viewed it as a democratic stronghold amid Germany’s radicalized public 
sphere. The efforts of American philanthropy to create a global civil society through a 
network of research institutes and to foster the development of German, democratic 
political sciences, however, clashed against the goals of Germany’s public intellectuals. 
The analysis of this relationship therefore serves as a case study for an understanding of 
the asymmetries that developed between American ideals of democracy and the realities 
of Weimar’s political system and its political culture, and hence questions the role of 
trans-national philanthropy in support of democracy and civil society.  
This study focuses on the praxis of civil society. In so doing, it closes the gap 
between theory and empirical analyses that characterizes much of the scholarship in civil 
society studies. In the aftermath of the war, liberal intellectuals grounded civil society in 
the “politics of civility,” and hence conceptualized a form of societal organization that 
recognized and accepted the intrinsic socio-political conflicts of modern societies. This 
study, however, also shows how during the Weimar Republic a conceptualization of civil 
society rooted in the acceptance of conflict and based on the notion of civility paved the 
path to a very different conception of societal organization under the Nazis. It therefore 
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points to the weakness of the civil society project in preserving and defending democratic 
institutions against powerful political alternatives.     
The Civil Society Debate 
 
At regular intervals, academic debates intersect broader public debates. On these 
occasions, social, economic, or political concepts find a broad resonance outside the 
academic ivory tower, shape public discourse, and influence society’s self-perception. In 
recent decades, no other political concept has met civil society’s same, unmatched 
success in both the scholarly literature and public debates. Civil society has become an 
ubiquitous concept in today’s public debates, whether conceptualized as a form of 
resistance against authoritarian regimes or as an utopian answer to intellectuals’ growing 
anxiety about the transformation of their post-modern democratic societies. 
From a broad perspective, two main approaches characterize civil society studies. 
The theoretical complexity of civil society spurred numerous investigations of civil 
society as part of intellectual history. These studies provide a better understanding of how 
intellectuals have used the concept of civil society to analyze the socio-political 
transformations of their societies. Hence, from a theoretical level, scholars point out the 
relationship between societal transformations and the shifting conceptualizations of civil 
society.4 Conversely, scholars have tried to capture and describe the empirical dimension 
of civil society through quantitative, qualitative, and historical approaches. Unless 
loosely defined and equated to associational life, however, scholars have struggled in 
applying a multilayered political concept to empirical analyses. 
In this study, I focus on the praxis of civil society. Accordingly, I move away 
from attempts to identify civil society with a specific social class or social structure as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 See the excellent Peter Wagner, ed., The Languages of Civil Society (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006).  
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well as from debates focusing on the dichotomy of good/bad associational life. In fact, 
civil society cannot be reduced to simple self-organization, as civil society allows 
differences and accepts and encourages them within limits. Consequentially, I view civil 
society as part of an ongoing debate over the ways modern individuals (that is, 
economically as well as politically independent and self-interested individuals) 
participate in public affairs and still identify with the common good.  
Civil Society in Theory: State, Associational Life, and Democracy 
 
As a political concept, civil society cannot be decoupled from the notion of 
“modernity” and from the perception of “crisis” and anxiety. Rapid societal 
transformations radically altered individuals’ relationship with the broader social-political 
world at the turn of the eighteenth century. Intellectuals found an answer to the 
worrisome societal transformations they were observing in civil society. The emergence 
of commercial society and the French Revolution signaled the end of the Ancien Régime 
and freed the individual from those social structures that had guided (and constrained) 
human action. Without social as well as political structures regulating political 
participation in traditional societies, intellectuals sought new social and organizational 
principles able to balance the relationship between individual and society in an era of 
rapid individuation.   
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel opened the modern debate on civil society by 
conceptually separating civil society and political society at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Before and after Hegel, however, all major civil society theorists have 
addressed the tension between private interest and the public good. These debates have 
focused on the kind of social individuals, social interactions, and organizations needed to 
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establish, maintain, or reinforce a liberal state. In other words, these theorists were 
concerned with the ways self-interested men could participate in public debates over 
political matters and still identify with the common good. The different solutions to this 
debate provide a useful framework for this study’s conceptualization of civil society, and 
help the understanding of Weimar’s tragic fate.  
In ancient Greece and Rome, scholars equated civil society to political society 
(hence, not recognizing forms of resistance against political power). The historical roots 
of the modern concept of civil society can be traced back to the Middle Ages. In West 
Europe, the competition between spiritual and secular centers of power, the emergence of 
the feudal system, and the existence of communes and cities with their privileges 
established some structural limits to centralizing nuclei of power. During the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, the emergence of the absolute state and natural law led theorists 
to find new ways to challenge the legitimacy of traditional sources of political authority. 
John Locke juxtaposed civil society to a state of nature. In contrast, however, to the 
devastation pictured by Thomas Hobbes, Locke argued that society existed before 
government and thus was formed by the enjoyment of natural rights (property) granted by 
God. Spiritual or political authority therefore could not limit society, which Locke 
conceived as pre-political or extra-political and rooted in economic relationships.5  
The American and French revolutions significantly changed the framework of the 
civil society discourse. The juxtaposition between state of nature and political (civil) 
society had responded to the need of conceptualizing the possibilities of resistance to 
political authority. The dramatic enlargement of the polity following the democratic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, edited by C. B. Macpherson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 
1980). 
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revolutions shifted the focus on ways in which expanded political participation could be 
integrated, mediated, and transferred to political institutions without threatening political 
as well social stability.6 Consequentially, intellectuals sought solutions to the tension 
between private interest and the common good in modern societies. These theorists 
alternatively pointed to the ability either of intermediate institutions (most notably 
voluntary associations) or of the authority of the state to tame their societies’ 
sociopolitical conflicts.    
Hegel’s conception evolved in response to the French Revolution, which in his 
view had delegitimized the contractual notion of government and demonstrated the 
fallacy of the principle of individual will. In civil society, he asserted, persons were 
connected in a developed totality through a “system of wants,” where the division of 
labor “limit[s] each person to a single kind of technical skills, and thus produce[s] more 
unconditional dependence on the social system.”7 Nonetheless, the individual would 
constantly and inevitably fall for egoistic self-interests, thus risking to tear apart society. 
Only the state and an impartial cast of professional bureaucrats could achieve the unity of 
civil society and of an abstract public interest. Through constitutional law, the state 
“protects the family and guides civil society,” acting as a mediator between particular 
interests and universal will. In short, Hegel concluded, the state had to ensure that civil 
society would remain civil.8  
By blending citizen and bourgeois, classical republicanism had traditionally 
emphasized the convergence of political participation and economic self-interest in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Jean Terrier and Peter Wagner, “Civil Society and the Problématique of Political Modernity,” in The 
Languages of Civil Society, edited by Peter Wagner (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006), 9-27. 
7 G.W.F. Hegel, The Moral Life, or Social Ethics (1830), in Nineteenth Century Europe. Liberalism and Its 
Critics, edited by Jan Goldstein and John W. Boyer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), 133. 
8 Hegel, The Moral Life, or Social Ethics, in Nineteenth Century Europe, 138-149.  
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ideal independent man. By contrast, Karl Marx shifted the emphasis to economic self-
interest. Under capitalism, he contended, civil society would become a sphere of freedom 
for few based on the exclusion of many. The French Revolution dissolved the old civil 
society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) but granted only a limited degree of freedom. 
Simultaneously, the individual suffered a split of identity: man, as abstract citizen in 
politics, was separated from man as an egoistic and materialistic individual in civil 
society. According to Marx, full human emancipation required the overcoming of this 
separation and the recognition of personal forces as social forces.9 In a materialistic 
vision of history, the division of labor implied an unequal distribution among individuals 
of material and spiritual activities as well as “of labour and its products, hence property,” 
produced a “cleavage … between particular and common interest,” and (out of this 
contradiction) forms the state. However, the state was only “illusory communal life … in 
which the real struggles of the different classes are fought out among each other.”10 The 
proletariat – “a class in civil society which is not a class of civil society” – historically 
can represent the whole society, bring forward universal human emancipation and hence 
successfully carry out the revolution. The revolution was possible when its objective 
conditions were at hand and the proletariat, in order to develop its “universal character,” 
would take consciousness of itself and of its history.11 
 Hegel had emphasized the state’s role in protecting civil society from falling apart under 
the pressure of a multiplicity of particular interests. The state thus embodied the abstract 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), in The Marx-Engels Reader, edited by Robert C. Tucker 
(New York: Norton & Company, 1972), 26-52.  
10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology: Part I (1845-46), in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
159 and 160.  
11 Karl Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction (1844), in The 
Marx-Engels Reader, 62-65. 
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common good in which liberty and freedom could, and would, be fully achieved. By 
contrast, the Marxist tradition viewed civil society as the locus where the relationship of 
productive forces that characterizes the capitalist system developed. In both case, the 
focus on the state was central to these conceptualizations, as either the idealistic 
objectivation of the common good or the body of coercive economic (and, hence, 
political) dominance that must be overthrown. 
The realities of the American experience shaped the reception of classical 
republicanism and liberal Enlightenment on the other extreme of the theoretical debate of 
civil society. Alexander Hamilton dismissed the common belief that a republican form of 
government could only be realized in small states.12 Consequently, James Madison 
advanced a pragmatic solution to the limits of classical republicanism in Federalist No. 
10. In order to contain factionalism and in the impossibility to address its causes, 
Madison argued that only large nations could possibly control the effects of factionalism, 
thus criticizing classical republicanism’s emphasis on small republics. The multitude of 
factions in large countries – Madison notably concluded – would automatically neutralize 
the disrupting influence of factionalism on society and balance the political system.13 
Like Madison, Tocqueville also recognized the dangers of factions. Associations 
were not only voluntary and publicly oriented, but their actions were also driven by 
“certain manners.” In contrast to America, European organizations developed as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Publius [Alexander Hamilton], The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection 
(Federalist No. 9).  
13 Publius [James Madison], The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection, 
Continued (Federalist No. 10). Madison’s argument mirrored Adam Smith’s assertion on the role of 
religious sects in society. As a reaction to religious wars, theorists advocated a clear separation of politics 
from religion and the need for a distinctive private sphere, where religious differences had to be relegated. 
Adam Smith argued that religious zeal was dangerous if only a few big sects existed in society and hence 
suggested that only the existence of many small sects could ensure that none would dominate. Adam Smith, 
The Wealth of Nation, introduction by Allan B. Krueger (New York: Bantam Classics, 2003), 995-1028. 
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“weapons” for political conflict.14 From a political perspective, Tocqueville discussed 
associations in relation to the tensions between majority and minority. He contended that 
universal suffrage mitigated the “excesses of political association” in America because 
“no party can reasonably claim to represent those who have not voted at all.”15 While 
civil associations facilitated political associations because men become familiar in the 
former with “the principle of association,” they came together in great numbers only in 
political associations. Therefore, men learned to “subordinate to the common action” in 
political associations. Associations ensured the equilibrium of society by balancing the 
individualist tendencies of democracy, and hence they could be considered “schools of 
democracy.”16 Tocqueville equated civil society with the sphere of voluntary associations 
in which self-interested individuals could learn to compromise. Associations would teach 
members to mediate between different interests and therefore to restrain their egoistical 
self-interests. Associations provided those levels of civility – “self-interest properly 
understood” – that would keep democracies from being torn apart by individualism. 
In Europe, Emile Durkheim renewed the attention to intermediary institutions and 
the role in guaranteeing the equilibrium of modern societies at the end of the nineteenth 
century. Durkheim investigated the intrinsic problem of modern industrialized societies, 
that is, the tensions between individual freedom and the social bonds necessary for the 
survival of the system. Solidarity was the affective and psychological bond that tied the 
individual to the social group.17 The French sociologist, however, was aware that organic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, edited by J. P. Mayer (New York: Harper Perennial 
Modern Classics, 2006), 193-195. 
15 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 194. 
16 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 522. 
17 Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, with an introduction by Lewis Coser (New York: The 
Free University, 1997). In mechanical solidarity “the ideas and tendencies common to all members of 
society exceed in number and intensity those that appertain personally to each one of those members” (85); 
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solidarity was extremely labile and that the division of labor could produce “different or 
even opposite” results. Durkheim contended that intermediary institutions must create 
equilibrium and prevent the atomization that a market society might create because state 
and family could not support the moral integration of the individual in industrialized 
societies. Organic solidarity could prevent anomie from emerging because it integrated 
the individual in the social group.18  
The distinct role of state and intermediary institutions in conceptualizations of 
civil society points to different forms of relationship between civil society and 
democracy. The centrality of the state in the Hegelian tradition reflects the mistrust in 
society’s ability to self-regulate and to balance individualizing self-interest and the good 
of the broader community. Conversely, the Tocquevillian tradition of civil society deems 
voluntary associations able to negotiate the contrasting and competing interests of 
modern societies and hence to educate the individual to the life in common. These two 
traditions inspire and shape the contemporary debate on civil society’s relationship with 
democracy.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
it is a solidarity characteristic of pre-industrial societies, mechanic and with no room for the individual, 
which “is zero.” Every individual is determined – through coercion (repressive law) – by collective 
tendencies and beliefs. In modern industrialized societies, as a consequence of the division of labor, every 
individual has a peculiar “sphere of action” and consequentially a “personality.” Through a biological 
analogy, Durkheim compares organic solidarity with the organism of “higher animals,” where “each organ 
has its own special characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the unity of the organism, the more 
marked the individualization of the parts” (89). Individual and society are thus inversely related. 
18 In mechanical solidarity “the ideas and tendencies common to all members of society exceed in number 
and intensity those that appertain personally to each one of those members” (85); it is a solidarity 
characteristic of pre-industrial societies, mechanic and with no room for the individual, which “is zero.” 
Every individual is determined – through coercion (repressive law) – by collective tendencies and beliefs. 
In modern industrialized societies, as a consequence of the division of labor, every individual has a peculiar 
“sphere of action” and consequentially a “personality.” Through a biological analogy, Durkheim compares 
organic solidarity with the organism of “higher animals,” where “each organ has its own special 
characteristics and autonomy, yet the greater the unity of the organism, the more marked the 
individualization of the parts” (89). Individual and society are thus inversely related. Durkheim, The 
Division of Labor in Society, 291-294 and 304-308. 
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Anticipating a theme that the “Putnam school” would later popularize, mass 
society critics had already explained the demise of the Weimar Republic in Tocquevillian 
terms in the 1950s. By drawing on Durkheim, Hannah Arendt and William Kornhauser 
argued that mass society had broken the connections between individuals and estranged 
citizens. The collapse of intermediary associations had left the individual without links in 
society, and this anomic individual eventually became the disillusioned elector of the 
National Socialist party.19 In so doing, mass society critics contributed to establish the 
neo-Tocquevillian orthodoxy of directly linking voluntary associations to democracy, 
hence seeing the cause of Weimar Republic’s collapse in a weak – or non-existent – civil 
society.   
Inspired by Tocqueville and Durkheim, scholars see the social embodiment of the 
civil society ideal in associational life. Accordingly, they view civil society as part of 
society in the form of voluntary associations.20 Scholars have found the precondition for 
democracy in associational networks by attributing civil society’s normative dimension to 
associations, as Robert Putnam posited in his bestselling academic works, Making 
Democracy Work and Bowling Alone.21 In what has become the orthodoxy of civil 
society studies, voluntary associations allegedly provide venues for social interaction free 
of the constraints to human action that characterize traditional societies by breaking the 
exclusivity of ascribed identities.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959) and Hannah Arendt, The 
Origins of Totalitarianism (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973). See also Irene Taviss Thomson, 
“The Theory That Won't Die: From Mass Society to the Decline of Social Capital,” Sociological Forum, 
vol. 20, no. 3 (2005), 421-448. 
20 For the distinction between civil society as a part and as a kind of society see Michael Edwards, Civil 
Society (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ldt, 2004).  
21 Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 2001) and Robert T. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern 
Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).  
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The direct relationship between associational networks and liberal democracy 
causes conceptual problems. The so-called “mediating approaches” focus on the indirect 
benefits that voluntary associations “produce.” It is, however, doubtful whether and why 
a certain mode of action developed in one sphere of society should be automatically 
transmitted to the entire social as well as political world. These approaches therefore are 
based on the criticizable assumption that a “transmission belt” exists between voluntary 
self-organization and broader political action.22 Conversely, some scholars have 
emphasized the negative effects of certain organizations on democracy. Scholars have 
excluded from the civil society realm several types of associations such as hate groups 
and mafia-kind organizations in order to maintain the positive relationship between 
associational life and healthy democracy. Authors have thus coined the antinomy “bad 
civil society.”23 Consequentially, scholars point out the critical role of the political 
framework within which associational life develops and unfolds.24 
Differences notwithstanding, these “bad” groups share several features that 
challenge current conceptualizations of civil society.25 Scholars have pointed to the 
negative externalities that some forms of social capital may produce for society at large.26 
Putnam thus introduced the distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social 
capital to pinpoint associational life’s positive and negative effects on society. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Nancy L. Rosenblum, Membership and Morals. The Personal Uses of Pluralism in America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 47-48. 
23 Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society,” Political Theory, vol. 29, no. 6 (2001), 
837-865.  
24 Sheri Berman, “Civil Society and Political Institutionalism,” The American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 40, 
no. 5 (1997), 562-574.  
25 Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider, “The Mafia and al-Qaeda: Violent and Secretive Organizations in 
Comparative and Historical Perspective,” American Anthropologist, vol. 104, no. 3 (2002), 776-782.   
26 See Francis Fukuyama, “Social Capital and Civil Society,” IMF Working Papers, no. 00/74 (2000) and 
Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landoldt, “The Downside of Social Capital,” The American Prospect, vol. 26 
(1996), 18-21. 
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bonding social capital is inward looking and strengthen exclusive ties and homogeneous 
groups, bridging social capital is outward looking and establishes connections across 
social, ethnic, and religious divides.27 This distinction therefore allows scholars to 
distinguish between voluntary associations’ positive and negative externalities, and thus 
points to the multifaceted impact of social bonds on forms of societal organization. 
The notion of bad civil society, however, reduces civil society to associational life 
and, at the same time, deprives voluntary associations of their intrinsic positive effects on 
democracy. Tocqueville had focused on associational life but also had maintained that 
membership in associations had positive side-effects, namely the formation of a “self-
interest properly understood.” Scholars have legitimately criticized the notion that a 
congruence exists between the internal life of voluntary organizations and democratic 
practices of governance. Nonetheless, they describe the existence of “bad” associations 
rather than of “bad” civil society by using the antinomy “bad civil society.” A positive 
connotation is, by definition, associated with civil society, and these critics correctly 
dismiss the intrinsic positiveness of associational life as a myth but then erroneously 
equate civil society and associational life, hence transferring their criticism of 
associations to civil society in general.       
Furthermore, theoretical tensions partially undermine the usefulness of the 
concept of social capital, and of the distinction between its bonding and bridging form. 
Scholars have pointed to the theoretical contradictions that are rooted in Putnam’s 
adaptation of a sociological concept that had been developed for an individual level of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 21-24. 
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analysis to a collective one.28 Undoubtedly, Putnam has the merit to draw attention to the 
social bonds that undergird the good working of democratic societies. The distinction 
between bonding and bridging social capital is, however, not sufficiently clear, as Mafia-
kind organizations may for example cooperate with Russian organized-crime societies, 
thus also relying on a form of bridging social capital.29  
Conversely, the focus on political institutions points to the state’s key role in 
supporting civil society and creating the framework for its development. In most 
conceptualizations, however, this approach assigns a neutral role to civil society, deprives 
it of its normative value, and links the stability of democratic systems to the strength of 
their political institutions. In so doing, these scholars paradoxically “close the circle” and 
renew the attention to the structural preconditions for democracy, which civil society 
research had originally aspired to complement. Indeed, the civil society debate draws 
attention to the societal dynamics our political societies are rooted in. In fact, the focus on 
civil society had been both the cause and the symptom of changed interpretative 
frameworks guiding the analysis of the relationship between state and forms of societal 
organization. Traditionally, scholars had evaluated states’ stability and performance by 
their level of provision of “political goods.” Hence, they made the collapse and failure of 
a state dependent on its ability to perform certain functions (functional dimension) and to 
maintain an institutional framework (structural dimension).30 The civil society debate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, “Beyond Tocqueville: Civil society and social capital in 
comparative perspective,” The American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 42, no. 1 (1998), 5-20 and Alejandro 
Portes, “The Two Meanings of Social Capital,” Sociological Forum, vol. 15, no. 1 (2000), 1-12.  
29 Amitai Etzioni, “Review: Is Bowling Together Sociologically Lite?” Contemporary Sociology, vol. 30, 
no. 3 (2001), 223-224.  
30 Annette Zimmer and Matthias Freise, “Bringing Society Back: Civil Society, Social Capital, and Third 
Sector,” in Civil Society and Governance in Europe: From National to International Linkages, edited by 
William A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth (Northampton: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008), 19-44 and 
Elizabeth S. Clemens, “The Constitution of Citizens: Political Theories of Nonprofit Organizations,” in The 
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calls attention to those societal dynamics that contribute to the establishment, 
maintaining, and strengthening of democratic states. 
The theoretical debates on civil society stress civil society’s nuanced and 
multilayered conceptual legacy. Theorists viewed civil society as an answer to the 
problems they observed in rapidly modernizing societies, which appeared to break the 
established equilibrium between private interest and the common good. In these 
conceptualizations, civil society always had a positive connotation because it embodied a 
form of societal organization that was able to address the challenges of transformed 
societies. Scholars, however, have struggled in applying such a normatively loaded 
concept to empirical analyses. The challenge for civil society studies is therefore to 
bridge the gap between theory and practice.    
Civil society in Practice: Associational Life and the Weimar Republic 
 
Scholars have developed numerous master narratives detailing the failure of the 
Weimar Republic. These analyses have often overlapped with the broader debate on civil 
society and its relationship with democracy. These studies, however, have not used civil 
society theory to understand the demise of Germany’s first democracy, even in the few 
cases in which they have explicitly used a civil society terminology. The debates on the 
failure of the Weimar Republic therefore tend to reflect (and epitomize) the general 
weakness of civil society studies and fail to close the gap between theory and empirical 
analysis. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Nonprofit Sector. A Research Handbook, 2nd ed., edited by Richard Steinberg and Walter W. Powell (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 207-220. See also Robert I. Rotberg, ed., When States Fail: Causes 
and Consequences (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) and Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause, 
“State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies,” Development 
and Change, vol. 33, no. 5 (2002), 753-774. 
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An influential line of research described the collapse of the Weimar Republic as 
the outcome of a peculiar German historical development. The Sonderweg (special path) 
thesis investigated the long-term causes of the Nazi regime by detailing the divergence of 
the German path from the averred Anglo-Saxon normality.31 These studies emphasized 
the ways a traditional society reacted to the socio-economic and political-structural 
transformations of Imperial Germany. The supporters of the Sonderweg thesis explicitly 
linked the weakness of Germany’s democratic tradition (and hence Weimar’s doomed 
fate) to the weakness of Germany’s middle classes and their associations.32 In particular, 
they viewed the failure of the bourgeois revolution of 1848 as the starting point of 
Germany’s peculiar historical development.33 In so doing, they linked the weakness of a 
German democratic tradition to the weakness of Germany’s bürgerliche Gesellschaft (an 
ambiguous German expression meaning both “civil society” and “bourgeois society”). 
A cohort of Anglo-Saxon historians – in particular Geoff Eley and David 
Blackbourn – criticized the Sonderweg paradigm. Scholars empirically detailed the 
emergence of a bourgeois culture in Imperial Germany and stressed the theoretical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf and the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler laid the bases for the Sonderweg 
thesis in two seminal works. Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Norton & 
Company, 1979 [1965]) and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (New York: Berg, 1985 
[1973]).  
32 Emblematically, Dahrendorf had related his work to Tocqueville’s Democracy in America. Dahrendorf 
stated that his goal was to analyze the reasons why democracy did not set foot in Germany, whereas the 
French nobleman had described why democracy blossomed in America. Dahrendorf, Society and 
Democracy in Germany, 14-15.  
33 More in general, the Sonderweg thesis rested on a set of political (nation-building from above, limited 
parliamentarism, and weak party system during the Empire), cultural (survival of traditional feudal, 
military, and cultural elites) and social factors (the weakness of the middle classes). Good reviews in 
Robert G. Möller, “The Kaiserreich Recast? Continuity and Change in Modern German Historiography,” 
Journal of Social History, vol. 17, no. 4 (1984), 655-683 and Jürgen Kocka, “German History before 
Hitler: The Debate about the German Sonderweg,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 23, no. 1 (1988), 
3-16. 
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inconsistency of a “normal” path to modernity.34 As a result, historians have investigated 
middle classes’ development, associational life, and political culture. Two broad research 
endeavors – the Bielefeld Project and the Frankfurt Project – proposed competing 
definitions of the German middle classes. Nonetheless, both research projects drew 
attention to the significant societal changes in the decades preceding World War One.35 
In fact, the late nineteenth-century associational boom challenged traditional moral 
imperatives because new associations allegedly gave voice to particular interests and to 
previously marginalized groups.36 These transformations heightened the appeal of radical 
nationalism at the turn of the twentieth century.37 
Controversially, however, these scholars entangled the history of the middle 
classes and the development of civil society. In fact, they investigated civil society as part 
of real historical transformations in the context of the history of the middle classes and 
their associations. Hence, these historians have associated a particular segment of society 
with the ideological underpinnings of a normative concept.38 As an ideology or doctrine 
related to democracy, scholars who identify civil society with an empirical part of society 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, The Peculiarities of German History: bourgeois society and politics 
in nineteenth-century Germany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
35 Good reviews in Jonathan Sperber, “Bürgertum, Bürgerlichkeit, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft: Studies of the 
German (Upper) Middle Class and Its Sociocultural World,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 69, no. 2 
(1997), 271-297 and Utz Haltern, “Die Gesellschaft der Bürger,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft, vol. 19, no. 
1 (1993), 100-134.  
36 See Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, “Democracy and Associations in the Long Nineteenth Century: Toward a 
Transnational Perspective,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 75, no. 2 (2003), 269-299, Stefan-Ludwig 
Hoffmann, Civil Society (New York: Pelgrave MacMillan, 2006), and Jürgen Kocka, “The Middle Classes 
in Europe,” The Journal of Modern History, vol. 67, no. 4 (1995), 783-806. 
37 Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right. Radical Nationalism and Political Change after Bismarck 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). 
38 Playing on the ambiguity of the German word “Bürger” (meaning both citizen and bourgeois), Jürgen 
Kocka argues that the histories of civil society and of middle classes (Bürgertum) are profoundly entangled 
until the half of the nineteenth century and then slowly diverged. Nonetheless, he concludes that the 
parallel decline of the Bürgertum and the disappearance of civil society by the late nineteenth century 
support the link between civil society and middle classes. See Jürgen Kocka, Civil Society and Dictatorship 
in Modern German History (Lebanon: University Press of New England, 2010), chapter 2.     
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such as the middle class situate these social groups at the center of a democratic political 
system and thus hand them a crucial function in the establishment of the system itself.39 
With few exceptions, therefore, historians who have used the concept of civil society 
have fallen short of closing the gap between theory and empirical reality.40 
Drawing on this broad empirical literature, Sheri Berman argues that associational 
life in nineteenth-century Germany developed in reaction to the inability or unwillingness 
of political institutions to address citizens’ needs. Germany’s dense network of 
associations provided Nazi activists with organizational skills and, at the same time, 
allowed the National Socialist Party to penetrate all sectors of society. Berman suggests 
that civil society might become an alternative to politics in the presence of weak political 
structures and institutions and, by potentially deepening social cleavages, risks 
undermining the stability of democratic regimes.41 Other scholars have adopted a similar 
perspective and linked the emergence of fascism in inter-war Europe to the tension 
resulting from voluntary associations’ pressures for democracy on relatively closed and 
authoritarian political institutions.42 
Berman’s work had a far-reaching influence on the broader field of civil society 
studies. By debunking the Tocquevillian myth of the intrinsic positiveness of 
associational life, Berman restates the centrality of political institutions over associational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Thomas H. Broman, “Introduction: Some Preliminary Considerations on Science and Civil Society,” 
Osiris, 2nd Series, vol. 17 (2002), 4-5.  
40 Although pointing out these limitations, Frank Trentmann and the contributors to his edited volume have 
also fallen short of closing the gap between theory and historical research. Frank Trentmann, ed., 
Paradoxes of Civil Society. New Perspectives on Modern German and British History, rev. ed. (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2003).  
41 Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 401-429. 
42 Dylan Riley, The Civic Foundations of Fascism: Italy, Spain and Romania, 1870-1945 (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
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dynamics in the context of societal transformations and processes of democratization.43 In 
so doing, however, Berman downgrades civil society to a neutral social structure that 
gains its significance from the surrounding political system. Paradoxically, therefore, 
Berman stripps associational live of its normative dimension and consequentially equated 
civil society with associational life without its positive functions, which had justified the 
identification of civil society and voluntary associations.     
As a result, Berman – perhaps unwillingly – reopened a debate on the “right” 
nature of civil society organizations. Bernd Reiter, for example, contests Berman’s 
argument and criticizes the shift in focus from civil society to political institutions. By 
viewing Prussian militarism as the main feature first of Imperial Germany and later of the 
Weimar Republic, Reiter contends that a strong anti-democratic and militaristic approach 
characterized Weimar’s civic associations.44 Similarly, Frank Bösch argues that 
associational life increasingly fostered a “militant sociability” (militante Geselligkeit) 
under the influence of the German Revolution and the Versailles Treaty during the 1920s. 
Militant sociability played a crucial role in the development of a bourgeois associational 
life, and was associated with masculinity and used as a substitute for military service.45  
Undoubtedly, these studies have the merit to offer a more nuanced understanding 
of associational dynamics and to warn against overly optimistic Tocquevillian notions of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 See also Berman, “Civil Society and Political Institutionalism,” 562-574. 
44 Bernd Reiter, “Civil Society and Democracy: Weimar Reconsidered,” Journal of Civil Society, vol. 5, no. 
1 (2009), 21-34. 
45 Frank Bösch, “Militante Geselligkeit. Formierungsformen der bürgerlichen Vereinswelt zwischen 
Revolution und Nationalsozialismus,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft, vol. 21 (2005), 158-166. 
Other authors have stressed the violent nature of conservative middle class organizations. See Sven 
Reichardt, “Gewalt, Körper, Politik. Paradoxien in der deutschen Kulturgeschichte der 
Zwischenkriegszeit,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft. Sonderheft, vol. 21 (2005), 205-239 and Bernd 
Weisbrod, “The Crisis of Bourgeois Society in Interwar Germany,” in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: 
Comparisons and Contrasts, edited by Richard Bessel (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 23-
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civil society. By focusing on associational structures, their outlook, and their relation to 
political institutions, however, these scholars tend to equate civil society with 
associational life. In the case of Berman, this equation leads to a dropping of the “civil” 
in favor of the socio-political structure. By contrast, scholars emphasizing the “nature” of 
associations establish (artificial) criteria of exclusion, which often are based more on the 
rhetoric than on the practice of violence.46 Like the theoretical approaches to civil 
society, these studies fall short of closing the gap between theoretical conceptualizations 
and empirical realities. In particular, these scholars have not analyzed the complex 
processes by which German elites developed alternative and contrasting forms of societal 
organizations, which gradually rejected the liberal balance between democracy, 
individualism, and associational life.   
In this study, I analyze civil society beyond the relationship to associational life 
and institutional framework. Considering civil society part of a debate over the tensions 
between private interest and the common good blurs the lines between democratic and 
undemocratic solutions. In fact, the complexity of the Weimar Republic stems from the 
difficulty of juxtaposing different forms of societal organization on the basis of their 
democratic/undemocratic character. The specific social context of Imperial Germany and 
the Weimar Republic led contemporaries to analyze – and perhaps exaggerate – the 
tension between private interest and the common good. The inability of conceptually as 
well as practically solving this tension eventually contributed to tearing apart Weimar 
society. Civil society, a product of modernity, paved the path in the 1920s to the 
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homogenizing project of the “people’s community” (Volksgemeinschaft), the pathological 
product of modernity. 
The Praxis of Civil Society 
 
In this study, I draw on Detlev Peukert’s influential analysis of the Weimar 
Republic. Peukert decoupled the notion of progress from the concept of modernity, and 
hence examined the modernity of the Weimar Republic from the perspective of a modern 
understanding of the human condition. Peukert described the Weimar years as a “crisis of 
classical modernity” and National Socialism as one possible outcome of the “pathologies 
of modernity.”47 Hence, he gave the Weimar Republic its autonomous place in German 
history despite its short history. Furthermore, Peukert’s work pointed to the need to 
analyze the ambiguity of modernity, to focus on the tension between contrasting solutions 
to the crisis of modernity, and to challenge conventional narratives of crisis and inject a 
sense of contingency into the picture of the Weimar Republic.48    
Both Peukert’s emphasis on the “crises of modernity” and the recent works on 
Weimar’s pluralistic political culture offer a framework to a civil society approach to the 
crisis of Germany’s inter-war democracy. By analyzing politicians, intellectuals, and 
journalists, scholars have suggested that the term “crisis” in Weimar Germany had not a 
pessimistic connotation, but rather indicated an optimistic vision of the future amid 
changing and uncertain times. Against this background, intellectuals and politicians 
across the political spectrum tended to develop “rhetorical construction of a mutually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Detlev Peukert, The Weimar Republic: the Crisis of Classical Modernity (New York: Hill & Wang, 
1992). 
48 Anthony McElligott, ed., Weimar Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), David L. 
Marshall, “Intellectual History of the Weimar Republic – Recent Research,” Intellectual History Review, 
vol. 20, no. 4 (2010), 503-517, and Benjamin Ziemann, “Review Article. Weimar was Weimar: Politics, 
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exclusive alternative for Germany’s future development,” around an exclusive “either-or” 
framework. The construction of these radical dichotomies defined the present as a time of 
decision and, by presenting “horror-scenarios” as an alternative, they aimed to motivate 
and push people to action.49 From this perspective, the concept of civil society provides a 
useful framework for an analysis of the debates over forms of societal organizations in 
the Weimar Republic. 
I view civil society as comprising a set of institutions and a political conduct.50 I 
define this mode of political action as the “politics of civility,” the praxis of civil society. 
This political praxis is rooted in the understanding that socio-political conflicts cannot be 
avoided in modern societies. I view therefore civil society as rooted in a peculiar attitude 
to conflict. Conflicts have a positive social function when they break the exclusive hold 
of ascribed identities on human action.51 Civil society therefore recognizes conflicts and 
multiplies them because the existence of exclusive socio-moral cleavage lines would 
disrupt the stability of modern societies, as Adam Smith and the authors of the Federalist 
Papers had recognized.  
Civil society therefore cannot be limited to self-organization, as it is rooted in the 
notion of civility and civil action. Civility, politeness, and tolerance are the foundational 
blocks of civil society because they provide the means to counter the disrupting 	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European History, vol. 43, issue 4 (2010), 604-605. See also Rüdiger Graf, Die Zukunft der Weimarer 
Republik: Krisen und Zukunftsaneignungen in Deutschland 1918-1933 (Munich: Oldenburg, 2008), Moritz 
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Edward Shils, “Civility and Civil Society: Good Manners Between Persons and Concern for the Common 
Good in Public Affairs,” in The Virtue of Civility. Selected Essays on Liberalism, Tradition, and Civil 
Society, edited by Steven Grosby (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997), 63-103.  
51 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), 67-85. 
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tendencies of modern societies. Crucially, civility is a socio-political principle that 
counterbalances self-interest, thus ordering society, ensuring its stability, and averting the 
dangers of factionalism and sectarianism.52 Civility therefore mediates between private 
interest and the common good. 
The stability of liberal states thus depends on their ability to institutionalize 
conflicts.53 The institutionalization of conflicts, however, presupposes a “politics of 
civility” at the individual level. In fact, individuals have to consider the socio-political 
enemy as a socio-political adversary to whom equal rights are granted.54 The politics of 
civility thus presupposes a particular vision of politics. In fact, the acceptance of conflict 
requires that individuals view politics in economic terms, hence through the lenses 
exchange, scarcity, and alternatives. Compromise is accepted and differences can be 
negotiated, split, and reduced.55  
The relationship between the civil society debate, which is centered on the tension 
between private interest and common good, and a liberal democracy is based on a 
conceptualization of civility as the recognition of differences and conflicts. Civil society 
is closely related to the process of modernization because the “virtue of civility” breaks 
the exclusive ties of family, tribe, and religion. Civil society is therefore a form of 
societal organization that is juxtaposed to sectarian or religious notions of politics, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 In his works on moral philosophy and political economy, Smith identified moral principles such as 
sympathy and fellow-feeling as counterbalances to self-interest, thus ordering society and ensuring its 
stability and civility. The tendency to sympathize with those familiar to us underlined, however, the 
dangers of factionalism and sectarianism. This tension could be solved only through the “impartial 
spectator,” which emphasized the necessity of observing actions from outside and thus provided the 
prerequisite for the development of the concepts of civility and moral compass. Adam Smith, The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1976). 
53 Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany, 28-30. 
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Tradition, and Civil Society, edited by Steven Grosby (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1997), 338-341. 
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are rooted in the sacredness and non-negotiability of the “idea.” Paradoxically, however, 
both forms of societal organization are grounded in the process of individuation that 
accompanies modernization. In fact, both civil society with its attempt to balance 
society’s competing interests and “sectarian” approaches with their emphasis on extra-
political or pre-political notions of unity and homogeneity reacted to the social 
fragmentation of modern societies.56      
Accordingly, I define civil society as an open public sphere outside state 
boundaries that, by institutionalizing and thus mediating between competing interests, 
allows individuals to participate in debates over the common good without being 
constrained by primordial (family, clan-based, or tribal) or sectarian ties. I suggest that in 
order to effectively support democracy, civil society is based on and recognizes conflict. 
In doing so, I distinguish civil society from a simple network of voluntary associations 
because it institutionalizes and mediates between conflicting interests. It is normatively 
defined as a sphere that not only goes beyond economic self-interests but also breaks the 
exclusive boundaries of family, clan, tribe, and religious community.  
In this context, philanthropy plays a key role in shaping civil society. By 
definition, it represents a locus where individual actions intersect broader societal 
dynamics. Philanthropy is both an expression of identity, that is, of the self, and of the 
capacity to identify with the other.57 Consequently, philanthropy contributes to establish 
those social bonds that bridge traditional socio-cultural divides, thus preventing the 	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Penguin Books, 1996) and Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1983).  
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solidification and atrophying of the exclusive identities of family, tribe, and religious 
community. In doing so, philanthropy is a foundational block of the politics of civility as 
it establishes, maintains, and strengthens those social bonds that hold modern societies 
together by countering the individualist tendencies of modern, complex societies. 
Furthermore, as this study will show, philanthropy supports the development of forms of 
political engagement outside formal political action. Philanthropy may support socio-
political perspectives otherwise unrepresented within official political institutions, thus 
guaranteeing political pluralism. 
Through an historical perspective, I investigate the inability of conceptions of 
civil society rooted in an acceptance of conflict to provide a solution to the tension 
between private interest and the common good in rapidly modernizing societies such as 
Germany at the turn of the twentieth century. Therefore, I analyze the disappearance of 
the civil society concept from the political vocabulary at the turn of the twentieth century. 
Germany’s inter-war democracy offers a perfect vantage point to understand the dark 
sides of modernization and the limits of civil society’s liberal project. 
Political Education and the Politics of Civility: The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik 
and the Politische Kolleg 
 
The analysis of the praxis of civil society ought to focus on the processes by 
which theoretical constructs are transferred to society at large. The politics of civility is 
not simply the product of historical developments, as some of the most prominent 
scholars in the field have argued.58 In fact, I view civility as an ethos and attitude that can 
be taught and learned. In this study, I focus on public intellectuals who sought solutions 	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to the tension between private interest and the common good in Germany’s radicalized 
public sphere. The analysis of the praxis of civil society, however, entails a focus on the 
means by which theorists transferred their conceptions of forms of societal organization 
to the world of practice. 
An intellectual history of civil society and rival forms of societal organization is 
only fruitful when it highlights the areas where the work of the abstract theorist overlaps 
practical experimentations. Accordingly, I focus on those theorists and intellectuals who 
were active at the critical juncture between the academic world of theory and practical, 
organizational experimentations. In so doing, I follow the lead of Jan-Werner Müller who 
has drawn attention to those theorists and “in-between figures” who mediated between 
political ideologies and the political justifications that these ideologies needed in order to 
validate themselves in front of the masses.59 Germany’s public intellectuals therefore 
provide a vantage point for the study of the praxis of civil society.   
The intellectuals and their organizations at the center of this study serve as an 
historical case study for the analysis of the praxis of civil society in the Weimar Republic. 
The circle that formed around Ernst Jäckh grounded parliamentary democracy in the 
“politics of civility” and in an economic picture of politics. In fact, they emphasized 
willingness to accept conflicts, readiness to compromise, and inclination to negotiate 
differences. In so doing, they attempted to insert a civil society discourse in Germany’s 
contentious public sphere. By contrast, the circle that formed around Arthur Moeller van 
den Bruck, Max H. Boehm, and Heinrich von Gleichen proposed forms of societal 
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organizations that consciously sought to avert modern societies’ socio-political conflicts. 
They did not accept the new liberal state and its institutions because the political process 
risked compromising the purity of the idea. Consequently, they favored socio-political 
systems that bypassed existing political institutions and created new channels of power 
that consciously avoided contrasting interests.     
Both groups of intellectuals viewed the collapse of Imperial Germany in 1918 as a 
new beginning. They concurred on the need for a more democratic and inclusive society, 
although they disagreed on the form of government, and specifically on a liberal 
republican model. The simultaneous use of a democratic terminology, however, points to 
quite different meanings assigned to the concept of democracy (synchronic perspective). 
In fact, the intellectuals around Jäckh rooted democracy in a pluralistic vision of society, 
although they were not immune to ambivalences. By contrast, the intellectuals around the 
Moeller-Bruck and Gleichen rejected visions of society based on a multitude of 
independent individuals and proposed organic models of societal organization, which 
they deemed more democratic because naturally integrating the individual into the whole. 
These differences notwithstanding, both groups of intellectuals placed the “people” 
(Volk) at the center of their conceptualization.   
As a result, political education became the answer to the problems of a 
democratizing society for both groups. Indeed, while these intellectuals notably differed 
in their analysis of German society and in the solutions they proposed, they shared the 
intention of transforming into reality ideological conceptualizations and saw – at least 
temporarily – the most promising tool to influence public affairs as well as political 
discourse in educational institutes and political education. Therefore, I use two 
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educational institutes as the center and point of reference of the two circles of 
intellectuals analyzed in this study. 
The group that gradually formed around Jäckh is at the center of this study. Jäckh 
became the midpoint of a circle of liberal reformers in the aftermath of the death of 
Friedrich Naumann in August 1919. Jäckh’s centrality, however, was silent and behind 
the curtain, although he egotistically prided himself on having a central, unofficial role in 
political decision-making. In fact, he was a skilful organizer and able manager of 
organizations rather than a sophisticated ideologue or theorist. In reality, therefore, the 
organizations that Jäckh founded over the course of his life were the point of reference of 
the intellectuals at the center of this study, rather than Jäckh himself. 
Jäckh possessed an unmatched ability to co-opt personalities from all walks of life 
for his endeavors. Theodor Heuss’s case is emblematic. Heuss had been the editor-in-
chief of the Necker Zeitung in Heilbronn since 1912. In 1917, Jäckh called him to Berlin 
where he offered him a “double position” as editor of the magazine Deutsche Politik and 
as collaborator of the Werkbund (German Association of Craftsmen). In January 1918, 
Jäckh introduced Heuss to the circle around the renowned historian Hans Delbrück (the 
“Delbrück-Evenings”) and, in the same month, Heuss also joined the “German Society 
1914.”60 Heuss, who considered Jäckh in possession of “extraordinary organizational 
skills,”61 described the impact with the “Jäckh-enterprise” as being caught in a “precise 
bureaucracy like in a web.”62 The case of Heuss (who after World War Two would 
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become Germany’s first federal president) confirms Jäckh’s central role in Berlin’s 
political circles. 
The public intellectuals that were associated with Jäckh’s most prestigious 
endeavor are at the center of this study. In the fall of 1920, Jäckh founded Germany’s 
first school of public affairs, the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik (German School of 
Politics, or DHfP). Jäckh was successful in involving numerous public figures in his 
venture, who were all actively participating in the public debates of the time. While their 
understanding of democracy and analysis of Weimar society’s problems would 
significantly vary, they shared an understanding of the role of the public intellectual in 
Germany’s public sphere. With few exceptions, these intellectuals avoided direct 
involvement with the political process and favored indirect forms of influence on public 
affairs.63 As their involvement with the DHfP will clearly show, these intellectuals 
viewed informed and objective debates as the solution to the tensions of German society 
and as the best way to shape public opinion by bypassing the slogans and propaganda of 
political parties.  
Scholars have analyzed the German School of Politics from two main 
perspectives. In the aftermath of the Second World War historians have stressed the 
democratic nature of the DHfP, as part of a general eagerness to identify democratic 
forces in pre-1933 Germany.64 This narrative paved the path to more critical analyses that 
stressed the ambiguities of the DHfP and of German political sciences. Scholars 	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dismissed the myth of the DHfP both as a democratic stronghold and as a locus of the 
development of a democratic-oriented political science. By drawing on two dissertations, 
political scientist Rainer Eisfeld challenged the positive image of the DHfP and 
uncovered Jäckh’s ambivalent attitude toward the National Socialist regime.65 This 
critical literature, however, primarily focuses on the development of German political 
sciences. In fact, these scholars point out the limits of political science’s 
professionalization, the thematic shift toward the right by the early 1930s, and the 
School’s continuities between its Weimar and Nazi phases (in terms of teaching, 
research, and personnel).66  
Scholars have overlooked, however, the central concern of these intellectuals by 
emphasizing the question of the development of political science over the pedagogical 
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for a New Germany, 1920-1933, dissertation thesis (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1978) and Roswitha 
Wollkopf, Zur Politischen Konzeption und Wirksamkeit der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920-1933), 
dissertation thesis (Berlin: Humboldt University, 1983). While Korenblat made extensive use of archival 
sources located in the United States (in particular the files made available by the Rockefeller Archive 
Center and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Wollkopf – an East German historian – had 
access to archival sources located in East Germany and thus inaccessible to western scholars. Among 
Rainer Eisfeld’s publications see Ausgebürgert und doch angebräunt. Deutsche Politikwissenschaft, 1920-
1945 (Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991) and “Nationale Politikwissenschaft von der 
Weimarer Republick zum Dritten Reich,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 31, no. 2 (1990), 241-243. 
66 On the continuities between the Weimar and the National Socialist periods see Hubertus Buchstein and 
Gerhardt Göhler, “In der Kontinuität einer ‘braunen’ Politikwissenschaft? – Empirische Befunde und 
Forschungsdesiderate,” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, vol. 27, issue 3 (1986), 330-340 and Ernst Haiger, 
“Politikwissenschaft und Auslandwissenschaft im ‘Dritten Reich.’ (Deutsche) Hochschule für Politik 1933-
1939 und Auslandwissenschaftliche Fakultät der Berliner Universität 1940-1945,” in Kontinuitäten und 
Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft, edited by Gerhard Göhler and Bodo Zeuner (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), 94-136. On the professionalization and conservative thematic shift see 
Detlef Lehnert, “‘Politik als Wissenschaft.’ Beiträge zur Institutionalisierung einer Fachdisziplin in 
Forschung und Lehre der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (1920-1933),” Politische Vierteljahresschrift, 
vol. 30, issue 3 (1989), 443-465 and Alfons Söllner, “Gruppenbild mit Jäckh. Anmerkungen zur 
‘Verwissenschaftlichung’ der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik während der Weimarer Republik,” in 
Kontinuitäten und Brüche in der deutschen Politikwissenschaft, edited by Gerhard Göhler and Bodo Zeuner 
(Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991), 41-64. The most nuanced account is Steven Korenblat, 
“A School for the Republic? Cosmopolitans and Their Enemies at the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 
1920-1933,” Central European History 39 (2006), 394-430. In a recent volume, Siegfried Mielke attempted 
to reappraise the DHfP, see Einzigartig. Dozenten, Studenten und Repräsentanten der Deutschen 
Hochschule für Politik (1920-1933) im Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus. Begleitband zur 
Ausstellung (Berlin: Lukas Verlag, 2006). 
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role of politics in the conception of the founding group of the DHfP.67 These public 
intellectuals aimed both to rebuild Germany in the aftermath of the lost war and to re-
elevate Germany to her natural role in the international community, as was repeatedly 
stressed on the occasion of the DHfP’s opening ceremony.68 To this end, these reformers 
momentarily abandoned Germany’s traditional emphasis on foreign policy and focused 
on German society’s internal fragmentation. They viewed internal solidarity and sense of 
community as the precondition for a renewed possibility of world power politics. This 
focus, however, was not a product of the Great War but rather part of the tradition of 
Friedrich Naumann’s national socialism.69 These intellectuals attempted to insert a civil 
discourse into the Weimar Republic’s radicalized public sphere by conceptualizing 
politics as an objective science providing a common ground for sober political debates 
across opposing political factions.              
The originality of the intellectuals around Jäckh emerges from a comparison with 
the circle that gradually formed around Moeller-Bruck and Gleichen. These intellectuals 
had not been politically active before the war. Rather, the experience of the “civic peace” 
and the shock of the Bolshevik threat influenced their theoretical approaches. This 
network was rooted in the web of war propaganda organizations that initially had been 
directed against the Western powers and – by the end of the war – against the communist 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 To my knowledge, the only brief analysis focusing on the pedagogical work of the DHfP is Reinhard 
Vent, “Überparteiliche ‘Politische Propädeutik.’ Eine Konzeption zur politischen Bildung aus der Endphase 
der Weimarer Republik,” Die Deutsche Schule, vol. 76 (1984), 283-294.  
68 The speeches held on occasion of the DHfP’s opening ceremony are in Politische Bildung: Wille, Wesen, 
Ziel, Weg. Sechs Reden gehalten bei der Erӧffnung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (Berlin: Deutsche 
Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1921).   
69 Friedrich Naumann was one of the founding fathers of the German liberal movement and a mentor for 
many of the intellectuals at the center of this study. In the two decades preceding World War One, he 
popularized the notion of a national socialism that could integrate the working classes into German society 
by appealing to their nationalism. By the end World War One, political and intellectual elites had grown 
aware of the mobilizing potential of nationalism and socialism. The Nazi movement was thus only one of 
multiple efforts to combine nationalism and socialism in order to mobilize the working classes by breaking 
the internationalism of Marxist thought. 
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threat. The experience within the official and unofficial propaganda apparatus of the 
German army contributed to the emergence of a new type of “professional” intellectual 
who had to rely on the market in order to find a space in Germany’s new public sphere.   
Moeller-Bruck and Max H. Boehm were the ideologues of the group and aimed to 
renew the conservative movement. Moeller-Bruck rarely spoke in public and, rather, 
guided the circle by his mere presence.70 By contrast, Boehm aimed to preserve 
“intellectual clarity and truth” and, “for the sake of the purity of the right ideas,” would 
reject and expel people from the circle for the fear of compromising the original message 
of the group.71 Boehm symbolically personifies the religious vision of politics that 
characterizes this group of intellectuals. In fact, they juxtaposed the purity and sacredness 
of the idea to the willingness to compromise and to the liberal political system’s lack of 
political direction, which they believed the Jäckh group personified.   
In the first years Gleichen was the midpoint of this milieu because of his skills as 
an organizer and manager of organizations. He established the “June Club,” which 
rapidly became the core of the circle. The Club actively aimed to bridge the political and 
religious lines dividing German society and aimed to influence public affairs through 
publicist activities. In particular, the magazine Gewissen provided a platform for 
participation in public affairs while avoiding direct involvement with political parties. 
The Gewissen offered an ideal place for political engagement because it was conceived as 
non-partisan and “above” political parties, it was a platform for communication for 
personal viewpoints, and was embedded in Weimar’s political culture by criticizing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Max Hildebert Boehm, “Moeller van den Bruck im Kreise seiner politischen Freunde,” Deutsches 
Volkstum, vol. 14 (1932), 694. 
71 Eduard Stadtler, Als Antibolschewist, 1918-1919 (Düsseldorf: Neuer Zeitverlag, 1935), 129.
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contemporary events and longing for unity.72 The most promising endeavor of these 
intellectuals, however, became the Politische Kolleg (Political College, or PK), through 
which they attempted to transform into reality their theoretical constructs.   
Historians have analyzed the Politische Kolleg as part of the larger intellectual 
movement referred to as conservative revolution, neo-conservatism, and young-
conservatism. Armin Mohler has introduced the apparent antinomy of “conservative 
revolution,” which has been used to identify a group of intellectuals conceptually placed 
between National Socialism and conservative reactionarism.73 Scholars have used a wide 
range of approaches to analyze this heterogeneous intellectual nebula, alternatively 
focusing on individual biographies, organizational networks, and theoretical 
frameworks.74 Scholars do not only disagree on the common ground that – beyond 
individual differences – unifies the intellectuals of the “conservative revolution” but also 
on whether these intellectuals form a consistent group.75 In addition, historians disagree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Claudia Kemper, Das “Gewissen” 1919-1925. Kommunikation und Vernetzung der Jungkonservativen 
(München: Oldenbourg Verlag, 2011), 220-221.  
73 Armin Mohler, Die konservative Revolution in Deutschland, 1918-1932. Ein Handbuch, third edition 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989). 
74 For a focus on media see for example Kemper, Das “Gewissen” 1919-1925 and Karlheinz Weißmann, 
“Das ‘Gewissen’ und der ‘Ring’ – Entstehung und Entwicklung des jungkonservativen ‘Zentralorgans’ der 
Weimarer Republik,” in Konservative Zeitschriften zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur. Fünf Fallstudien, 
edited by Hans-Christof Kraus (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2003), 115-154. For a biographical focus see 
for example: Sebastian Maass, Kämpfer um ein drittes Reich: Arthur Moeller van den Bruck und sein Kreis 
(Kiel: Regin-Verlag, 2010) and Gabriele Clemens, Martin Spahn und der rechts Catholizismus in der 
Weimarer Republik (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1983). 
75 While Mohler identifies as the common element of the conservative revolution a conceptualization of 
time that rejected a linear time, Breuer rejects the notion of conservative revolution because of the absence 
of agreement beyond a rejection of liberalism among these intellectuals. Mohler, Die konservative 
Revolution in Deutschland and Stefan Breuer, Anatomie der konservativen Revolution (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993). In addition, from a Marxist perspective, Petzold describes the 
young conservatives as part of a strategy of a pragmatic wing of the monopolist capitalism that – aware of 
the limits of capitalism – employed different strategies to maintain a capitalist society and avoid – at the 
same time – revolutionary upheavals. Joachim Petzold, Wegbereiter des deutschen Faschismus. Die Jung-
Konservativen in der Weimarer Republik (Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein Verlag, 1983). Lastly, in a recent 
volume, Berthold Petzinna characterized Arthur Moeller van den Bruck – the silent center of the young 
conservatives – as an example of “aesthetic opposition.” Berthold Petzinna, Erziehung zum deutschen 
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on the relationship between these intellectuals and, on the one hand, traditional 
conservatism and, on the other, National Socialism.76    
The common denominator of these two circles was the clear intention to influence 
public policy and shape public opinion. Their activities did not remain confined to 
theoretical debates, but consistently spilled over to the world of practice and of 
practitioners. With few exceptions, both circles did not include original thinkers or 
theorists. For example, Heuss re-elaborated the political thought of Friedrich Naumann 
and Max Weber. Similarly, in his memoirs, Moritz J. Bonn defined himself as a 
“speaking tube to convey hints for unscrambling history.”77 Moeller-Bruck and Boehm 
were the official ideologues of the June-Club, but the originality and the coherence of 
their thought may be questioned. Therefore, these intellectuals primarily interpreted, 
transmitted, and simplified complex ideological systems, without necessarily contributing 
to their development. Most importantly, however, they attempted to transform into reality 
these conceptualizations, and political education as well as educational institutes would 
become a crucial tool in these efforts. 
Since the constitutional debates in the spring of 1919, the United States had 
become a point of reference for liberals’ search for models of societal organization able 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Lebensstil: Ursprung und Entwicklung des Jungkonservativen “Ring”-Kreises, 1918-1933 (Berlin: 
Akademie Verlag, 2000). 
76 From the perspective of the Sonderweg thesis, some scholars have described the Nazi regime as part of a 
long Volkisch and undemocratic German tradition and – not surprisingly – placed Arthur Moeller van den 
Bruck and other intellectuals of his circle in this broader tradition. See for example George L. Mosse, The 
Crisis of German Ideology. Intellectual origins of the Third Reich (New York: Howard Fertig, 1997 
[1964]), Kurt Sonheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik (München: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1978 [1962]), and Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: a study in the Rise of 
German Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974 [1961]). By contrast, Mohler and 
Klemens van Klemperer saw in the young conservatives a new type of conservatism that – in spite of some 
individual overlaps – had to be separated from National Socialism. See Mohler, Die konservative 
Revolution in Deutschland and Klemens von Klemperer, Germany’s New Conservatism. Its History and 
Dilemma in the Twentieth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968 [1957]). 
77 Moritz J. Bonn, Wandering Scholar (New York: J. Day, 1948), 316.    
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to guarantee levels of individual liberty while strengthening the national bonds of 
Germany’s fragmented society.78 At the same time, American philanthropists’ and 
foundations’ officials’ open sympathies and – at times – unrealistic hopes in Germany’s 
political leadership before the war had paved the road to hostility and enmity during the 
war. Against this background, the relationship between American philanthropic 
foundations and the leadership of the DHfP serves as an historical case study for the 
analysis of the (asymmetric) connections between American ideals of democratic 
processes and the realities of the German political system, and hence raises more general 
questions about the role of trans-national philanthropy in support of democracy and civil 
society. 
Robert Arnove and the contributors to his influential edited volume argue that 
philanthropic foundations “have played the role of unofficial planning agencies for both a 
national American society and an increasingly interconnected world-system with the 
United States at its center.” By using a Gramscian approach, the authors use the notion of 
“Cultural Imperialism” to capture the ethnocentrism of the elites who controlled U.S. 
philanthropic foundations, their use of political and economic power to spread their 
“culture,” and the relationships between their educational policies and concepts such as 
“classical colonialism,” “internal colonialism” and “neocolonialism.”79 Undoubtedly, the 
merit of these and similar contributions lies in drawing attention to inevitable power 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 For the fascination of German elites with American models see Mary Nolan, Visions of Modernity: 
American Business and the Modernization of Germany (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) and 
Charles S. Maier, In Search of Stability. Explorations in Historical Political Economy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987).   
79 Robert F. Arnove, ed., Philanthropy and Cultural Imperialism: The Foundations at Home and Abroad 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 2 and 17.  
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dynamics at play in the relationship between grantors and grantees, which – as these 
scholars claim – much of the earlier literature had consciously downplayed.80  
A second – often overlooked – merit of this critical turn in the literature was to 
spur a new interest in the activities of philanthropic foundations. Although primarily 
focusing on the American context, Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz convincingly have 
dismissed Gramscian as well as Foucaultian interpretative models.81 Karl, in particular, 
has argued that philanthropic foundations’ main role was the training of leadership when 
industrialization and massification of society weakened the balance between democracy 
and mass society.82 Nonetheless, Inderjeet Parmar’s recent work testifies to the 
attractiveness – and ultimately also to the theoretical fruitfulness – of more nuanced and 
sophisticated critical approaches.83 As Katharina Rietzler, however, suggests in a recent 
review, the limited use of non-American sources constrains much of the literature on 
philanthropic foundations.84     
While scholars have investigated the institutional development of the DHfP and 
the contribution of American philanthropy, less attention has been paid to placing the 
relationship between German thought-leaders and American philanthropy beyond the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Merle Curti is rightly considered a pioneering figure in the field of philanthropic studies. His work, 
however, was part of a project on the history of American philanthropy at the University of Wisconsin 
supported by a Ford Foundation grant. Therefore, it has been suggested that, as a result of the power 
dynamics between grantor and grantee, he uncritically assumed the altruistic and disinterested motives of 
American international philanthropy. Merle Curti, American Philanthropy Abroad (New Brunswick: 
Rutgers University Press, 1963). 
81 Barry D. Karl and Stanley N. Katz, “Foundations and Ruling Class Elite,” Daedalus, vol. 116 (1987), 1-
40. 
82 Barry D. Karl, “Philanthropy and the Maintenance of Democratic Elites,” Minerva, vol. 35 (1997), 207-
220.  
83 Inderjeet Parmar, Foundations of the American Century. The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller 
Foundations in the Rise of American Power (New York: Columbia University Press 2012). 
84 Katharina Rietzler, “Rezension zu: Philanthropy in America. A History und Foundations of the American 
Century. The Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller Foundations in the Rise of American Power,” H-Soz-u-Kult, 
(February 26, 2013), http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-berlin.de/rezensionen/2013-1-127. 
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level of the DHfP and its institutional existence (1920-1933).85 By integrating traditional 
printed primary sources and archival materials, I provide a more nuanced understanding 
of the interactions between international philanthropy, political culture, and practical 
experimentations in Germany in the first three decades of the twentieth century. In 
addition, the focus on Ernst Jäckh offers fresh insights on the activities of American 
philanthropic foundations in Germany’s contentious public sphere.   
Methodology and Sources 
 
In this study I focus on civil society by integrating political theory and empirical 
analysis. The intellectuals at the center of this study were critical figures at the 
intersection of the practice of politics and the theory of politics. The DHfP and the PK 
provide a fruitful vantage point for an investigation of the praxis of civil society. These 
two institutes, however, only represent the midpoint of the two circles of intellectuals at 
the center of this study and are the place where theoretical constructs intersected practical 
experimentations. Therefore, this study focuses on two levels of analysis. On the one 
hand, I investigate the contrasting forms of societal organizations that these intellectuals 
proposed. On the other hand, I focus on the organizational activities of these thought 
leaders. Consequently, I analyze the processes by which a conception of civil society 
paved the path to a radically different form of societal organization under the Nazi regime 
through the prism of these two groups of thought leaders.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 The institutional history of the DHfP has received much attention during the 1980s and 1990s. The 
records of the Rockefeller Archive Center, however, have been used only to complement other archival 
material in order to write a more comprehensive history of Jäckh’s institute. While these scholars have 
provided a better picture of the institutional development of the DHfP, they have not placed – and in truth 
this was not the goal of these studies – the relationship between American foundations and DHfP in the 
broader “philanthropic dynamic” of grantors and grantees.       
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This study relies on historical comparisons. The investigation of the PK and its 
leadership serves as a comparative reference point that aims to highlight the peculiarity of 
the conception of civil society developed by the intellectual circle that gradually formed 
around the DHfP. In particular, this comparison points to radically contrasting 
understandings of democracy, nonpartisanship, and role of politics in modern societies. 
Conversely, this comparison also stresses certain topoi in public discourse and partially 
narrows the gap between democratic and allegedly un-democratic solutions to the 
tensions of German society. A comparison is asymmetrical when one of the comparative 
points is merely sketched rather than investigated in depth – the intellectuals around the 
PK in the case of this study.86 This asymmetrical comparison serves to point the attention 
to the broader specificity of the role of the Jäckh circle. 
An investigation of the praxis of civil society and of democratization processes 
requires a particular attention to periodization.87 Periodization dates may be quite 
arbitrary dates that attempt to identify moments of discontinuity or change in the flow of 
time. In this study I move beyond the institutional existence of the DHfP and the PK. The 
activities of these intellectuals during World War One and after 1933 shed light on both 
the emergence and the fading of certain conceptions of civil society. Furthermore, I move 
beyond the traditional limits of periodization in historical approaches to democratization 
processes. In fact, as Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt suggest, the analysis of single 
democratic institutions rather than on conventional turning points allows to focus on 
critical junctures within larger processes of change, thus “leaving open the possibility that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 See Jürgen Kocka, “Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: The Case of the German Sonderweg,” History 
and Theory, vol. 38, no. 1 (1999), 40-50.  
87 On the importance of periodization in social research see Arthur L. Stinchcombe, The Logic of Social 
Research (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005), 117-148 and 130-135. 
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democratic reforms may stall or come under retrenchment.”88 Consequently, I analyze 
crucial periods of change and factors that are not necessarily associated with the 
momentous years of 1918 and 1933. Consequentially, after briefly contextualizing the 
experience of these intellectuals in Imperial Germany, this study analyzes these elites’ 
activities and conceptualizations from the early days of World War One to their 
experience under the Nazi regime or in exile.  
The analysis of the praxis of civil society must consider theoretical 
conceptualizations. The focus on conceptions of civil society and of rival forms of 
societal organization is based on a future-oriented rather than past-oriented perspective. 
The theoretical constructs and the rhetorical choices of these intellectuals provide 
important insights. These intellectuals viewed war and revolution as a “crisis” that freed 
Germany from the last vestiges of Imperial Germany and opened the road to new 
possibilities. Both groups employed an exclusionary rhetoric that explicitly juxtaposed 
their conceptualizations and educational institutes. In so doing, they created an “either-
or” narrative that aimed to validate their own proposals of societal organizations by 
denigrating alternatives. In this way, this study places the concept of civil society in a 
general narrative of crisis and anxiety, which – however – assumed the possibility to 
influence future societal developments.  
Accordingly, I use as key primary sources the major publications of the 
intellectuals who saw their institutional point of reference in either the PK or the DHfP. 
Published as well as unpublished texts such as speeches, memoranda, newspaper articles, 
and letters require – particularly in the field of political culture – critical reading and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New 
Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond,” Comparative Political Studies, vol. 43, no. 8/9 (2010), 942. 
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interpretation.89 In political discourse, concepts such as democracy, parliamentarism, and 
nonpartisanship (just to mention a few) are not only loaded with meanings that have 
evolved over time but also tend to assume different and often contrasting meanings at 
certain historical junctures.  
The focus on political culture and political discourses, however, points to the 
importance of also reading these texts as performative acts. In fact, the written text is 
often part of a general narrative (emplotment) that conveys additional meaning to the 
author’s words. Therefore, the form and structure of writings or discourse may suggest 
forms of constructing the “self” that are also influenced by the broader “discourses” of 
the period. In addition, the attention toward the diverse roles of the subject in the text 
points to the different functions of the “I” as narrator and as subject of the narration.90 
The study of the praxis of civil society also requires an investigation of the 
organizational means by which these intellectuals aimed to act upon their theoretical 
constructs. These intellectual elites participated in a broad network of both formal and 
informal associations during World War One and its immediate aftermath. The failure of 
these endeavors to bridge the divisions of German society discredited the faith in 
associations’s ability to solve the tension between private interest and the common good. 
Consequently, the DHfP and the PK became these intellectuals’ most promising 
institutional efforts to act upon their conceptions of civil society and of rival forms of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 A good introduction to critical reading of sources is Miriam Dobson and Benjamin Ziemann, Reading 
Primary Sources: The Interpretation of Texts from Nineteenth and Twentieth Century (New York: 
Routledge, 2008). A useful checklist for the reading of primary sources is in Miriam Dobson and Benjamin 
Ziemann, “Introduction,” in Reading Primary Sources, 1-18.  
90 For “emplotment” see also Hayden White, “Interpretation in History,” New Literary History, vol. 4, no. 2 
(1973), 281-314. For “discourse analysis” see Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History, translated by 
Tom Conley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988 [1975]) and Peter Schöttler, “Historians and 
Discourse Analysis,” History Workshop Journal, vol. 27, no. 1 (1989), 37-65.   
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societal organizations, which emphasized the unity of the “nation” over the freedom of 
the individual.      
Archival material provides valuable information for the analysis of institutions 
and organizations. The broad associational network that developed during World War 
One and was crucial in the process of politicization of these intellectuals rarely left 
official records. Therefore, memoirs, autobiographies, and private papers often were the 
only source of information. They require a careful critical assessment because of the 
inherent bias of self-perception. The private papers of the founders, as well as of their 
associates and rivals help to study the purposes and motives of those who established the 
organization.91 In some cases, government and police files from the Berlin Regional 
Archive (Landesarchiv Berlin), the Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage 
(Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz), and the Federal Archives-Lichterfelde 
(Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde) have integrated these sources. In fact, many of these 
political clubs and associations established official as well as unofficial contacts with 
government agencies, and the police monitored them because of their political activities, 
although they did not always register as associations (eingetragene Vereine). 
The analysis of the DHfP and the PK relies on traditional historical methodology 
grounded in archival research. The Secret State Archives Prussian Cultural Heritage and 
the Federal Archives-Lichterfelde hold the records of these two institutes. Furthermore, 
governmental files at both federal and state level complement these institutional records 
and provide a perspective on the political effectiveness of these intellectuals and their 
organizations. Accounts from its American financial supporters integrate the records of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 On the relevance of integrating institutional records with private papers in philanthropic studies see 
David Hammack, “Private Organizations, Public Purposes: Nonprofits and their Archives,” The Journal of 
American History, vol. 76, no. 1 (1989), 181-191.  
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the DHfP. The Rockefeller Archive Center and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace Archives provide a wealth of information by including official 
reports, grant communication, evaluations, and private letters as well as diaries of 
foundations’ officers.           
Overview 
 
In this study I investigate the praxis of civil society through the prism of 
Germany’s first school of public affairs. This analysis of the thought leaders that formed 
this school illustrates four major points. Firstly, the failure of voluntary associations to 
establish a cross-party solidarity discredited the primacy of associational life in civil 
society in the eyes of German elites. In fact, by the end of the World War One, voluntary 
associations seemed to replicate and reinforce German society’s socio-political cleavage 
lines. Secondly, the intellectuals at the center of this study viewed civility as the core of 
their conception of civil society. Indeed, the politics of civility appeared to tame socio-
political conflicts, ensure the good working of the liberal state, and build a civil society in 
Weimar’s radicalized public sphere. Thirdly, I focus on the asymmetry between 
American ideals of democracy and the realities of the German political system and 
discourse by analyzing the relationship between U.S. foundations and these intellectuals. 
Finally, the last years of the Weimar Republic show how a conception of societal 
organization rooted in acceptance of conflict, willingness to compromise, and rationality 
(that is, the politics of civility) paved the path to powerful alternatives emphasizing the 
notions of unity and homogeneity. This study therefore points to the intrinsic weakness of 
the civil society project.       
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In “Chapter 2,” I analyze the activities of the intellectuals at the center of this 
study during the crucial years of World War One. Their participation in a network of 
associations that purposely cut across Germany’s traditional socio-moral milieus became 
a key moment in their politicization. These associations provided venues of social 
interaction that aimed to create a cross-class solidarity and hence integrate previously 
excluded groups into the national body. Furthermore, these clubs allowed Germany’s 
cultural elites to interact with the political as well as military leadership. By 1916, 
however, this nonpartisan solidarity proved to be ephemeral. New associations 
reproduced the pre-war fragmentation of German society and hardened socio-political 
cleavages. In the eyes of these intellectuals, these events discredited the centrality of 
associations in civil society. German public intellectuals therefore sought new principles 
to bridge the tension between private interest and the public good.     
The development of contrasting conceptions of democracy after the military 
defeat in World War One is at the center of “Chapter 3.” Temporarily, the communist 
revolution in the winter of 1918/19 created an emergency that appeared to transcend 
political divisions. Although this commonality of intents soon faded, both liberal and 
conservative intellectuals recognized the need to develop forms of societal organization 
that would be more integrative than the one of pre-war society. They developed, 
however, contrasting conceptions of democracy that typified the conceptual distinction 
between an economic vision of politics and a religious picture of politics. Young 
conservatives proposed a powerful, alternative form of societal organization to the new 
political system that emphasized the unity of the “nation” over society’s pluralism, which 
they believed would enhance fragmentation. By contrast, liberals supported the new 
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republican form of government, although criticizing the proportional system of 
representation and the radicalization of political discourse. For these liberals therefore 
neither the state nor voluntary associations could tame the socio-political conflicts they 
risked breaking apart Germany’s young democracy.      
As I show in “Chapter 4,” German public intellectuals aimed to transform their 
theoretical constructs into reality through political education. The liberals of the German 
School of Politics aimed to instill practical knowledge and a political sense of duty in 
German society. The good working of a parliamentary democracy depended on citizen’s 
capacity to respect the position of the political adversary, develop a mature political will 
(which averted the dangers of ideology), and to discuss political differences and conflicts 
on the basis of “objective” facts. In so doing, these intellectuals grounded the liberal 
political system in a political ethos, the politics of civility. Conversely, the young 
conservatives of the Politische Kolleg saw their educational goal in both the creation of a 
collective political will and the education of political leaders who would bypass the 
fragmentation of Germany’s political society. This comparison exemplifies the paradox 
of the civil society project. In fact, these intellectuals sought to solve the tension between 
private interest and the common good either by conceptualizing civil society as rooted in 
the acceptance of conflicts or by emphasizing notions of homogeneity and unity that 
bypassed the conflicts of a modern society.      
In “Chapter 5,” I analyze the connections between an American understanding of 
democracy and the reality of German political culture. German philanthropists’ support to 
the School significantly decreased by the mid-1920s. During numerous lecture tours in 
both the United States and England, Ernst Jäckh and his closest associates publicized the 
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“New Germany” and emphasized the democratic convictions of Germany’s government 
and society. As a result, Jäckh secured the support of American philanthropists. 
Rockefeller philanthropic institutions (the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial and the 
Rockefeller Foundation) linked, however, their grants to the development of empiric 
research in the social sciences. The relationship with Rockefeller philanthropic 
institutions gradually changed the School’s original focus on practical, vocational 
training. Furthermore, the emphasis of the leadership Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace on international scientific cooperation was not fully aware of the self-
serving approach to internationalism of Germany’s cultural elites. In fact, for German 
elites the prestigious relationship with American institutions served to break Germany’s 
international isolation and re-establish German cultural prestige. The analysis of this 
relationship highlights the development of a clear asymmetry between the School’s goals 
and priorities and those of American donors.    
As I detail in “Chapter 6,” the School of Politics shifted toward more conservative 
positions by the second half of the 1920s. Paradoxically, the School started to officially 
cooperate with the Politische Kolleg in 1926, and several conservative scholars remained 
at the School even after the end of the cooperation in 1930. Influenced by American 
grants, the leadership of the School shifted the focus on the study of international 
relations, whose courses were taught by conservative scholars. The involvement of these 
thought leaders in endeavors such as the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung and the Gustav 
Stresemann Memorial confirm the marginalization of political education. At the same 
time, liberals’ appeal to the politics of civility sounded like a passive acceptance of the 
authoritarian shift in German politics. They viewed the centralization of authority in the 
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hands of the president as a way to bypass the deadlocked parliament. A conception of 
civil society grounded in the acceptance of conflict appeared unable to defend Germany’s 
weak democratic system. The Nazi movement exploited the weaknesses of Germany’s 
first democracy and the contradictions of Weimar’s parliamentary system by emphasizing 
homogenizing notions such as “people’s community.” 
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CHAPTER 2: SOCIALIZATION AND POLITICIZATION BETWEEN 
IMPERIAL GERMANY AND WAR 
 
World War One left a lasting imprint on the political consciousness of the 
intellectuals at the center of this study, as it shaped their perspectives of politics and of 
public intellectuals’ role in society. The analysis of their actions during the war provides 
a necessary frame of reference for the subsequent investigation of their multiple efforts to 
shape Germany’s future form of societal organization. The war experience reinvigorated 
these intellectuals’ sense of responsibility toward the commonality, thus pushing them to 
seek new solutions to Germany’s radicalized public sphere, as the associations that had 
emerged during the war proved unable to tame German society’s socio-economic 
conflicts. The myth of the “civic peace” (Burgfrieden), of a German nation that 
successfully had bridged its internal fragmentation, became the nourished utopia of both 
these intellectuals and society at large.           
German intellectual elites had struggled with Wilhelmine society’s socio-
economic transformations since the 1890s. Rapid industrialization and the increasing 
political weight of the Social Democratic Party, which had effectively organized the 
workers’ movement, challenged society’s established political, social, and economic 
equilibrium. Although these transformations had an extraordinary impact on the 
consciousness of a society that in few decades had witnessed national unification, 
(limited) parliamentarization, and swift industrialization, Germans’ worrisome reactions 
mirrored a general European sense of crisis. A pessimist view of modernization, which 
appeared as an unstoppable trend toward bureaucratization, provided a conceptual frame 
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of reference for an entire generation of intellectuals desperately seeking new forms of 
societal organization at the end of the nineteenth century.1    
On the eve of World War One, therefore, German elites strained coming to terms 
with societal transformations that, in a combined assault of rationalization and 
massification, seemed to limit individual freedom and possibilities of political action. In 
the eyes of these intellectuals, the socialist party embodied German society’s negative 
transformations. The centrality of economic relationships in Marxist thought seemed to 
reflect the general economicist and rationalizing turn of social life. Furthermore, 
combined with its ideology of internationalism and “class struggle,” the socialist party’s 
popularity seemed to confirm Germany’s fragmentation in mutually exclusive milieus, 
hence supposedly weakening Germany in a time of rising international competition.  
In Germany, social fragmentation was more radically perceived than in other 
industrializing societies. In fact, all of Germany’s political parties were rooted in specific 
socio-moral milieus that, with the exception of the socialist one, had surfaced before the 
foundation of the Reich.2 Each subculture developed its own network of voluntary and 
self-help organizations, trade unions, press, and eventually political parties. 
Paradoxically, even industrialization was unable to break the hold of these socio-moral 
milieus. Rather, as the growing strength of the Social Democratic Party seemed to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Georg Kamphausen, “Charisma und Heroismus. Die Generation von 1890 und der Begriff des 
Politischen,” in Charisma. Theorie, Religion, Politik, edited by Winfried Gebhardt, Arnold Zingerle, 
Michael N. Ebertz (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993). 
2 M. Rainer Lepsius, “Parteiensystem und Sozialstruktur: zum Problem der Demokratisierung der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft,” (1966), in Deutsche Parteien vor 1918, edited by Gerhard A. Ritter (Köln: 
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Democracy. Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). By drawing on Dankwart Rustow’s “dynamic model” of democratic transition, Anderson contends 
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confirm, industrialization appeared to radicalize German society’s political cleavages by 
hardening class conflicts.3          
Against this background of crisis, the ideas and actions of the liberal politician 
Friedrich Naumann became a point of reference for an entire generation of political as 
well as social reformers. As a pastor and theologian, Naumann had been involved in the 
charitable organizations of the Evangelical Church since the early 1880s. He had initially 
become interested in the “social question” through Adolf Stöcker’s Evangelical Social 
Movement but had grown impatient with the conservatism of the Kaiser’s court chaplain. 
Like most of the social reformers of the period, Naumann believed that Imperial 
Germany’s political institutions had not used all the national forces in support of 
Germany’s national as well as international goals. Hence, Naumann searched for 
alternatives to both social democracy and radical nationalism.   
The intellectuals at the center of this study were indebted to Naumann for his 
attempt to integrate all social forces into the national body and for the centrality of 
political education in his thought. Beyond the level of socio-political ideals, however, 
Naumann’s political practice became a model for a new type of public intellectual. The 
Naumann circle renounced the exclusivity of the intellectual ivory tower and was directly 
involved in the socio-political praxis. As an organizer, editor, and writer, Naumann used 
associations, magazines, and pamphlets to influence public opinion and public policy. As 
a point of reference for the Wilhelmine reformist milieu, he contributed to establishing a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Franz Walter and Helge Matthiesen, “Milieus in der modernen Gesellschaftsgeschichte: Ergebnisse und 
Perspektiven der Forschung,” in Anpassung, Verweigerung, Widerstand. Soziale Milieus, politische Kultur 
und der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus in Deutschland im regionalen Vergleich, edited by 
Detlef Schmiechen-Ackermann (Berlin: Schriften der Gedenkstätte Deutscher Widerstand, 1997), 46-75 
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new type of intellectual in German history, who – with few exceptions – avoided direct 
political participation and preferred informed and competent, research-based 
interventions in public debates in order to influence and shape public opinion.4  
Fearing the dangerous consequences of Germany’s socio-political fragmentation, 
Naumann (and most Germans) celebrated World War One as an historical moment 
recreating an original cross-class national unity. The intellectuals around Naumann joined 
a broad network of voluntary associations in support of Germany’s military effort and in 
the attempt to gain political influence. Clubs and associations offered the possibility to 
discuss the course of the conflict with leading personalities of the civil as well as military 
leadership. Through personal connections and, in the area of war propaganda, through 
official forms of cooperation with federal agencies, therefore, this associational network 
provided avenues for political engagement. In addition, by cultivating a cross-class 
sociability, these associations aimed to support the social cohesion created during the 
early war years and to preserve it for the times of peace. 
The solidarity celebrated by Berlin’s political clubs and associations soon 
collapsed under the pressure of a total war. By the end of the war, contrasts between 
conservatives and liberals disrupted the internal life of those associations that had been 
established in the name of the “spirit of 1914.” Furthermore, newly founded associations 
had a clear partisan character and were aligned with German society’s traditional party 
divisions. At the same time intellectuals’ hopes to influence political decisions were 
revealed to be ephemeral. On the eve of the establishment of Germany’s first democratic 
form of government, voluntary associations had failed to instill a culture of compromise 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Ursula Krey, “Demokratie durch Opposition: Der Naumann-Kreis und die Intellektuellen,” in Kritik und 
Mandat: Intellektuelle in der deutschen Politik, edited by Gangolf Hubinger and Thomas Hertfelder 
(Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 2000), 74-75. 
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in their members and – on a lesser level – had not been able to provide forms of political 
influence.     
Accordingly, in this chapter, I first discuss Naumann’s analysis of Wilhelmine 
society, which deeply influenced the reformist milieu that gradually formed around him. 
As a writer and organizer, Naumann socialized and politicized a young generation of 
intellectuals who would play a central role in Germany’s public life. Secondly, I describe 
the broad network of political clubs and associations that, during the war, aimed to 
strengthen Germany’s home front by purposely cutting across political parties. In 
addition, organizations devoted to war propaganda soon entered in a close cooperation 
with governmental agencies and, in so doing, opened possibilities of political influence. 
As I analyze in the last part of the chapter, the solidarity across social classes, political 
party lines, and religious confessions celebrated by Berlin’s political clubs rapidly faded 
under the pressures of a total war. In fact, the resurfacing of old antagonisms provided the 
background to the emergence of the intellectual circles around Ernst Jäckh and around 
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck and Heinrich von Gleichen.  
Friedrich Naumann and the Wilhelmine Reformers  
 
The euphoria that had accompanied the German wars of unification in 1866 and 
1870-71 had progressively paved the path to disillusion. While united as a state, Germans 
still appeared divided as a nation. Concerned with the growing strength of the German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD), Chancellor Otto von Bismarck outlawed the party with 
the Anti-Socialist Law of 1878. Aware, however, of the necessity to integrate the 
working classes into the newly formed German state, the chancellor tried to win the 
lower classes’ allegiance by introducing social insurance legislation in the 1880s. 
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Nonetheless, in a rapidly changing society, these measures proved unable to break the 
hold of the SPD on workers. Increasing inequalities of wealth and income, low quality of 
housing for workers, and the social problems accompanying industrialization contributed 
to the growing influence of the socialist party on industrial workers.5  
In this context, a new social perspective on poverty emerged. Nineteenth-century 
poor relief centered on the notion that lack of character determined all forms of social 
deviance paved the path to the acknowledgement of social and environmental forces that 
acted outside individuals’ moral conduct.6 This new form of social knowledge relied on a 
deep trust in science’s objectivity. New research frameworks emphasizing the 
“objectivity” of science appeared able not only to support the new tasks of the German 
welfare state and of the new industrial elites but also to provide an answer to the socio-
economic controversies of the time. In fact, while the natural sciences offered solutions to 
the new needs of an industrial society, the social sciences, with their focus on quantifiable 
data on economy and society, addressed the so-called “social question.”7  
In 1890, the young Kaiser Wilhelm II renewed reformers’ interest in the “social 
question” by ousting Bismarck, repealing the Anti-Socialist Laws, and renewing the 
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nationalist appeal to the working classes.8 Squeezed between a conservative state and a 
popular workers’ movement, this reformist milieu saw in extra-parliamentary activities 
both a valid way out from the political stalemate and an alternative form of political 
engagement. Convinced that radical political conflicts would threaten Germany’s unity 
and prosperity, they favored “scientific” and “objective” solutions based on empirical 
research (thus above political as well as social conflicts) and aimed to integrate the 
working class into the nation. The form of the voluntary association, the use of similar 
techniques to influence public policy, the appeal to the authority of science, and the 
emphasis on nationalism became common features of the reform movement.9  
Naumann had a central role in the reformers’ milieu because of his more direct 
involvement in politics.10 In the three decades before his sudden death in 1919, he 
influenced a group of young reformers who would play a crucial role in Germany’s 
public life in the 1920s. The Naumann circle was a key moment in the process of 
socialization and politicization for all these public figures. Theodor Heuss, Ernst Jäckh, 
Elly Knapp (who became Heuss’s wife), and Gertrud Bäumer were part of this younger 
generation of reformers who had joined the Naumann circle at the turn of the century and 
through it were first introduced to the public sphere. In addition, among an older 
generation of influential industrialists and academics, some were close to the Naumann 
circle in spite of temporary disagreements (Max Weber and Lujo Brentano), whereas 
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others became involved in politics for the first time through Naumann’s influence (Robert 
Bosch and Friedrich Meinecke).  
Ernst Jäckh was one of the most significant personalities of Naumann’s inner 
circle and is still today surprisingly absent in accounts of both Imperial Germany and the 
Weimar Republic. A friend of Naumann since his student years in Munich at the turn of 
the century, Jäckh had supported Naumann’s political campaigns as editor of the Necker 
Zeitung and served as secretary of the German Werkbund (German Association of 
Craftsmen). Although he had close ties with the Foreign Office and to the political 
leadership,11 Jäckh would always renounce official political positions to preserve his 
independence. He self-described himself as a “civil-apostle” and an “educator of the 
nation” whose preferred political approach was that of the “Round-Table-Tactic.” In 
Berlin, he soon emerged as an able organizer and in-between figure at the center of 
political clubs and associations.12 
As a “manager” and organizer, Jäckh was a crucial figure in the circle that 
gradually emerged out of Naumann’s reformist milieu. Significantly, Jäckh also became 
the gatekeeper and contact person between the reformist milieu and the philanthropist 
Robert Bosch, to whom he was related by marriage. The founder of one of Germany’s 
most important manufacturing firms, Bosch was often referred to as the “red Bosch” 
because he had introduced the eight-hour workday and other social innovations when 
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they were regarded as revolutionary.13 Introduced to the Naumann circle by Jäckh, Bosch 
would become involved in domestic policy and social questions through his close 
friendship with Naumann.14 During the war, he decided not to profit from the conflict and 
to devote all the profits he would derive from the war economy to public benefit 
projects.15 During and in the aftermath of the war, Bosch would support Jäckh’s 
numerous reformist projects.16 
Naumann’s influence derived from his ability to carve out a sphere of action at the 
critical point of intersection between official politics and private endeavors. His attention 
to the interdependence between domestic reforms and aggressive foreign policy, his 
constant use of associational means to further his political as well as social ideals, and his 
emphasis on political education would shape the agenda of liberal reformism in the 
subsequent decades. 
Naumann had soon recognized the necessity to involve the working classes in the 
political process. In fact, he did not consider Social Democrats national enemies, and 
viewed socialism as “the political organization of all the masses” rather than as a 
revolutionary ideology.17 Nonetheless, he aimed to integrate the working class into the 
national body by creating a nationalist-oriented party able to compete with socialists’ 
internationalism. Consequentially, he tried to integrate socialism and nationalism, as the 
two most powerful forms of mass mobilization. To this end, in 1896, he founded the 
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13 Theodor Heuss, Robert Bosch. His Life and Achievements (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1995 
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14 Heuss, Robert Bosch, 259 and Theodor Heuss, Friedrich Naumann. Der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit 
(München: Siebenstern Taschenbuch Verlag, 1968 [1937]), 440. 
15 Heuss, Robert Bosch, 248-253. 
16 Heuss, Erinnerungen, 1905-1933, 216. 
17 Friedrich Naumann, “Weshalb nennen wir uns Sozialisten?” (1899), in Werke, vol. 5 (Köln: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 268  
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national body because “in the long run it is impossible that a minority, which is fought 
against by the masses, could preserve Germany’s power.”18 Naumann, however, 
contended that the working class had to abandon its position of radical opposition to 
which it had been driven by the policies of the SPD and, rather, patriotically had to 
support the state. 
Naumann somehow anachronistically linked his liberal imperialism to a Kaiser-
mythology in Democracy and Empire, which became his best-known analysis of 
Germany’s contemporary problems. In his analysis, political society’s factionalism was 
Germany’s crucial problem.19 In fact, the three major social forces – Junkers (the anti-
democratic, Prussian landowners), the industrial elites, and the clerical elites – were 
either unable to mobilize the masses in order to overpower its competitors or unwilling to 
ally and compromise with each other. Hence, Naumann developed the notion of a “social 
Empire,” which was rooted in the cooperation between working classes and Kaiser and 
based on the assumption that an inclusive and solid, national community would allow its 
head – the Kaiser in the historical figure of Wilhelm II – to pursue Germany’s 
international and imperialist goals.20 In so doing, all ambiguities notwithstanding, 
Naumann recognized the necessity to root political systems in popular support. 
 To a certain degree, however, Naumann shared the common ambivalence toward 
the masses and political democracy. In fact, in his work, he used concepts such as 
“masses” (Massen), “nation” (Nation), and Volk that in Germany’s intellectual tradition 
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vol. 4 (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 237-240.   
19 Friedrich Naumann, Demokratie und Kaisertum, second edition (Berlin: Buchverlag der “Hilfe,” 1900), 
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were loaded with meaning. Significantly, he referred to the “industrial masses” as the 
forces of democracy. In so doing, he associated the concept of democracy to the word 
“masses,” which for German elites had traditionally had a negative connotation. By 
contrast, he employed words such as Nation and Volk – to which contemporaries attached 
a clear positive value – when describing the Kaiser’s charismatic role in guiding the 
German “nation” or “people.” These choices reflected the notion that only the Kaiser’s 
charismatic leadership could organize the disorganized democratic forces in a nation. 
Scholars have traditionally pinpointed the shortcomings of Imperial Germany’s 
political system. They have detailed a political system in which the legislative had no 
influence on the executive and the Kaiser had the right to appoint Imperial ministers, and 
as King of Prussia he also had this right for Germany’s largest state.21 Nonetheless, 
historians have recently pointed to alternative readings of the German Empire’s political 
system and draw attention to the complexities and ambivalences of a simplistic 
dichotomy between economic modernization and political backwardness. From this 
perspective, authors have stressed that Germany’s record in legislative and administrative 
affairs, as well as in social policies, compared positively with other European states.22            
After the demise of the National Social Association – which had missed its scope 
by failing to attract the working class – Naumann became the point of reference for the 
left liberals by advocating the political cooperation between working class and 
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bourgeoisie.23 As a first step in creating such an inclusive political platform Naumann 
founded in 1910 the Progressive People’s Party, which merged liberal groupings to the 
left of the National Liberal Party.24 With the approaching of the 1912 parliamentary 
elections, the Progressive People’s Party cooperated with Social Democrats, whereas the 
National Liberal Party, fearing socialists’ growing influence, allied with conservative 
parties.  
Naumann’s analysis reflected the transformation of Germany’s political society. 
The growing political influence of the SPD paralleled the penetration of the “masses” in 
Germany’s political institutions, and thus polarizing political society. The bourgeois left 
(around Naumann and the Progressive People’s Party) shared some of the positions of the 
workers’ movement but was unable to make significant inroads in the working classes. 
Conversely, in reaction to the growing influence of the SPD, the National Liberal Party 
gradually aligned to both Conservatives and Imperial government. By contrast, by being 
rooted in the Catholic milieu and drawing support from the Catholics, the Catholic Center 
Party was the only real national party by being able to integrate various social classes.  
The 1912 elections further fragmented Germany’s political society. In fact, the 
SPD, by receiving more than one third of all votes, became the largest party in the 
parliament holding 110 of 397 seats. As a result, conservatives and radical nationalist 
associations again considered reversing the slow parliamentarization of the political 
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system through a coup d’état from above. In short, they did not even believe in this 
limited form of democracy.25   
The new focus on the complexities of Imperial Germany’s political system, 
however, warns against the establishment of a too rigid dichotomy between the defenders 
of the socio-political status quo and the workers’ movement. In fact, some conservatives 
appealed to nationalism to win popular support and counter societal fragmentation. The 
Imperial Government’s open support to the German Navy League and the Pan-German 
League corroborates interpretations of a manipulation of national opinion from above. At 
the same time, however, these societies became the pillars of an expanding nationalist 
milieu and contained the seeds of a nationalist opposition to the Imperial government.26 
Likewise, also Naumann’s increasing use of the nationalist appeal confirmed both 
the stalemate of Germany’s political system and liberals’ limited possibilities of success 
in domestic politics, as they were unable to appeal to a broad enough group of voters.27 
As a result, he turned his attention to the lack of political education after failing with his 
social nationalism both to make inroads in the workers’ movement and to achieve 
significant political influence in Germany’s fragmented liberal camp. He recognized that 
class interests dominated mass politics, thus confirming Germany’s socio-political 
fragmentation. Naumann had acknowledged the difficulties of cutting across social 
boundaries and thus stressed the complexity of creating stable parliamentary majorities 
already at the turn of the century; at the time, however, he had trusted in the Kaiser.28 	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After his disillusion with Wilhelm II, while seeing in general elections “the beginning of 
a nation’s self-education to the principle of majority formation,” he viewed the lack of 
both interest in politics and “political sense of duty” as the gravest threat to Germany’s 
political life.29  
Naumann never rejected in principle the monarchic system. Nonetheless, he grew 
concerned with the passivity of Germany’s educated middle classes. Directly addressing 
the educated bourgeois, he lamented, 
It would be possible to steal it [civil rights] overnight and you would 
hardly notice it. Perhaps the cries of others would waken you a bit from 
the slumber, but you, you would not feel poorer even if tomorrow you 
would be back a subject and not a citizen.30 
 
Even in the framework of a monarchy, Naumann viewed political participation as crucial 
for the development of individuals’ sense of responsibility toward the community. 
Naumann, however, only voiced a common concern of educated elites, as the general 
complains about the lack of political education, Germany’s “political dilettantism,” and 
centrality of economic concerns in political life confirmed.31 
In Naumann’s thought, social nationalism and political education fostered 
individual responsibility and national community, thus countering German society’s 
fragmentation. Simultaneously, Naumann also participated in various non-political 
organizations, which attempted to counter those side effects of industrialization and 
rationalization that were reinforcing social fragmentation. In 1907, with the architects 
Henry van de Velde and Hermann Muthesius, he founded the German Werkbund, which 
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supported the ideal of a cultural, artistic industrialization. The Werkbund, like the 
contemporary Werdandi-Union (also founded in 1907), was only one of a plethora of 
organizations that since the 1890s pursued the renewal of Germanness through cultural-
political programs, which took an ambivalent path between traditional Germanic culture 
and modernity.32  
 Naumann’s life and his multifaceted activities mirror German intellectual elites’ 
quest for new frames of references for the analysis of their modernizing society. 
Industrialization hardened class identities and, hence, radicalized the tension between 
individual interest and the common good. Naumann clearly pinpointed the problems of 
German society. The fragmentation of political, associational, and cultural life seriously 
limited the possibilities of individual actions for the good of the broader national 
community. In addition, as the work of Naumann’s close friend Max Weber symbolized, 
liberal elites worried about the tension between the process of rationalization and 
individual autonomy.33  
Consequentially, these intellectuals repeatedly turned to nationalism and 
leadership ideals (as exemplified by Naumann’s Kaiser-mythology and Weber’s 
charismatic leadership) as the means to counter both the emergence of a class-based 
society and rationalism of societal relationships, which appeared to be the main by-
product of industrialization. Emblematically, at the same time also conservatives 
appealed to nationalism to win popular support and counter societal fragmentation.  
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Political Influence and “Civic Peace”: Wartime Sociability and Propaganda 
 
World War One tragically signaled the end of the long bourgeois century and laid 
bare industrializing societies’ inner tensions. In 1914 all the tensions that had 
accumulated over decades of industrial growth and imperialist expansion between states 
and within nations exploded. Although German elites would initially find solace in the 
fictional solidarity created by the war, World War One unleashed forces that gave a new 
urgency to the key questions that Naumann had addressed within the political framework 
of the Wilhelmine Empire. Across the political spectrum, political education would 
prominently figure as the best means to address social conflicts, which the pressures of a 
total war further radicalized.      
All major European powers mobilized for war in the weeks following the 
assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand in June 1914. 
At the same time, the national presses created a sense of expectation that made the 
declaration of war at the beginning of August appear as a solution to these societies’ 
domestic conflicts. While between July 26 and 30 the SPD organized mass protest 
demonstrations, the jingoistic scenes in Germany’s major cities notably allowed Kaiser 
Wilhelm II to state on August 1, on occasion of the announcement of the general 
mobilization, that he saw only Germans and not multiple, antagonistic political parties. 
On August 4, all German political parties voted for the war credits, including the SPD 
whose support to the war overshadowed its cautionary language.34   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 As good overviews see Wolfgang Kruse, “Die Kriegsbereitung im Deutschen Reich zu Beginn des Ersten 
Weltkrieges. Entstehungszusammenhänge, Grenzen und ideologische Strukturen,” in Kriegsbegeisterung 
und mentale Kriegsvorbereitung. Interdisziplinäre Studien, edited by Marcel van der Linden and Gottfried 
Mergner (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), 73-87, Reinhard Rürup, “Der ‘Geist von 1914’ in 
Deutschland. Kriegsbegeisterung und Ideologisierung des Krieges im Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Ansichten vom 
Krieg. Vergleichende Studien zum Ersten Weltkrieg in Literatur und Gesellschaft, edited by Bernd Hüppauf 
(Königstein: Forum Academicum, 1984), 1-30, Jeffrey Verhey, “War and Revolution,” in Imperial 
	   64	  
Momentarily, the war seemed to call a halt to all reformers’ worries. Although 
Germans’ response to the war varied across social classes and regions, World War One 
appeared to create a national unity able to transcend internal differences and restore 
Germany’s domestic solidarity. Still decades later, the renowned historian Friedrich 
Meinecke sentimentally remembered the strong emotion generated by the initial 
solidarity across parties.35 Enthralled, Naumann stated 
All the usual trivial matters appear at once of little value, and the hidden 
life of the whole lifts itself in the high. Also our party disputes become 
meaningless as long as the state has to be defended. Now we have no time 
for self-righteousness and vanity. We are all one party, namely a sacred, 
determined nation. The confessions shake hands, class struggles are 
postponed, old wounds are forgotten, until we once again have time for 
internal disputes, unless by themselves they are swept away in the stream 
of the general experience. Now it is really: Germany, Germany above all, 
above all in the world!36 
 
 
Not surprisingly, most of the reformers embraced the notion of the “civic peace” as the 
realization of their pre-war ambitions.  
The war rapidly politicized German society. In fact, as a member of the myriad of 
political clubs that sprang up in Berlin recalled, “The air seemed electrically charged. At 
the time, almost everyone was driven by a kind of natural force to the liberating exchange 
of ideas with like-minded.”37 In the early war months, however, this process had a 
nonpartisan character and associational life became the favored means to foster social 
interaction across Germany’s traditional socio-political dividing lines. Rather than 	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limiting their contribution to the military effort to theoretical constructs, German 
intellectuals eagerly joined a plethora of associations and clubs that aimed to strengthen 
internal solidarity and keep alive the “spirit of 1914.” At the same time, associations, 
clubs, and more or less formal endeavors provided the means for political participation 
and forms of influencing public affairs.  
The “German Society 1914” was the most impressive example of Berlin’s 
associational life during the war.38 The Society was established on November 28, 1915 
and soon after was officially registered as an association.39 It counted 900 members soon 
after its establishment and reached a membership of over 2000 during its existence. The 
Society had grown out of more informal meetings held every Tuesday at Jäckh’s house 
(the Jäckh-Table),40 which had aimed to create channels of communication between the 
Foreign Office and the Ministry of the Interior, as well as between the civil and the 
military leadership.41 Bosch bought and made available rent-free a palace in 
Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin to support the establishment of the “German Society 1914.”42 
At the first meeting, Jäckh was nominated to the Board of Directors, whereas Bosch 
became a regular member.43  
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Like the “German Society 1914,” also the “Wednesday-Society” (initially, 
“Continental-Society”) resembled English political dining societies. The Swiss 
philosopher Ludwig Stein and Ernst Bassermann (leader of the National Liberals in the 
parliament) founded the “Wednesday-Society,” and organized it around a common dinner 
and “after-dinner-speeches.” The political variety of its membership confirmed the 
nonpartisan character of this dining society, as it included conservative politicians, 
industrialists (noteworthy, the future financial backers of the young conservatives, Hugo 
Stinnes and Alfred Hugenberg), Social Democrats, liberal academics, and publicists such 
as the conservative Russia-expert Otto Hoetzsch.44   
Endeavors such as “German Society 1914,” the “Wednesday-Society,” and the 
“Free Patriotic Union” (founded on February 28, 1915) purposely cut across party as well 
as ideological allegiances. These clubs cultivated – as Meinecke somehow nostalgically 
remembered – the spirit of 1914 by uniting Berlin’s leading circles and creating a unique 
opportunity for meeting people from all walks of life.45 In so doing, they provided social 
avenues that facilitated the interaction between Social Democrats, trade unionists, 
conservatives, and radical nationalists. Furthermore, they reflected the nationalist and 
nonpartisan pathos of the early war period, and – in this – mirrored Naumann’s 
integrative approach.  
Both the “Wednesday-Society” and the “German Society 1914” had an elitist 
character, although their ranks were open to previously excluded political groups. In fact, 
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it accepted members only by invitation and required high membership fees.46 In addition, 
the “German Society 1914” had initially limited its membership to a maximum of 1000 
members.47 Critically, the Social Democratic press defined the “German Society 1914” as 
a “splendid list” of men of the propertied and educated circles, which with its high 
membership fees de facto excluded proletarians.48 The socialist Vorwärts sarcastically 
noted that supporting the “civic peace” cost a 60 M yearly membership fee and invited 
Social Democrats to decide between membership either in the Society or in the SPD.49  
The intentional, direct and indirect, limits to membership, however, expressed the 
continuity more of patterns of political action rather than of social exclusion. In fact, by 
facilitating encounters and communication among economic, political, and social elites, 
both societies were still anchored to old patterns characteristic of the “politics of 
notables.” These associations’ goals were not to generate popular support for political 
leadership but rather to create avenues of communication and, if possible, to influence 
political decision-making through personal contacts and networks. Dinners and lectures, 
thus, were events aiming to facilitate the circulation of information and the rooms of the 
societies soon became spaces for both formal and informal political meetings.      
Either explicitly or implicitly, however, these associations’ goals were not limited 
to the war period. As the “Free Patriotic Union” clearly stated, the somehow artificial 
commonality of intents that the war had created had to be cultivated in order to be 
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maintained in times of peace. The ultimate goal, therefore, was to carry over the “power 
of national unity” from the war years to times of peace, which “must not destroy what the 
war accomplished.”50 Accordingly, social intercourse and sociability were not only 
means for political action but also became a goal by themselves. During its first meeting, 
the Board of Directors of the “German Society 1914” debated avoiding lectures that 
“could lead to political discussions” and the Social Democratic delegate Albert Südekum 
suggested, for the sake of an “easier social intercourse,” to place in society’s main room a 
plaque expressing the organization’s spirit, “In this room everyone is introduced to 
everyone.”51  
Explicitly, therefore, these societies cultivated a sociability that purposely crossed 
political camps and, in so doing, aimed to bridge Germany’s socio-political divides by 
establishing networks of personal relationships.52 According to its by-laws, the “German 
Society 1914” aimed “to provide … men of all ranks and professions with no party 
distinction the opportunity of an unrestrained intercourse, free of prejudices, and hence 
carry the spirit of the unity of 1914 in the years of peace.”53 In his opening address, the 
chair of the Society, Secretary of State Wilhelm Solf, rooted this cross-partisan spirit in 
the nationalism that the outbreak of the war had inflamed.54 The “German Society 1914” 
held regular board as well as members’ assemblies until its demise in 1933/34.55 Most 
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importantly, however, its public and private rooms soon became a common meeting point 
for Germany’s elites. A cursory survey of numerous public figures’ correspondence 
testifies to the centrality of the “German Society 1914” in the social life of the period. In 
1918, paradoxically, Hans Delbrück preferred avoiding the rooms of the Society for a 
highly confidential political meeting because there “one is too easily observed.”56  
Similarly, in a typical celebration of the “civic peace,” the “Free Patriotic Union” 
opened its first public announcement with a statement of unity. “Hate and quarrel among 
fellow countrymen have been silenced, old barriers broke down, rusty prejudices have 
been put aside” because the emergency of the war had renewed the “awareness of 
belonging together.”57 In line with the common topos, the signatories of the document 
including Jäckh and Delbrück declared that the new association’s goal was avoiding that 
the “special interest of the individual, of the political parties, of the religious confessions, 
of the professions, ranks and classes improperly pushes back the sense of commonality 
and aggravate the communal work.”58  
These large societies cultivated social intercourse and sociability and, thus, 
primarily aimed to indirectly support Germany’s military effort by strengthening internal 
solidarity. By contrast, other associations and informal groups aimed to support 
Germany’s cultural propaganda. Explicitly, these associations participated in the 
propaganda war and, to this end, aimed to mobilize scholars and intellectuals who 
previously had not participated in political debates.  
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Cultural as well as intellectual elites actively participated in Germany’s war 
propaganda as part of a reaction to the Entente’s accusations that Germany had violated 
Belgium’s neutrality and committed brutalities against civilians. In October 1914, 
German intellectuals reacted with the pamphlet titled “To the Cultural World!” Signed by 
93 well-known German public figures (Naumann among them), the famed “Manifest of 
the 93” represented intellectuals’ endorsement of Germany’s military conduct. With the 
Manifest, German intellectuals and scholars publicly protested against English and 
French war propaganda.59 Against this background, associations, task forces, and 
committees became valid organizational forms to allow direct participation in public 
affairs, beyond the celebration of cross-party sociability and a sterile politics of notables.  
The “Union of German Scholars and Artists” (Bund deutscher Gelehrter und 
Künstler, or Kulturbund) reflected the organizational structures and intellectual goals of 
cultural elites’ involvement in Germany’s war propaganda. The Kulturbund aimed to 
provide intellectuals and scholars with the means to exercise political influence, because 
up to the war they had “remained isolated in their scriptoria and offices and therefore 
without influence.”60 With its activities, it aimed to create a more positive reception of 
Germany abroad and to counter the kind of propaganda that, on the eve of the war, had 
created enmity in all countries and represented an obstacle to the restoration of peace.61 
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Initially a committee of few members,62 the Kulturbund soon became a standing 
organizations aiming to “correct untrue reports on Germany’s behavior for the cultural 
and scientific representatives of neutral foreign countries and to highlight the breaking of 
international law and human rights by our war enemies.”63 Starting with the “Manifest of 
the 93,”64 the Kulturbund used its members’ personal networks to distribute propaganda 
material because convinced that cultural leaders had an unmatched influence on the 
development of “the spirit of a nation” and because aware of the risks associated with an 
extreme propaganda in neutral countries.65 By the end of January 1915, the Kulturbund 
had 195 members and its internal structure comprised a bureau – which focused on 
practical tasks such as correspondence and publications – and an archive, which collected 
relevant propaganda material.66  
While during the first months the Kulturbund primarily focused on its activities 
abroad, its leaders soon became aware of the importance of domestic propaganda. 
Already in October 1914, the Kulturbund had requested the Ministry of Education’s 
support for the organization of lecture series during the winter by arguing that both the 
abolition of many evening entertainments and the growing public interest in current 
political and military developments made these lectures necessary.67 By the beginning of 
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1915, the Kulturbund had revised its by-laws in order to broaden its membership.68 The 
new by-laws now explicitly aimed to support a “patriotic attitude” on the home front and 
to establish practices of cooperation among German cultural elites that could support 
similar efforts in times of peace.69  
Baron Heinrich von Gleichen, a nationalist member of the “German Society 
1914,” took over the executive leadership of the Kulturbund in 1916. Although mostly 
uninvolved in the pre-war political debates, in an article published in 1913, Gleichen had 
voiced nationalists’ longing for a European conflict, which would free the individual 
from industrial society’s rationalized life.70 Gleichen had decried the “mechanics of the 
progress,” which had transformed public figures into marionettes “pulled by wires.”71 He 
lamented that the masses had enslaved Germans who lacked true leaders.72 On the eve of 
World War One, Gleichen viewed “the emergency” (die Not) as the only possible source 
of help. Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that only a catastrophic event, such 
as a war, could create the emergency that would free Germans of the impersonal 
rationalism of the rational laws that appeared to rule industrial mass societies.73      
Under Gleichen’s energetic leadership, the Kulturbund played a central role in the 
reorganization and centralization of Germany’s war propaganda. Shortly after his 
nomination, Gleichen drafted a memorandum on the necessity to reorganize Germany’s 
propaganda apparatus and submitted it to the director of the Foreign Office’s propaganda 
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department. In the document, Gleichen pointed out the need to create a “Central Office” 
for the coordination of all war propaganda and for the collection of information. In 
particular, he stressed the importance to coordinate the activities of the myriad of private 
and official organizations.74     
Consequentially, Gleichen became the in-between figure of official and private 
war propaganda. The Foreign Office offered him a position within its propaganda 
department with the task of collecting information on the personalities and associations 
active in the field of propaganda and establishing channels of communication with the 
Foreign Office.75 Gleichen, however, insisted on continuing his activity at the Kulturbund 
with the motivation that without this “personal union” it would be difficult to gain an 
overview of the propaganda activities in Germany.76 With the impossibility of 
contemporarily holding a leadership position in the Foreign Office and a private 
organization,77 Gleichen used the Kulturbund to survey all the organizations active in 
foreign propaganda and establish connections between them and the Foreign Office.78 By 
the summer of 1917, Gleichen had established a permanent office, directed by Walter 
Schotte, within the Kulturbund in charge of mapping the activities of organizations active 
in war propaganda and of publishing monthly reports summarizing these activities.79    	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In its first years and under Gleichen’s leadership, the Kulturbund had established 
itself as the key organization in war propaganda. Supported by membership fees, grants 
from the Ministry of War, Ministry of the Economy, and Ministry of the Interior, and 
substantial private contributions, its activities included the organization of public lectures, 
the distribution of placards and pamphlets, and the production of propaganda movies.80 
Also well-known liberal intellectuals close to the Naumann circle participated in 
Kulturbund’s propaganda activities. Meinecke and Ernst Troeltsch held public lectures on 
“The German Freedom” and “Western Democracies,”81 and Jäckh, Naumann, and the 
scholar of geo-politics Adolf Grabowsky were members of the Kulturbund’s various 
committees.  
The war propaganda was in part cause and in part expression of the rapid erosion 
of the cross-party solidarity that had initially sustained the “civic peace.” The debate on 
Germany’s war aims and on internal reforms – which both became increasingly part of 
intellectuals’ cultural propaganda – reflected the breaking down of Germany’s inner 
cohesion and, at the same time, signaled the progressive disruption of the internal peace 
of Berlin’s cross-partisan associations. In an internal memorandum, Prussia’s Ministry of 
the Interior Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell noted that the positions in the war aim debate 
reflected Germany’s traditional party divisions. Observing the growing distance between 
government and conservative parties, he argued that domestic transformations must be 
“above the political parties.”82 With the progressive collapse of the “civic peace,” 
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however, opposition parties progressively made their war support dependent on domestic 
reforms, whereas conservative circles called for extreme war aims and a military 
dictatorship.  
Associational Fragmentation and Political Radicalization  
 
Already by 1916, the debate on “war aims” and internal reforms disrupted the 
internal life of those clubs and societies that had celebrated Germany’s “civil peace.” 
Noting the influence of industrial circles within the “Wednesday-Society,” Jäckh 
retrospectively juxtaposed it to the liberal circle around Hans Delbrück.83 Like most 
political circles of the time, also the “Delbrück-Evenings” were the product of the war’s 
early enthusiasm. At the end of August 1914, the National Liberal representative Eugen 
Schiffer had established a regular “round-table” to discuss daily military and political 
events. As Schiffer later recalled, the group selected Delbrück as chairman for his rare 
ability to combine historical scholarship and political acumen.84 Under Delbrück’s 
leadership, the question of the war aims dominated the group’s discussions.85 Aware 
already in 1915 of the impossibility of a “victorious peace,” Delbrück – with the support 
of Troeltsch and Meinecke – advocated a “negotiated peace,” which rejected the extreme 
war aims of conservative and radical right-wing circles.  
In contrast to both the “Wednesday-Society” and the “German Society 1914,” this 
circle only reunited an average of twenty persons and explicitly aimed to influence public 
affairs through personal contacts with the political leadership. Delbrück was in direct 
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contact with Rudolf von Valentini, a member of the Secret Civil Cabinet and close 
collaborator of Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg. In their correspondence, 
Delbrück advocated for a “negotiated peace” because “Our enemies derive a significant 
part of their strength from the belief that we are world conquerors who want to transform 
all other nations into Helots.”86 The group was unable to win over the political and 
military leadership for a “negotiated peace” in spite of its political connections and 
Bosch’s generous financial support.87 In his memoirs, Prince Max von Baden linked this 
lack of influence to the Delbrück circle’s cultural mindset, which not only made it 
difficult to oppose a course of action once the government had adopted it but also a 
reluctance to take personal responsibility.88  
With the radicalization of the war aims debate, however, also the liberal circles 
that supported a “negotiated peace” restated the ambivalent interdependence between 
foreign and domestic policy that had been integral part of Naumann’s national liberalism. 
While before the war reformers had argued that national solidarity was the precondition 
for a successful foreign policy, now foreign policy goals became tools for the 
reestablishment of domestic unity and neutralization of extreme annexationist plans. 
Although in an article published in 1917 Delbrück advocated for the establishment of a 
colonial empire,89 in a private letter he explained that he did not believe in these plans but 
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considered them necessary to distract popular opinion from the nationalist propaganda 
fixated on an annexation of Belgium, which he considered an obstacle to peace.90  
Similarly, while rejecting extreme annexations, the Naumann circle supported the 
idea of “Central Europe” (Mitteleuropa), which, based on a closer German-Austrian 
unity, attributed to Germany a central and dominant role in a military as well as economic 
unity of central European territories. To this end, Naumann established the “Working 
Committee for Central Europe” (Arbeitsausschuss für Mitteleuropa) with Bosch’s 
financial support, and Jäckh, Paul Rohrbach, and Philipp Stein founded the magazine 
Deutsche Politik.91  
Established in February 1916, the “Working Committee for Central Europe” did 
not only express liberal circles’ ambiguities but also signaled the beginning of a new 
stage in the relationship between federal agencies and private initiatives. Conceived as a 
“task force with practical goals,” the Committee’s purpose was “the voluntary support of 
German government’s negotiations on the future political, military and especially 
economic relations between the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and 
Turkey.”92 Accordingly, through Max Weber, the Committee inquired about possible 
forms of cooperation with the Ministry of the Interior.93  
Like most of the other organizations that sprung up during the war, Naumann’s 
“Working Committee” also aimed to seize the opportunities opened by the war, in the 
form of supporting a unity with Austria-Hungary that would survive the end of the 	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conflict.94 The “Working Committee” built a network of personalities from the political 
as well as economic world (including all party directions) in order to create the basis for 
the realization of the Mitteleuropa program. Naumann, Jäckh, Bosch, and Gleichen’s 
collaborator Schotte (who became the secretary of the organization) represent some of 
those involved in this organization. The organization aimed to support the Mitteleuropa 
ideal through propaganda and a society for the fostering of European economic interests 
and, to this end, requested the financial support of the Foreign Office.95      
The Committee’s activities, however, soon appeared problematic to Germany’s 
political leadership. By the end of 1917, government officials expressed their concerns 
with Naumann’s propaganda for the Mitteleuropa ideal and opposed public financial 
support for the expansion of the activities that Naumann had requested.96 Significantly, 
Schotte received lukewarm replies when he invited high ranking governmental officials 
to participate in the founding of the “Economic Council for Central Europe,”97 which 
aimed to lay the practical basis for a continuation of the current economic union also in 
times of peace.98 For instance, vice-chancellor Friedrich von Payer pointed to the cool 
reception for the Mitteleuropa plans in Austria and Hungary. Consequentially, concerned 
with the reaction of allied countries’ public opinion in a critical stage of the war, he 
informed Schotte that the government had no interest in being officially involved with an 
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organization whose goals seemed to the surpass those of the official negotiations with 
Austria and Hungary.99  
Government officials’ hesitancies toward Naumann’s “Working Committee” 
paralleled the increasingly closer cooperation between federal agencies and Gleichen’s 
Kulturbund. The Kulturbund’s shift from foreign to domestic propaganda signaled 
changes in Germany’s society under the pressures of a total war. Significantly, this 
strategic change of focus was the outcome of a meeting held at the War Department on 
June 21, 1916.100 Both the military and civil leadership gradually became aware of the 
dangers of German society’s internal fragmentation, as food shortages threatened the 
“civic peace,” and government’s inability to control the black market created tensions 
between farmers, city dwellers, and government officials.101 By the end of 1917, 
Prussia’s Ministry of the Interior noted with concern the growing discontent and unrest 
on the home front and developed channels of communication with other ministries to 
prevent riots and protests.102 At the same time, the Supreme Military Command stated the 
need to neutralize those elements that both consciously and unconsciously were 
weakening the morale on the home front.103 Conversely, the Social Democratic press 
increased its attacks against the government suggesting that the preservation of the “civic 
peace” was based on an unequal treatment of social democratic associations.104  
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The centralization of Germany’s war propaganda and the focus of both official 
and private organizations on domestic propaganda reflected the increasing concerns with 
the home front. In November 1917, in an internal confidential note, the Supreme Military 
Command stressed the risk that Germany’s war enemies may exploit the growing internal 
discontent and, thus, requested a more decisive counter strategy by Germany’s federal 
agencies.105 Arguing that the enemies were attempting to weaken Germany through 
“cosmopolitan and revolutionary ideas,” the military leadership demanded an active 
involvement of Germany’s cultural elites in domestic propaganda.106 To this end, the 
government established the “Intelligence Service for the Homeland” (Aufklärungsdienst 
in der Heimat), which aimed “to fortify the inner strength of the German nation at war.” 
Mirroring the plans exposed in Gleichen’s memorandum, the central office for domestic 
propaganda coordinated the activities of all propaganda agencies, distributed “reliable” 
material, co-opted intellectual leaders, and financially supported private endeavors.107        
In the cultural war, German intellectuals developed the notion of a special 
German path (Sonderweg) between capitalism and Marxism. The celebration of the 
“spirit of 1914” and the “ideas of 1914,” however, was increasingly directed inward and 
elevated 1914 to the beginning of a new, German era. The despised “practical,” 
“materialistic,” and “positivist” developments of German society were projected on the 
French and British war enemy and juxtaposed to an allegedly positive German path 
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rooted in the Idealist ideals of Kultur (culture) and Bildung (a spiritual formation of the 
man as a whole).108 
Gleichen had guided the expansion of the Kulturbund’s activities and its 
collaboration with the official propaganda apparatus of the German army. This space 
between official and private propaganda organizations became the seedbed of the future 
young-conservative milieu, which gradually formed around the figures of Gleichen and 
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck. While Gleichen “managed” a large private propaganda 
organization, the two future ideologues of the young conservatives, Moeller-Bruck and 
Max H. Boehm, were active in the propaganda department of the Supreme Military 
Command (Auslandsabteilung der OHL, or OHLA). Under the influence of the mythical 
community created by the “emergency” of the war, both ideologues developed influential 
analyses that aimed to counter the resurfacing of internal contrasts by stressing the 
common cultural, spiritual, and historical roots of the German nation.  
These propagandists were consciously projected into the future. While the cross-
partisan associations that had sprung up in the war’s early months had aimed to preserve 
national solidarity also in times of peace, these radical nationalists used the rhetoric of 
national unity to break with the bourgeois (political as well as social) conventions of the 
long nineteenth century. In fact, during the war and in its aftermath, these intellectuals 
would recurrently use Wilhelmine society and its bourgeois conventions as a rhetorical 
devise to condemn contemporary developments and push for a radical transformation of 
German society and politics.  
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 The celebration of Germany’s society at war therefore reflected a clear rejection of the 
soulless mechanized and industrialized life of Wilhelmine Society. Boehm explicitly 
juxtaposed Germany at war to Wilhelmine society. Although celebrating Germany’s 
technical development and will to power, he condemned the past emphasis on 
“civilization,” which had used up all national energies and thus not supported Germany’s 
spiritual and cultural development. Pre-war German society was based on the “notion of 
security,” which – he asserted – was rooted in a sense of reciprocal suspicion. In fact, he 
suggested that a lack of trust in fellow countrymen characterized modern societies. 
Industrial society had thus established welfare systems that replaced informal system of 
help with a “soulless mechanical institution,” which had transformed a reciprocal “gift of 
kindness” into “a legal claim.”109 Like Gleichen, Boehm condemned the mechanization 
of life in industrial society and viewed welfare systems as an expression of this 
rationalization.   
Nonetheless, writing at the end of the war, Boehm recognized that the German 
welfare state had facilitated the integration of the working classes into the national body. 
In fact, “The working class should grow into the idea of the Reich through a sober 
commonality of interests, in order to in peace as well as war … become a solid reliable 
support for the young Reich.”110 From this perspective, the war and the “civic peace” 
seemed to validate the Bismarckian strategy of the welfare state, or at least it appeared to 
transform the hopes of the reformers and critics of Wilhelmine Reich into attainable 
reality.   
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The war seemed to free individuals from industrial society’s “wires,” hence 
apparently validating the pre-war longing for a conflict that would break the hold of 
mechanized relationships. The war had created new opportunities for the individual.111 
By emphasizing the necessity of preserving the “militant man,” Boehm clearly voiced the 
growing concerns that the initial war enthusiasm was already paving the path to the 
reemergence of old bourgeois conventions. Also Moeller-Bruck decried Imperial 
Germany’s decadence and false sense of security and stated that, for Germans, 
“emergency” had always been “redemption”; in fact, “We are a nation for the case of 
emergency.” He celebrated the spirit of the war because  
The air of this war is our air, the pure and purifying, the sharp and spiritual 
and still so enormously true and real air, which already so frequently has 
ravished us in a whirl, which only in the emergency let us wind what 
greatness is, to which eventually we owe the enduring and earnest things 
in the world we have created.112  
 
At the same time, the associations and societies that had supported cross-party 
sociability and cultivated the spirit of the “civic peace” strained under the reemergence of 
radical partisanship. Foreshadowing the resurfacing of past ideological contrasts, the 
growing affinity of the “German Society 1914” with Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg 
alienated more conservative personalities. In a memorandum of 1915, the radical 
nationalist member of the “German Society 1914” Wolfgang Kapp attacked Bethmann 
Hollweg who, through a “policy of diagonal,” tried to balance the demands from both left 
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and right.113 As a reaction, during a parliamentary session, Bethmann Hollweg decried 
the “on-goings with public and secret publications” and condemned Kapp as a one of “the 
pirates of public opinion” who were usurping the “flag of national parties” to disrupt the 
the German nation’s internal solidarity.114  
Kapp – who after the war would lead a coup d’état against the republican 
government – also was the hidden initiator of a proposal aiming to change the by-laws of 
the “German Society 1914.”115 In the proposal, the authors argued that the Society was 
rooted in the war and that thus its ideals would be betrayed if it remained open, even only 
in theory, to members of nations at war with Germany.116 It was a “duty” for the Society 
– the drafters of the proposal asserted – to exclusively accept Germans because, as the 
name of the “German Society 1914” clearly signaled, the goal of the society was to keep 
alive the spirit of national unity that had emerged in the summer of 1914.117 The 
Members’ Assembly, however, rejected the proposal, which received only two votes in 
support.118 Few months later, Kapp would leave the Society.119   
By 1917 the fragmentation of German political society reflected the antagonisms 
among intellectual elites. In April, the socialist party split into two camps over the 
support to the war – the anti-war Independent Social Democratic Party (USPD) and the 
Majority SPD. In July, the Parliament passed a Peace Resolution that again divided 	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Germany’s political society along the traditional lines dividing supporters and opponents 
of the status quo. When, also in July, the Army Military Command ousted Chancellor 
Bethmann Hollweg, radicals’ demands for a military dictatorship appeared to be realized 
under the powerful war heroes Paul von Hindenburg and Erich von Ludendorff. These 
events testified to the definitive collapse of a political common front.  
Against this background, previous claims of nonpartisanship paved the path to 
endeavors that were clearly factional and often established in direct juxtaposition to other 
ventures. In September 1917, Kapp (at the time still a member of the “German Society 
1914”) and Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz founded the German Fatherland Party, which 
supported radical territorial annexations. Allegedly pursuing exclusively foreign policy 
goals, the new party had included in its name a reference to the faded patriotic spirit of 
August 1914. The Social Democratic as well as liberal press immediately accused the 
Fatherland Party of being “only a new concealment of well-known men,”120 and of 
fostering domestic antagonisms by defining itself as patriotic, thus implicitly suggesting 
that other political parties were not supporting the Fatherland.121  
The “Union of the Kaiser’s Loyalists” (Bund der Kaisertreuen) added radical 
domestic policies to the annexationist aims of the Fatherland Party. Despite denials from 
the leadership of the Fatherland Party,122 critics recognized the Union as a “sub-
company” aiming to fulfill the Fatherland Party’s domestic goals.123 Reacting to the 
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Union demanded “an unconditional, manly and tough, advocacy of the principle that 
what belongs to the Kaiser, remains to the Kaiser.”124   
As the war entered its third winter, calls for peace gained more popular support. 
Food rationing, massive casualties on the battlefields, and uncertainties over the 
attainability of a victorious peace extracted a heavy toll on a population that had entered 
the war trusting in a swift and triumphant victory. The establishment of associations 
expressing antagonistic perspectives on peace and war thus symbolized the end of the 
mythical solidarity of the early war years, and Germany’s associational life again 
expressed traditional political dividing lines.  
At the beginning of 1917, Delbrück had denounced the dangers of radical 
annexationist war aims. In confidential letters, Delbrück informed Valentini that, with a 
group of like-minded personalities, he aimed to collect funds to support political 
endeavors fighting against domestic and foreign chauvinism. While this struggle was 
necessary because chauvinism was an obstacle to peace, he initially argued that these 
plans had to be postponed to avoid a further radicalization of domestic contrasts.125 
Expressing similar concerns, Meinecke condemned extreme annexationist plans because 
they only radicalized domestic contrasts. In addition, he argued that the war aim debate 
risked generating the belief abroad that the German government supported such extreme 
annexationist plans.126  
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Max Weber also entered the political fray with a series of articles published in the 
Frankfurter Zeitung in the summer of 1917. He condemned radicals’ “inveighing against 
the enemy” and “mak[ing] speeches and pass[ing] resolutions about what ‘we’ must 
annex before ‘we’ can conclude peace.”127 He argued that parliamentary democracy was 
superior to the German form of government not because of the concept of popular 
sovereignty, but because it was more efficient in the context of modern, rationalized 
warfare (as the Western powers’ military successes were demonstrating). He attacked 
those “literati” criticizing the parliamentary form of government “in the most arrogant 
and extravagant form, with disdainful venom and without any willingness to understand 
the preconditions of effective parliaments.”128 
By the summer, Delbrück also argued that only the concession of democracy and 
the reform of the Prussian electoral system could avoid internal collapse during the 
winter.129 At the same time, the liberals participating in the war propaganda voiced their 
skepticism about propaganda’s effectiveness. In a private letter, Troeltsch asserted that 
while in the past it had been possible to influence foreign countries by stressing 
Germany’s cultural and scientific achievements, now this was “totally excluded.” The 
only way to have an impact abroad – he continued – was through domestic reforms, “All 
the rest is, completely now, totally ineffective and purely theoretical.”130 Observing the 
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unfolding events in Russia, Meinecke stressed the necessity for domestic reforms to show 
“that the days of the conservative authoritarian system have ended for us.”131 
Liberals founded the “National Union for Freedom and Fatherland” (Volksbund 
für Freiheit und Vaterland, or Volksbund) as a counterforce to the German Fatherland 
Party. This new organization overlapped the “Free Patriotic Union” and the “Delbrück 
Evenings.” Rejecting both the cooperation with the Fatherland Party and careful of not 
moving “too much to the left,” the Volksbund involved the powerful Christian as well as 
Free Trade Unions.132 Observers from the Fatherland Party recognized the threats coming 
from the new organization. They feared it would compete with the Fatherland Party and 
develop a “silent propaganda” against Kapp’s endeavor, thus threatening to co-opt the 
Fatherland Party’s more liberal elements.133      
The speakers clearly expressed their opposition to the Fatherland Party during the 
opening ceremony of the Volksbund. In his address, Meinecke stated that, although past 
differences did not disappear, the war had created a commonality of interest and had 
bound together German society. This unity, however, was not the same as the one of 
August 1914 because “we again have among us sharp and profound party juxtapositions, 
and out of these contrasts has been born our Volksbund.”134 The Volksbund – Meinecke 
continued – was as committed to the fatherland as the Fatherland Party was, but “our 
heads are cooler and clearer!”135 While still rooted in the rhetoric of national unity, the 
Volksbund was thus the product of Germany’s fragmented political context.  	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Although the Volksbund did not adopt the strong position against the Fatherland 
Party that Delbrück had advocated,136 it was seen as a central office for propaganda 
against the Fatherland Party’s “desperate efforts” to win members.137 Competing with the 
financially potent Fatherland Party,138 the Volksbund’s capacities were only increased 
when Bosch – initially referred to as an anonymous “friend” – guaranteed strong 
financial support for two years on the condition that the Volksbund hired an “agitator” 
and increased its publishing activities.139 In addition, in September 1918, the Board of 
Directors decided to decrease the minimum membership fee in the hope that this would 
facilitate “the competition with the Fatherland Party.”140  
In contrast to the elitist approach of the cross-partisan organizations of the war’s 
early months, the Volksbund was aware of the need to root political decision-making in 
popular support. Meinecke argued, “A state, which has to conduct a war with a mass 
army of 12 percent of the population, has also to base its domestic policies on the 
masses.”141 To this end, the Volksbund clearly pushed for domestic reforms. In its first 
public announcement, it explicitly stressed the interconnections between domestic 
reforms and a successful foreign policy.142 Even more explicitly, during the opening 
ceremony, the leadership of the organization argued that a strong and effective foreign 
policy was possible only if large sections of society supported it. This, however, required 
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that the people were allowed greater political participation, “the free development of the 
people in the homeland is the highest and supreme source for outward-directed power. … 
As the greatest service to the fatherland we need a liberal reform.”143 To this end, the 
Board of Directors decided to rely on the organizational network of its institutional 
members to establish local branches in cities with over 50,000 inhabitants.144 The 
Volksbund requested lists of “trustworthy” personalities in several cities who would play 
a crucial role in broadening the associational network of the organization.145  
The Volksbund also established close connections with the “Intelligence Service,” 
which benefited from the former’s broad network and contacts with the trade unions. The 
“Intelligence Service” relied on organizations such as the Volksbund and the “Union of 
German Scholars and Artists” in its efforts to reach all sections of German society. It 
financially supported these organizations, and Ernst Francke (president of the 
Volksbund), Gleichen, and Jäckh represented them within the “Intelligence Service.”146 
By the summer of 1918, the “Intelligence Service” could claim to have connections with 
ca. 760 organizations with a total of 7 million members.147    
This connection with Germany’s central propaganda office gave liberal circles 
access to the political leadership in the last, critical months of the war. Within the 
executive committee of the “Intelligence Service,” the growing awareness of the negative 	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impact of food rationing on the population spurred debates on the need to offer 
“something positive,” as for example the reform of Prussia’s electoral system and social 
legislation.148 Francke and Theodor Heuss – one of Naumann’s protégés – stressed the 
dangers of strikes and of the common “depression,” and insisted on the symbolic 
importance of an official gesture regarding the Prussian electoral reform. Aware of the 
limits of domestic propaganda and the increasing popular distrust in the political 
leadership, Francke noted, “With movie screenings and posters it is not possible to win 
such confidence.”149  
The failure of Germany’s last military offensive in March 1918 set in motion a 
chain of events that would influence both the actions and conceptualizations of 
intellectual elites and the nation at large. The Supreme Military Command renounced its 
almost dictatorial powers against the backdrop of imminent defeat on the war front and 
growing discontent on the home front. In this new political context, Meinecke pointed out 
the necessity to go public with a program oriented toward the future in a late-September 
meeting of the Volksbund’s executive directors. Meinecke warned against leaving the 
initiative to political parties and renouncing the opportunity to exercise direct influence 
on the people, although other members more inclined to wait for the outcome of 
parliamentary negotiations opposed his plans.150   
With the nomination of Prince Max von Baden to lead a government that for the 
first time included delegates of the parliament, Germany became a parliamentary 
monarchy. Naumann celebrated these transformations and saw in them the realization of 	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the vision he had exposed almost twenty years earlier in Democracy and Empire.151 
Similarly, in his opening address at the Volksbund’s assembly on October 27, Francke 
stated,  
When almost a year ago the Volksbund was established, it raised its voice 
for the unity between national leadership and people’s representation on 
the basis of trust in the people and by the people. This goal is achieved. 
We have a people’s government, which relies on a vast parliamentary 
majority and wants to anchor itself in the people.152 
   
Germany’s “bourgeois” revolution, however, rapidly paved the path to the 
November Revolution, which shook liberals’ last bourgeois securities. On November 9, 
the Workers’ and Soldiers’ Council in Berlin called for a general strike, which was 
accompanied by the sailors’ mutiny in Kiel and Wilhelmshaven. In commenting on the 
chaos and insecurity, one perceptive observer emblematically noted, “when leaving 
home, one wonders whether houses and trees are still standing.”153 In Berlin, on 
November 9, rumors of an impending putsch and the unclear intentions of the Spartacist 
leadership almost compelled the SPD deputy Philipp Scheidemann to declare a “German 
Republic.” On the same day Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated and fled into exile in Holland, 
thus sealing the fate of the German Empire. On November 16, Troeltsch recognized, “the 
end is here, the four-year long veil of secrecy has been lifted. It is an end with horror, far 
more terrible than expected,” and saw the only solution in democracy, “there is no other 
way and no other help…”154  
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The Weimar Republic came into being “by default” against the backdrop of 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils springing up in November and December of 1918 and the 
Spartacist uprising in January 1919. In the midst of general insecurity and a mounting 
civil war, voters elected on January 19, 1919 the National Assembly and supported with 
three-quarters of the vote the “pro-republic” parties, that is, the Majority Socialists, 
liberals, and the Catholic Center Party. The delegates assembled for the first time on 
February 6, 1919 in the safety of the city of Weimar, 180 miles south of Berlin where the 
Social Democrat Gustav Noske had violently suppressed the German revolution with the 
help of the voluntary, “Free Corps” units of former soldiers. The Assembly elected the 
Social Democrat Friedrich Ebert president and Philipp Scheidemann of the SPD formed a 
coalition government of the Majority SPD, the liberal German Democratic Party 
(Deutsche Demokratische Partei, or DDP), and the Catholic Center Party (the so-called 
Weimar coalition).155 
With the end of the war, also the focus of the clubs and associations that had been 
formed during the war changed. At the “Delbrück-Evenings,” rather than seeking direct 
political influence, Delbrück guided the debates into an inquiry of the causes and conduct 
of the war, thus often “specialists” from military as well as diplomatic circles would 
attend the meetings in the 1920s.156 Similarly, at the “Wednesday-Society,” the 
discussions focused on foreign as well as domestic politics and Ludwig Stein invited 
foreign speakers in order to discuss contrasting perspectives. Germany’s request of 
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membership in the League of Nations, for example, caused heated debates, but Harry 
Graf von Kessler and Walter Simons were able to convince the majority of the members 
of the wisdom of the request.157 Although the “German Society 1914” would continue to 
serve as a meeting place for political elites until the Nazi seizure of power,158 an 
anonymous author decried on occasion of its ten-year anniversary the failure to establish 
similar organizations in the post-war years.159 
Symbolically, Berlin’s new social clubs naturally aligned with the new political 
parties that mushroomed in the months leading to the elections of the National Assembly. 
The Berlin Democratic Club was close to the German Democratic Party, whose first chair 
was Naumann. Founded on March 9, 1919 at the Hotel Bristol in Berlin, the Club’s by-
laws set the acceptance of the new democratic form of government as a precondition for 
membership. As an elitist group that was open to new members only through invitation, 
the Club united leaders from all walks of life for political discussion and social 
gatherings.160   
In a parallel development, in October 1919 conservative, aristocratic, and military 
circles founded the “National Club,” whose first president became General Oskar von 
Hutier.161 As the membership list of the Advisory Board shows, this social club was close 
to both the conservative German People’s Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, or DVP) and the 	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even more conservative German National People’s Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, 
or DNVP).162 Indeed, the National Club aimed “to support the social aggregation of 
German men and women who acknowledge the strengthening of the nationalist thought 
as the precondition for the reconstruction of Germany.”163  
Milieu formation had fragmented and polarized German society at the turn of the 
twentieth century in the wake of and in reaction to the processes of democratization, 
parliamentarism, and industrialization. Even World War One and the process of 
modernization did not break the exclusive ties of subcultures. On the contrary, the 
Weimar Republic, which is characterized in Peukert’s account by an accelerated process 
of modernization, consolidated milieus.164 As a result, it opened a “civil war of 
memories” in which the right, the republicans, political Catholicism, and the extreme left 
developed their own master-narratives of Weimar’s place in history, hence stressing “the 
lack of any basic consensus about the past, present and future of the German state and 
society.”165   
Conclusion 
 
Historians and political scientists have used concepts such as “socio-moral 
milieu” and “cleavage” to point out German society’s fragmentation in the late nineteenth 
century. While some scholars tend to relativize the rigidity and exclusivity of these social 
camps, contemporaries voiced a common sense of fragmentation and incompleteness. 
Although they could pride themselves on Germany’s economic and military 	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achievements, contemporaries lamented the withering of the spirit that had guided 
national unification and had made these attainments possible. By the end of the 
nineteenth century, the growing influence of the socialist movement gave visible 
expression to the alleged positivist and economic-centered turn of German social, 
cultural, and political life. The penetration of the masses in both the educational and 
political system not only questioned established cultural norms but also challenged the 
codified balance of power in Germany’s political system.166  
Naumann recognized the futility of any attempt to exclude the socialist masses 
from public life. By acknowledging Social Democrats as political opponents, he broke 
the long tradition that had labeled the German socialist party as an un-German and anti-
national force. Naumann’s goal, however, remained the integration of the workers’ 
movement into the national body; a goal that could be achieved only by breaking the 
party allegiance of the workers through an emphasis on the national element. In the 
traditional German perspective of the primacy of foreign policy, the internal solidarity 
and solidity deriving from a successful integration of all national forces was the 
precondition for Germany’s leading role in the international arena.  
The war seemed to create the internal unity that Imperial Germany’s liberal 
reformers had been longing for since the 1890s. In its initial phases, the war appeared to 
cancel Germany’s traditional political, social, and religious cleavages. German elites 
actively aimed to support this artificial unity by joining a plethora of formal as well as 
informal organizations, groups, and clubs that aimed to reinforce Germany’s domestic 
solidarity by cultivating a cross-partisan sociability. These organizations consciously 	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supported social interaction of the highest echelons of German society in order to create 
channels of communications both across the political spectrum and between Germany’s 
cultural elites and political leadership. In this way, these associations also provided 
avenues for the political participation of German intellectuals who – with few exceptions 
– had until then shunned the highly politicized public sphere.    
The cultivation of domestic solidarity clearly had a foreign policy function. As 
Naumann and the Wilhelmine reformists had recognized since the 1890s, the inner 
strength of the German nation was seen as the precondition for an effective foreign and 
military policy. Paradoxically, the necessity to integrate all societal strata in the national 
body not only disrupted the internal life of Berlin’s nonpartisan associations but also 
domestic unity. In fact, the rhetoric of unity and internal solidarity was an ideology that 
within itself repeated the social fragmentation of German society. While authoritarian 
elites celebrated the integration of all sections of society into the national body, minority 
as well as marginalized groups interpreted their participation in the national community 
as part of a process of socio-political recognition. The ideology of national solidarity was 
therefore repressive because it aimed to eliminate social conflicts, and projected domestic 
tensions on the image of the enemy.167 
By the second half of the war, the old dividing lines of German society resurfaced 
stronger than before. The German Fatherland Party and the Volksbund gave visible 
expression to the fragmentation of associational life. Paradoxically, German cultural 
elites’ growing involvement in propaganda activities signaled the end of the mythical 
“civic peace” of the early war period. Germany’s war propaganda had been focused on 
the home front by supporting the narrative of a defensive war and the specificity of 	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Germany’s cultural as well as political development. Federal agencies’ attempt to involve 
cultural leaders and their organizations in the propaganda apparatus reflected political 
elites’ growing concerns with domestic unrest. At the same time, however, this 
intensified cooperation between private organizations and federal agencies did not result 
in an enhanced political influence of Germany’s intellectual elites. As the case of 
Naumann’s “Working Committee” shows, political leadership worried that private 
initiatives would surpass official policy and thus become counterproductive. Conversely, 
Gleichen’s Kulturbund and the executive committee of Aufklärungsdienst testified to the 
presence of these elites at the critical juncture between voluntary endeavors and official 
politics. Nonetheless, the democratization of Germany’s political system was the result of 
military defeat and popular unrest rather than of the activities of these intellectuals, who 
beheld these events with increasing distress.        
The experience during the last two decades of the Wilhelmine Reich and – in 
particular, during the war – contributed to the emergence of a new type of public 
intellectual. Although involved in often acrimonious public debates, all these intellectuals 
sought direct or indirect forms of influence in public affairs. Their contributions, 
however, did not remain limited to analyses of German realities and conceptualizations of 
forms of societal organization that theoretically would solve the tension between private 
interest and the common good that industrialization and now parlamentiarization had 
exacerbated. In fact, all these intellectuals – and here lays the far-reaching influence of 
Naumann – tried to transform their conceptualizations through practical experimentations 
into reality. Not surprisingly, therefore, the central nuclei of these two intellectual circles 
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were not a set of shared ideas but rather two educational institutes that provided the base 
for both conceptual and organizational experimentations.                
The November Revolution was an abrupt awakening. For some, the collapse of 
the German Reich came like a shock. The conservative Catholic historian Martin Spahn 
appeared incapacitated to act by a depressive collapse168 and also Naumann struggled to 
deal with the disappearance of the political system that volente o nolente had provided the 
frame of reference for all his reformist plans.169 Others found in the emergency of the 
time a new impetus to action. Old liberals like Max Weber and Meinecke would 
participate in the constitutional debates. Jäckh – the organizer as always – would support 
a momentarily revitalized Naumann in his educational programs and establish new 
organizations in support of the “League of Nations.” The circle around Moeller-Bruck, 
Boehm, Eduard Stadtler, and Gleichen would see in post-revolutionary Germany the risk 
of returning to the old Wilhelmine decadence and meaninglessness after the intermezzo of 
the war, and thus frantically worked to maintain the state of emergency in German 
society. 
For all, the post-war period and the Weimar Republic would became a laboratory 
of modernity, in which it was possible to conceptualize and experiment with different, 
alternative, and contrasting forms of societal organization. Paradoxically, all these 
conceptualizations would recognize the need to legitimize new political forms of societal 
organization in front of the masses. In a sense, therefore, the boundaries between 
democratic and undemocratic solutions to the tension between private interest and the 
common good were not as straightforward as the division of the political spectrum into a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 Eduard Stadtler, Als Politischer Soldat, 1914-1918 (Düsseldorf: Neuer Zeitverlag, 1935), 175. 
169 Walter Struve, Elites against Democracy: Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political Thought in 
Germany, 1890-1933 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 115. 
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continuum from the extreme right to the extreme left may suggest. The people (Volk) 
from accessory of the political discourse were now moved to the center of it. All new 
forms of societal organization had to consider this as a given. Political education, 
formation of independent and responsible leadership, creation of national consciousness, 
and perpetuation of the militant man became the goals (sometimes contrasting, often 
overlapping) of these two intellectual circles. 
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUALIZING DEMOCRACY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL 
AND VOLK 
 
By the end of the war, associational life once again seemed increasing domestic 
tensions because it was fragmented along milieu-lines and unable to bridge socio-
economic individualism and communitarian values. Similarly, the Weimar Republic 
quickly lost its legitimacy as it was saddled with the consequences of the peace 
agreement, which included massive reparations and an admission of war guilt. The 
government, therefore, could hardly play the role of the protector of civil society. On the 
contrary, German intellectuals soon perceived the proportional system of representation 
as both a cause and product of Germany’s internal fragmentation. In fact, the Weimar 
Republic’s parliamentary system reinforced the perception that political parties – as 
products of different socio-moral milieus – merely expressed contrasting self-interests.  
Nonetheless, out of a sense of personal responsibility toward the national 
community, Wilhelmine liberals actively participated in public debates and confronted 
the radically modified relationship between Volk and the individual. The republican form 
of state moved the “people” to the center of the political process, and abruptly 
transformed subjects into citizens. Hence, democrats had to address the crucial questions 
of people’s political capacities, political leadership, and the formation of public opinion 
in a pluralistic society.1 The new parliamentary democracy therefore had to solve the 
problem that – exacerbated by the war – had caused the collapse of the monarchic 
system, namely the integration of a pluralistic, industrial society into the state. 
Consequentially, Max Weber and Friedrich Meinecke drafted constitutional proposals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Christoph Gusy, “Einleitung: Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik – 
Entstehungsbedingungen und Vorfragen,” in Demokratisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik, edited by 
Christoph Gusy (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 28-35. Cf. Margaret L. Anderson, Practicing Democracy. 
Elections and Political Culture in Imperial Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
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and investigated the role of the republican presidency. Friedrich Naumann established the 
“Citizens School” in order to counter the lack of political consciousness and Ernst 
Troeltsch analyzed the German roots of democracy.  
These intellectuals’ attitude towards the new democratic state was, however, not 
one of whole-hearted endorsement. Meinecke’s often-quoted statement – “I remain, 
facing the past, monarchist by heart and will become, turning to the future, republican by 
reason” – characterized a broad group of Wilhelmine liberals, the Republicans of Reason 
(or Vernunftrepublikaner).2 These intellectuals supported the new political system out of 
a sense of political responsibility rather than of moral convinction. As the writings of 
Theodor Heuss will also show, these cultural elites turned their back to the monarchic 
system not because convinced of political democracy’s intrinsic superiority but rather 
because military defeat had deligimized the German monarchy. Their republicanism was 
therefore pragmatic and grounded in a rational, intellectual choice.    
By contrast, young conservatives posed as an extra-parliamentary force rejecting 
both party system and liberal state as foreign, un-German entities. Also aware of the new 
centrality of the Volk, they, however, conceptualized it as a unity, hence not considering 
it as a plurality of independent citizens. Accordingly, young conservatives saw true 
(rather than formal) democracy as the expression of a unified common will and tended to 
interpret social plurality and multiplicity of interests as disturbing factors for true 
democracy. By de-legitimizing the parliamentary system, young conservatives deprived 
society of intermediate venues able to institutionalize conflict and hence mediate between 
contrasting interests. Nationalism’s emphasis on social homogeneity, the notions of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Friedrich Meinecke, “Verfassung und Verwaltung der deutschen Republik,” Die neue Rundschau, vol. 30 
(January 1919), 2.   
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Gemeinschaft and corporatism, the elevation of the state to a “moral project,” and 
charismatic leadership offered ways to bypass existing political institutions and to create 
new channels of political legitimization. 
Both circles of intellectuals at the center of this study strained to come to terms 
with the new post-war political context. Initially, the defeat and, most importantly, the 
communist threat offered a last opportunity of cooperation across political divides. By the 
summer of 1920, however, this initial commonality of intents paved the path to the 
conceptualization of radically contrasting forms of societal organization. In this period, 
acrimonious debates punctuated these intellectuals’ activities. While young conservatives 
rejected the parliamentary system tout court, the liberals of the Jäckh circle limited their 
attacks to the proportional system of representation. Ultimately, however, both 
intellectual circles continued viewing social fragmentation as the primary cause of 
Germany’s weakness.  
Contrasting conceptualizations of societal organization thus dominated public 
discourse during the Weimar Republic. Both groups at the center of this study were 
aware of the monarchy’s inability to integrate all social forces into the nation. They did 
not disagree on the fundamental need to develop a more integrative social as well as 
political system. While at the center of both conceptualizations, the “people” or “nation” 
– identified with the ambiguous German word Volk – was either theorized as a unity and 
thus able of common will or as an entity necessarily fragmented in multiple conflicting 
groups and individualities. 
Accordingly, I first analyze the crucial months between the armistice and the 
Treaty of Versailles. In this period, when hope and despair seemed deeply entangled, 
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German public intellectuals’ activities and ideas developed against the backdrop of 
communist uprisings, the promises of Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points,” and the 
“Diktat” of Versailles. Secondly, I analyze the understanding of democracy by the 
intellectuals that gradually formed the circle around Ernst Jäckh. These intellectuals 
accepted the new liberal, parliamentary system, although with some initial ambivalences. 
In their view, the new parliamentary democracy became the only form of state able to 
integrate all German social strata into the nation. Finally, I turn to young conservatives’ 
alternative solutions and their attempts to find a path for Germany between Western 
liberal parliamentarism and Eastern Bolshevism. Young conservatives were unequivocal 
in their principled rejection of the pre-war social as well as political system. The 
revolutionary outburst of the winter of 1918-19 offered the opportunity to purify the 
German nation of all foreign influences, and in particular of a liberal political system that 
allegedly disrupted the unity of the German nation.               
From the Armistice to Versailles: Associational Life between Hopes and Despair 
 
In the months between the armistice and the Treaty of Versailles, national and 
international politics shaped the actions of Germany’s public intellectuals and set the 
parameters of public debates. The Wilhelmine Empire’s collapse had heightened the 
sense of individual responsibility toward the national community. At the same time, the 
still fluid new political system supported hopes in the possibility to influence the future 
development of both Germany’s society and form of government. Woodrow Wilson’s 
“Fourteen Points” and the “League of Nations” seemed to offer tools to counter the 
centrifugal forces that the communist uprisings of the winter of 1918-19 had awakened. 
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The Treaty of Versailles, however, was an abrupt awakening and would significantly 
influence the goals and strategies of German intellectuals and of their associations.           
In these months, Germany’s “crisis” seemed to clearly break with a burdensome 
past and the future appeared open to a range of possibilities. Emblematically, towards the 
end of the war, Naumann wrote, “the coming times lay ahead of us all like a wide fog, in 
which bright and dark areas wrestle.” – Nonetheless, he noted, – “Such a palpitating 
fogginess has something beautiful and intoxicating, conjures hope, expectations, [and] 
duties in a strange greatness.”3 In November 1918, Moeller-Bruck also voiced similar 
hopes. The war had juxtaposed “young” and “old” nations, “A nation is young by acting 
on the world it creates out of the world it finds,” and Germany, he asserted, embodied the 
ideal of the young nation.4 Both groups of intellectuals therefore interpreted the collapse 
of the old political system as the possibility for a new beginning.  
Across the political spectrum, therefore, German elites repeatedly stressed the 
importance of taking individual responsibility. In a confidential note, a group of 
intellectuals stressed the necessity to take “responsibility for the country’s destiny” and 
warned against “remain[ing] secluded, detached, and isolated.” The signatories including 
Naumann, Meinecke, and Troeltsch placed themselves “at the disposal of the nation, its 
will, and its representatives” and aimed to constructively influence the course of events.5 
Similarly, Gleichen, in a circular letter to the Kulturbund’s members, stated that the 
current times required “everyone’s general willingness to self-sacrificing individual 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Friedrich Naumann, “Vier Reden an Junge Freunde,” in Friedrich Naumann and Wilhelm Heile, 
Erziehung zur Politik (Berlin: Buchverlag der “Hilfe,” 1918), 24. 
4 Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, “Das Recht der jungen Völker” (November, 1918), in Das Recht der 
jungen Völker. Sammlung politischer Aufsätze, edited by Hans Schwarz (Berlin: Verlag der Nahe Osten, 
1932), 157. 
5 Confidential Circular Letter, November 14, [1918], Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep. 226, Nr. 17.  
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effort, because only work can save Germany, can [save] our nation.”6 The old political 
system’s collapse provided the opportunity to mold Germany’s future political 
transformations, and this – all Germany’s elites acknowledged – required taking 
responsibility in the public sphere.      
The communist uprisings of the winter of 1918-19 gave urgency to this general 
call to individual action. Repeatedly, liberal elites voiced their uneasiness with the 
revolutionary events. They condemned socialists’ incapacity to transform themselves 
from a “class-struggle party” into a “national party,”7 and doubted that the “civic peace” 
of August 1914 had ever existed.8 The communist revolution had broken the unity that 
the war had cemented, and signaled the definitive penetration of the masses in Germany’s 
political society.9 Hence, Wilhelmine liberals saw in the communist uprising not only the 
advent of the masses but also the victory of the Marxist ideology of “class struggle” over 
the nourished myth of the “civic peace.” Across the political spectrum, German 
intellectual elites agreed on the necessity to overcome the ideology of “class struggle” 
and that this primarily was a task for the cultural intelligentsia.10   
Naumann recognized that the total war had awakened people’s political will and 
engagement. In the midst of the radical political transformation of the fall and winter of 
1918, Naumann focused on the need for political education, which in his view could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Heinrich von Gleichen, Circular letter, January 25, 1919, p. 1. BArch, R 901/71075. 
7 Wilhelm Heile, “Deutsche Demokratie,” Die Hilfe, no. 51 (December 19, 1918), 613-615. Some of these 
comments, however, must be considered against the background of the upcoming elections for the National 
Assembly. See also Friedrich Naumann, “Der neue Parlamentarismus,” Die Hilfe, no. 9 (February 27, 
1919), 99-100 and Wilhelm Heile, “Die Politik der deutschen Demokratie,” Die Hilfe, no. 51 (December 
18, 1919), 722-724. 
8 Gertrud Bäumer, “Die Überwindung des Klassenkampfes,” Die Hilfe, vol. 24, issue 11 (1918), 117. 
9 Gertrud Bäumer, “Die Seele der Revolution,” Die Hilfe, vol. 25, issue 15 (1919), 180 and Gertrud 
Bäumer, “Der Fluch der Masse,” Die Hilfe, vol. 25, issue 27 (1919), 347.  
10 In a note significantly released on the same day as his call to action, Gleichen warned against the notion 
that the “idea” of Bolshevism coincided with the “means” of Bolshevism. He argued that with the military 
victory over Bolshevists in Berlin, intellectuals’ task was to overcome Bolshevism as an idea. Heinrich von 
Gleichen, Circular letter, January 25, 1919. BArch, R 901/71075.  
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bridge parties’ divisions and counter the Marxist ideology of “class struggle.” It became 
therefore crucial to make the people familiar with the “apparatus of government.”  
As a pure spectator you stay inexperienced, and all appears strange and 
confused. Go to your club, in the humble little club of your district, sit 
there among the twenty or thirty men and women. As small as your district 
parliament is, it may still be the water chamber for important decisions if 
you take it seriously. All important movements started in a corner.11 
 
In fact, democracy required higher levels of political knowledge and participation 
because it transformed the individual into an active citizen. Herman Heller – who would 
become one of the most original thinkers associated with Jäckh’s post-war circle – 
similarly stressed the necessity to transform “subjects” into citizens when they requested 
the “right of participation in the decision-making process of the state.”12  
Shocked by the revolutionary outbursts, Naumann viewed political education as 
the solution to German society’s worrisome transformations. Naumann aimed to educate 
the masses to democracy because he feared communists’ and independent socialists’ 
influence on the soldiers returning from the front. He hoped to de-radicalize political 
conflicts by eliminating or reducing class antagonism, and hence to contain the 
Bolshevist threat. Indeed, as Max Weber had pointed out, the primary political task had 
to be allowing “returning soldiers to rebuild that Germany which they have saved – 
through the ballot in their hands and through their elected representatives.”13 Naumann 
thus founded the “Citizens School” (Staatsbürgerschule) with Bosch’s financial backing. 
The School opened its courses in the summer of 1918 and, between November 1918 and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Friedrich Naumann, “Politische Pflicht” (1919), in Werke, vol. 5 (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964), 
738-739.  
12 Hermann Heller, “Volkshochschule und Parteischule” (1919/20), in Herman Heller, Gesammelte 
Schriften, vol. 1, edited by Christoph Müller with the collaboration of Sabine von Levetzow (Leiden: 
Sijthoff, 1971), 601.    
13 Weber, “Parliament and Government in a Reconstructed Germany,” 1381-1382. 
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January 1919, successfully attracted returning soldiers, hence significantly increasing its 
student body.14  
While Naumann decisively turned to political education as a means to influence 
the German masses, within Gleichen’s Kulturbund, Eduard Stadtler rapidly rose to 
notoriety as one of the most effective anti-Bolshevik public speakers and mobilizers. 
Stadtler’s biography exemplifies the progressive transformation of a young, Catholic 
academic enthralled by the war into a “drummer” and organizer of anti-Bolshevik 
organizations. He had witnessed the Bolshevist Revolution as a war prisoner and, after 
his return to Germany in August 1918, Stadtler became a fierce advocate for an 
aggressive anti-Soviet policy.  
In his public speeches, Stadtler repeatedly warned against the revolutionary threat 
in Germany, which in his view was following Russian patterns. On occasion of the first 
public event of Gleichen’s newly founded “Coalition for National and Social Solidarity” 
(Vereinigung für nationale und soziale Solidarität), Stadtler argued that Germans must 
unite in order to avoid the spiritual as well as economic collapse that may accompany the 
revolution. He stated that a proletarian dictatorship could be avoided only by involving 
the working classes in the reconstruction of the state. Furthermore, he argued that in order 
to avoid a Sovietization of the economic system, Germany’s elites had to recognize the 
collapse of nineteenth-century capitalism, and thus needed to establish a new, corporatist 
form of economic organization.15    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Heuss, Friedrich Naumann, 440-441. Marxist historians have denounced Naumann’s attempt to de-
radicalize class conflicts and break the hold of socialism on the masses. See for example Wollkopf, Zur 
Politischen Konzeption, 2-7.  
15 Eduard Stadtler, Der Bolschewismus und seine Ueberwindung (Berlin: Generalsekretariat zum Studium 
und zur Bekämpfung des Bolschewismus, 1918), 13-16. According to Stadtler, the speech was a success 
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During the communist uprising in Berlin, Stadtler intensified his collaboration 
with Gleichen and established organizations aiming to mobilize and organize the masses 
against the communist influence. In December, Stadtler founded the “General Secretariat 
for the Study and Fight of Bolshevism” (Generalsekretariat zum Studium und zur 
Bekämpfung des Bolschewismus) and the “Anti-Bolshevist League” (Antibolschevistische 
Liga), which aimed to become an umbrella organization for like-minded groups. Even 
Naumann supported these endeavors with a contribution of 3,000 M from one of his 
political funds.16 The Generalsekretariat comprised three departments – scientific, 
propaganda, and press – to which a fourth charged with security and information tasks 
was soon added.17 The Generalsekretariat rapidly established local branches in several 
north-German cities,18 despite the authorities briefly shut the organization down at the 
beginning of December.19At the same time, Stadtler secured substantial financial support 
from industrial circles and established a personal relationship with Hugo Stinnes.20 
In Stadtler’s strategy, the Generalsekretariat combined negative propaganda – 
that is, the rejection of Bolshevism – with constructive messages for Germany’s future. In 
a speech on January 25, 1919, Stadtler attacked the optimist conviction that German 
Bolshevism had been vanquished with the defeat of the communist uprising in Berlin. He 
contended that Bolshevism was the continuation of the “anarchic degradation process of 
the world war,” that is, the massification of society with the consequential uprooting of 	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social order. In Germany, this process had taken the form of political chaos, economic 
dissolution, and radicalization of the masses. In Stadtler’s analysis, therefore, only a 
strong political-military dictator able to resist the Russian army, a socialization of the 
economy, a renewal of Germans’ national consciousness, and, most importantly, a peace 
policy between the Entente and Germany could avoid Bolshevism’s victory in 
Germany.21 
Stadtler’s attempt to maintain this high level of alert failed, however, to convince 
his financial supporters. In addition, he was convinced of the necessity to turn to those 
ideas and principles that found expression in Bolshevism without, however, adopting 
Russian methods. In his inflammatory rhetoric aiming to establish a mass-based anti-
Bolshevik movement he expressed therefore his approval of a council system that, by 
being corporatively rooted in society, could overcome nineteen-century capitalism. In late 
January, he expressed a favorable opinion of the council system in a speech in front of 
5,000 workers. His financial backers summoned Stadtler and only Stinnes’s intervention 
could avoid a definitive rupture. Stadtler’s activism contrasted with the interests of his 
financial supporters after the definitive defeat of the communist uprising and the 
progressive channeling of internal tensions into the National Assembly’s constitutional 
debates. By the end of March, Stadtler had to renounce the leadership of the “Anti-
Bolshevist League.”22 
The activities of Naumann and Stadtler testify to the fundamental agreement over 
the new role of the masses in the political process. Whether stressing the need to educate 
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Stadtler dates this speech January 23. Stadtler, Als Antibolschewist, 1918-1919, 60. 
22 Stadtler, Als Antibolschewist, 1918-1919, 70, 115-116, and 123-124. 
	   111	  
them to democracy or to mobilize them against the communist threat, both Naumann and 
Stadtler recognized the fundamental transformation of Germany’s political society. 
Intellectual elites also shared concerns with the radicalization of class differences in 
Germany’s post-war society, as Naumann’s financial support to Stadtler’s activities 
shows. Initially, the fear of Bolshevism unified previously separated strata of society and 
pushed the bourgeoisie to self-organize.23  
Nonetheless, old and new associations soon strained in adapting to the rapidly 
changing political framework. The Volksbund and Ernst Jäckh’s new endeavor, the newly 
established “German League for the League of Nations” (Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund), 
pinpoint the problems of German intellectual elites’ efforts. The Volksbund’s dejected 
final stages and its leadership’s inability to transform the organization into a pillar of the 
new republican state symbolized the ephemeral nature of the cross-partisan unity that had 
re-emerged during the winter of 1918-19. Conversely, the “German League” pointed to 
the strictures on Germany’s public discourse. Unanimously, German public intellectuals 
condemned the Treaty of Versailles. Paradoxically, however, an event that aroused the 
nationalism of intellectuals and of the nation at large also widened the rupture between 
the two circles of intellectuals at the center of this study.         
The Volksbund’s leadership struggled in keeping its association alive and in 
adapting its mission to the new political context without losing its influential sponsors. In 
November 1918, Francke had argued that the Volksbund’s new task was to “negotiate 
contrasts, which can emerge and have emerged between the different strata of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 See for instance Carl H. Becker to Tante Emma, November 17, 1918, p. 2, GStA PK, VI. Nl Becker, C. 
H., Nr. 8683. 
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nation.”24 Nonetheless, the executive committee disagreed on the organization’s future 
goals, although an internal survey had showed that the majority of its leading members 
favored maintaining the organization.25 In fact, some pointed to the dangers of a backlash 
following the revolution and Adolf Grabowsky explicitly warned against the Bolshevist 
threat. Conversely, the Free Trade Unions requested the Volksbund’s liquidation because 
it had lost its reason of existence with the revolution and Fatherland Party’s demise.26 
Even Bosch withdrew his financial support in August 1919 because he considered the 
organization’s purpose fulfilled.27  
As a result, the Volksbund shunned controversial domestic activities and turned to 
the idea of the League of Nations, which appeared “neutral” and thus politically safe. 
Therefore, the secretary of the Volksbund, Martin Wenck offered the organization’s 
cooperation to the “German League for the League of Nations.”28 The nature of this offer, 
however, again confirmed the Volksbund’s internal tensions. In fact, the decision to assist 
the “German League for the League of Nations” rather than directly supporting the 
League of Nations was rooted in the necessity to avoid possible disagreements with the 
Free Trade Unions.29  
 The leadership of the organization strained to develop a politically integrative role in a 
rapidly changing political context. In September 1919, in a confidential meeting held in 
the rooms of the “German Society 1914,” Minister of the Interior Eduard David 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Niederschrift aus der Vorstandssitzung vom 29. November 1918, p. 1, BArch, R 8057/2. 
25 Martin Wenck, Circular Letter, January 23, 1919, BArch, R 8057/4. 
26 Niederschrift aus der Vorstandssitzung vom 29. November 1918, pp. 2-5. BArch, R 8057/2. 
27 Robert Bosch to Ernst Francke, August 8, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5 and Ernst Francke to Robert Bosch, 
August 27, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5. 
28 Martin Wenck to Ernst Jäckh, December 28, 1918, BArch, R 8057/10.   
29 Niederschrift aus der Vorstandssitzung vom 11. Oktober 1918, BArch, R 8057/2. See also Komitee zur 
Propaganda des Verständnisses in Deutschland für den Völkerbund, Niederschrift der Sitzung, BArch, R 
8057/9, p. 22 and Niederschrift aus der Vorstandssitzung vom 22. Oktober 1918, BArch, R 8057/2. 
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suggested using the Volksbund as a nonpartisan organization to instill a democratic 
attitude in the population.30 The Volksbund contacted Jäckh as a way of indirectly 
inquiring whether Bosch would support these revised goals.31 Jäckh replied in the 
negative and advised against contacting Bosch.32 Frantically, the Volksbund’s leadership 
discussed the organization’s chances of survival without the support of the trade unions 
and its greatest donor,33 and sought out new sources of financial support.34 
A public assembly on December 7, 1919, however, confirmed the general lack of 
interest in the Volksbund. Neither the press nor Berlin’s mayor – who refused to speak at 
the assembly – showed interest in the event, and Wenck wryly noted, “the Volksbund 
does not have an appeal any more. … We can do what we want: the enterprise does not 
attract any more.”35 Thus, in a poorly attended meeting,36 the Board of Directors decided 
to liquidate the Volksbund because the Revolution had accomplished its original goals 
and new goals had neither found personal nor financial support.37 In January 1920, the 
Volksbund ended its activities,38 after balancing its deficit with a small grant from 
Bosch.39  
    The lack of coherence over possible new goals had rapidly relegated the 
Volksbund to a marginal role in Germany’s public spheres. The eventual demise of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Martin Wenck to Ernst Jäckh, October 6, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5. 
31 Martin Wenck to Ernst Jäckh, October 6, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5 and Martin Wenck to Ernst Francke, 
October 7, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5. 
32 Ernst Jäckh to Martin Wenck, October 8, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5 and Martin Wenck to Ernst Francke, 
October 10, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5. 
33 Martin Wenck to Vorstandsmitglieder, October 13, 1919, BArch, R 8057/4. 
34 Martin Wenck to Ernst Francke, October 18, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5. 
35 Martin Wenck to Ernst Francke, December 10, 1919, p. 2. BArch, R 8057/7. 
36 Martin Wenck to Ernst Francke, December 20, 1919, BArch, R 8057/7. 
37 Martin Wenck to Ausschussmitglieder des Volksbund für Freiheit und Vaterland, December 22, 1919, 
BArch, R 8057/7. 
38 Martin Wenck, An die Mitglieder des Volkbundes für Freiheit und Vaterland, January, 1920, BArch, R 
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39 Martin Wenck to Privatsekretariat des Herrn Robert Bosch, January 12, 1920, BArch, R 8057/7. 
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organization testified to German intellectual elites’ inability to bridge political as well as 
ideological differences. Like Stadtler’s exclusion from the “Anti-Bolshevist League,” the 
liquidation of the Volksbund showed that the Bolshevist threat had lost its unifying appeal 
with the end of the emergency situation in Berlin, as the debates on the organization’s 
future goals confirmed. In addition, the financial negotiations with Bosch undoubtedly 
confirmed Ernst Jäckh’s central role in the liberal nationalists’ associational network. 
Paralleling the Volksbund’s demise, Jäckh emerged as an energetic organizer at the center 
of the liberal milieu. His Naumannian nationalism influenced his activities in the critical 
months around the Treaty of Versailles.     
To a large degree, German intellectuals’ hopes had rested on the American 
President’s proclaimed principle of self-determination. The publication of the peace 
terms on May 7, 1919, however, dissipated the hope that Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” 
would provide the framework for the Allied peace conditions.40 Under shock, the German 
government headed by the Social Democrat Philipp Scheidemann declared the conditions 
unacceptable and resigned, thus refusing to sign the peace treaty. A nationalist outrage 
swept over Germany in the weeks preceding the acceptance of the peace conditions. The 
new government signed the Versailles Treaty amid the protests not only of the nationalist 
forces but also of the liberal-democratic circles. Heuss later described the Treaty as a 
“continuation of war by other means,”41 and young conservatives viewed the Treaty as 
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Rhine as well as limits to Germany’s army, navy, and military equipment, Germany’s war responsibility 
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the Entente’s tool to destroy Germany.42 Large sections of German society, therefore, 
viewed the “League of Nations” as the product of the Treaty of Versailles and merely a 
tool of the victorious states.43    
The “German League for the League of Nations” was thus devoted to a highly 
contentious political goal, namely Germany’s membership in the “League of Nations.” 
Established on December 17, 1918, it aimed to support the idea of the “League of 
Nation” and to foster the cooperation among like-minded organizations in Germany and 
abroad.44 The domestic focus of the organization, however, led to a certain degree of 
ambivalence. In fact, the founding members recognized that the organization could not 
achieve its goals under the leadership of pacifists. Consequentially, they decided to open 
its ranks to both “real pacifists” and “opportunists.”45 Under Jäckh’s directorship and 
with the Foreign Office’s endorsement,46 the organization aimed to root the idea of the 
“League of Nations” in the German masses by reaching out to a broad network of 
institutional member organizations.47   
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43 The writings of Otto Hoetzsch – who was close both to the Jäckh circle and to the young conservatives – 
confirm the general agreement in condemning the Treaty of Versailles. He argued that the League could not 
guarantee peace because, by being the product of Versailles, it was the guarantor of the status quo. The 
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44 Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund, Satzung, August 16, 1919, p. 1. Landesarchiv Berlin, B Rep. 042, Nr. 
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45 Minutes, Members’ Meeting, December 20, 1918, p. 1. Landesarchiv Berlin, B Rep. 042, Nr. 26394.  
46 Ernst Jäckh to Amtsgericht Charlottenburg, April 30, 1919. Landesarchiv Berlin, B Rep. 042, Nr. 26394.  
47 Deutsche Liga für Völkerbund, Bericht über das Jahr 1919 (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, December 1919). 
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The leadership of the “German League” considered the “League of Nations” a 
tool for the revision of the peace treaty. The Board of Directors expressed the hope, 
during a meeting that was significantly held in Versailles, that the “League of Nations” 
would protect Germany.48 On the magazine of the “German League,” Delbrück argued 
that, by creating the “League of Nations,” the Treaty of Versailles had provided Germany 
with the tool to achieve its only possible foreign policy goal, that is, the revision of the 
treaty.49 The “German League” therefore sought to prepare the path for a revision of the 
Versailles Treaty based on the rule of international law.50 To this end, the organization 
initially aimed to counter the general lack of knowledge about the Treaty of Versailles by 
publishing an edited version of the Treaty at a low price.51 In addition, it published a 
series of booklets under the title “The Burden of Peace,” which intended to expose “the 
monstrosity of the peace.”52 Through its network, the “German League” supported the 
Foreign Office in distributing material on the Versailles Treaty and the necessity of its 
revision.53   
The Treaty of Versailles gave a significant nationalist turn to public discourse. 
The nationalist language and the actions of the leadership of the “German League” show 	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49 Hans Delbrück, “Friede – und was nun?” Mitteilungen der Deutschen Liga für Völkerbund, A. 10. 1. 
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the pragmatic centrality of nationalist discourse in liberals’ thought. The parallel debates 
on the Volksbund’s goals, however, reveal the different centrality of nationalism in the 
conceptualizations of societal organization of the intellectuals at the center of this study. 
Within the Volksbund, the conservative Grabowsky advocated for the transformation of 
the organization into a “Culture Congress,” which would emphasize Germany’s cultural 
legacy and hence support international understanding. Emblematically, he argued that 
such a plan would win the support of those personalities who, like himself, did not 
support the current government.54 This proposal exemplified conservative and nationalist 
intellectuals’ attempt to strengthen the cultural bonds between Germany and the 
territories that had been lost after the war through an emphasis on German national as 
well as cultural values.  
The societal fragmentation that accompanied domestic conflicts’ radicalization in 
the aftermath of the war paralleled the breaking of German national unity, which the 
territorial losses decided at Versailles had caused. The celebration of an original national 
unity beyond state’s borders, the concern with the fate of Germans living abroad, and the 
appeal to the principle of self-determination became central topoi in young conservatives’ 
writings.55 As in the years preceding the war, nationalism offered notions of “pre-
political” unity able to transcend political differences. In the momentous months after the 
armistice, the principle of national self-determination contained the promise of solving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Adolf Grabowsky to Martin Wenck, October 21, 1919, BArch, R 8057/5. See also Martin Wenck to 
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55 To a certain degree these themes appeared also in the analyses of the liberals of the Jäckh circle. Heuss 
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domestic contrasts on the ground of a national union of all Germanic people. 
Consequentially, the concepts of Mitteleuropa, “Greater-Germany” (Großdeutschland), 
and “Germans living abroad” (Auslandsdeutsche) dominated the political discourse. 
The young-conservative ideologue Max H. Boehm most consistently developed 
the concept of Irredentism and Volk. In 1923, with Europa Irredenta, he investigated the 
origins of the World War and analyzed the Versailles Treaty from the perspective of 
“Irredentism.” He asserted the impossibility of reestablishing the congruence between 
state borders and Volk borders and thus advocated a Central European federation under 
German leadership.56 On occasion of the 75th anniversary of the revolution of 1848, 
Boehm decried Germany’s current condition and the inability of its politicians to 
recognize Germany’s role in central and east Europe.57 He blamed French foreign policy 
and the revolutionary government of 1918 for the failure of uniting Austria and Germany 
and emphasized the contradictions between the principle of self-determination and the 
will of the victorious nations. He argued that to achieve the Großdeutschland it would be 
necessary to awaken the “greater-German will” in all Germans.58  
As a result, this international context modified the relationship between foreign 
and domestic policy. Wilhelmine reformers’ emphasis on foreign policy led them to 
stress Germany’s domestic problems. In line with the Naumannian tradition, a strong 
foreign policy depended on the strength of the national body. In contemporary Germany, 
however, Troeltsch decried the tendency to use international matters primarily as 	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weapons in domestic political fights, hence stressing once again the fragmentation of 
Germany’s political arena. Accordingly, he advocated for the “strengthening of internal 
relationships.”59 As a result of the Versailles Treaty, Heuss noted, “All foreign policy, 
which is not only fantasy or noise but rather has a validity, concentrates in the foreseeable 
future on the domestic [policy], on the possibility and the timing of the national and 
economic consolidation.”60 Liberals thus concluded that a real foreign policy would be 
impossible in the foreseeable future.  
Young conservatives restated foreign policy’s primacy and condemned the focus 
on domestic disputes. Nonetheless, they noted the necessities of party politics’ doctrinism 
and fragmentation. Moeller-Bruck condemned Germans’ narrow-mindedness and decried 
the lack of political knowledge and expertise.61 This required political education and a 
focus on the younger generations.62 Similarly, Spahn linked “good domestic policy” to 
the “best foreign policy,” thus stressing the necessity “To renew ourselves and restore our 
health at home” in order to be seize any opportunity to re-establish Germany’s 
international status.63 
The fragmentation that had characterized Wilhelmine society reemerged with new 
strength in the months following the armistice. Associations formed in the context of the 
war struggled in adapting to this transformed socio-political environment. At the same 
time, new organizations reacted to the political challenges of the time but were unable to 
cross party lines beyond the initial emotional reaction that first Bolshevism and then the 	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Treaty of Versailles had generated. In this fluid context, both liberals and young 
conservatives developed contrasting forms of societal organization, which were rooted in 
radically different notions of state, Volk, and individual.      
German Democracy, the Weimar Republic, and the Parliamentary System 
 
The intellectuals close to Friedrich Naumann and Max Weber were torn between 
the shock for the sudden collapse and the need to find their own personal way of dealing 
with the new democratic system. Naumann, Weber, and Meinecke actively participated in 
constitutional debates in the months following the German Empire’s collapse.   
The dualism between an elected president and an equally elected parliament 
characterized the organization of the new German state. The new Constitution, which 
came into effect on August 11, 1919, included a first section (Art. 1-108) detailing the 
organization of the Reich government and its federative system and a second one (Art. 
109-165) listing basic individual rights.64 Both Weber and Meinecke consistently argued 
that a strong head of state was a necessary counter-force to the fragmentation of the 
party-dominated parliament. For these old Wilhelmine liberals, a strong executive in the 
hands of a president had to be protected from fluctuating parliamentary majorities.65 In 
fact, Weber contended that only an elected president would be able to resist the 
particularistic pressures of the Federal Chamber, balance the proportional system and 
Prussia’s head of state, and provide a system for the selection of political leadership 
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within political parties.66 Nonetheless, aware of the risks of a dictatorship in a Bolshevik 
or fascist style, Meinecke posed it as the German task to find a “trust dictatorship” able to 
solve a problem that was common to all Europe.67  
Naumann, Weber, and Meinecke profoundly influenced the circle around Jäckh. 
The case of Heuss is typical. Influenced by Naumann and Weber, he conceptualized 
politics as a struggle for power and maintained a relativist approach to political systems. 
Heuss had neither supported revolutionary change nor rejected the monarchical 
principle,68 although he had been critical of Imperial Germany and advocated for reforms 
before the war.69 In his analysis, democracy had become a historical necessity without 
credible alternatives after the monarchy’s failure to survive the war’s challenge.70 Like 
his mentors, therefore, he approached the new democratic system with caution and out of 
reason rather than of inner conviction. 
Heuss was, however, aware of the socio-political conflicts characterizing modern, 
industrial societies. Therefore, he viewed democracy as a “power-system,” which was 
rooted in the transferring of authority rather than in the idea of “government by the 	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people.” From this perspective, he saw the value of the majority principle not in its 
intrinsic rightness but in its contained possibility of “self-correction,” that is, that today’s 
majorities might be tomorrow’s minorities.71 Consequently, he acknowledged the 
importance of political parties, which he considered “the channel for the formation of the 
political will of the nation” and, by being placed “in the indispensable mediating role of a 
multitude of individual opinions and wishes, … a tool for national education.”72 
Ultimately, therefore, Heuss assigned the role of mediating between conflicting and 
competing interests in society to the republic’s intermediary institutions.  
Heuss exemplifies the position of this younger generation of public intellectuals. 
He witnessed the old political system’s collapse with uneasiness and worried about 
political society’s massification. Emblematically, however, he aimed to both provide 
political knowledge and fight political resignation and passivity with his writing in the 
immediate aftermath of the war. By analyzing Germany’s future, he dismissed political 
alternative to democracy, whose German roots he traced back to Tacitus and Immanuel 
Kant, and explained the tensions between capitalism and socialism as well as between 
nationalism and internationalism.73 Heuss therefore typifies the in-between intellectual 
who aimed to enlighten the masses by simplifying the theoretical frameworks that 
Naumann, Meinecke, Weber, and Troeltsch developed.   
The German Empire’s collapse and the revolution had broken the historical 
narrative legitimizing the German state, thus posing new tasks to scholars and 	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intellectuals. In fact, as Prussia’s Minister of Education Carl H. Becker later noted, to 
these intellectuals “the unspoken, in part even unconscious intention remains the 
justification of our national existence on the basis of old lore.”74 Indeed, while “the 
legend of the past gave the old state, independently from the nature and the value of its 
representatives, a strong ethos,” Heuss recognized that “today the bands are torn up and 
out of ourselves must emerge the courage for the new” because the past can “transform 
itself to the bonds of the becoming.” Hence, he urged Germans to understand the 
democratic lessons of Germany’s bourgeois revolution of 1848.75  
Accordingly, the reformers investigated the roots of Germany’s democratic 
tradition and rejected the idea of an unbridgeable gap between western and German 
political traditions. Troeltsch argued that democracy did not come to Germany “over 
night,” but was the natural outcome of modern developments that Prussia’s military 
system had blocked in Germany since 1848. Today, however, he claimed, democracy was 
neither “a pure political-moral question of principles nor a means of warfare of upcoming 
social strata” but rather a practical necessity.76 During the chaotic days of the German 
revolution Troeltsch argued that democracy had an enormous potential but also 
dangerous anarchic tendencies, as it may foster interests-based struggles. Therefore, a 
German democracy could neither be the product of doctrinism nor the “realization of bare 
political forms,” but required a modification of social relationships.77  
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Both Troeltsch and Meinecke – in what appeared a combined endorsement of 
democracy by old Wilhelmine liberals – dismissed the notion of Germany’s lack of a 
democratic tradition as inconsistent. In particular Troeltsch analyzed the roots of the 
moral and philosophical divide between Germany and Western Europe. He asserted that 
German ideology was based on the notion of different-peculiar individualities and 
individualizing forces, whereas the French Revolution introduced a radical idea of 
progress and people’s sovereignty. He acknowledged that the concepts of individual 
responsibility and independence of the person were underdeveloped in Germany. 
Troeltsch thus concluded that Germany must not repudiate its history, but rather adapt its 
“ideology to today’s profoundly changed world context.”78  
Democracy’s problem depended on political radicalization and societal 
fragmentation rather than on German democratic tradition’s weakness or Germans’ non-
political character. The liberal economist Moritz J. Bonn argued that Imperial Germany’s 
collapse had transformed the German parliament from a “united representation of the 
people against the Crown” to a “representation of the different interests represented, 
bitterly fighting each other.”79 Perceptively, already in August 1919, Troeltsch had noted 
the radicalization of political conflicts, which found its origin in the fears the revolution 
had aroused in the bourgeois classes.80 Two years later, he pointed to the common belief 
that only violent means could solve conflicts.81  
It is not yet characteristic of the German to consider the noise of the 
political campaign as an indispensable hoopla that, once done its part, 	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should not anymore be taken seriously. So far, he loves the bullheaded 
hatred and aggressive blustering, which makes any political cooperation in 
the aftermath impossible but provides great personal satisfaction to 
complacent pigheaded fellows.82 
 
This radicalization of political discourse stemmed from society’s fragmentation. 
Naumann and other Wilhelmine reformers had recognized the dangers of German 
society’s divisiveness. They had failed to integrate the working class into the national 
body, and – as Gertrud Bäumer had noted – the revolution had revealed the illusionary 
nature of the “civic peace.” By referring to Naumann’s pre-war efforts, Meinecke argued 
that, with the monarchy’s failure of linking the masses to the state during the war, 
Germany needed a constitutional form able to create a greater coherence between state 
and masses.83 Bäumer had urged to dissolve this mass on the grounds of democracy 
because “the subject of the state eventually must be the person, not the masses.”84 Hence, 
these liberal intellectuals were aware that Germany’s problems were rooted in the 
traditional confessional fragmentation and the socio-economic divisions that had limited 
Germany’s unity, and which the war had further exacerbated.85  
The proportional electoral system and party politics appeared to enhance this 
radicalization and fragmentation. The proportional system was an obstacle to the 
formation of a strong majority. Germany’s parliamentary system thus seemed to be in a 
“permanent deadlock” and a “never-ceasing haggling over economic points and a 
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preponderance of purely materialistic interests,” which discredited these institutions 
“among the men of action and the dreamers of dreams.”86 In addition, as Heuss 
repeatedly argued, German political parties differed from their Western counterparts 
because, constituted in a pre-parliamentary and conflict-ridden period, they developed an 
extreme “doctrinism” as a result of their inability to participate directly in political 
decisions, and hence “the programmatic energy was reinforced, built up, stiffened in 
order to maintain alive and pure the promotional nature of the idea.”87 While during the 
war politics had been interpreted as politicization and thus mobilization for the national 
cause, after the war politics was equated with party politics and thus at the origins of 
society’s political fragmentation. This reduction of politics to party politics and thus to a 
struggle between conflicting interests was the outcome of the politicization of the entire 
life during the total war.88  
For these intellectuals, the proportional system and the intertwining of political 
parties and economic interests became factionalism’s major cause. Bonn argued that, in 
the absence of political education, economic considerations would dominate political life 
and – accordingly – fragment Germany along economic interests.89 Also Heuss argued 
that, while all political parties traditionally had claimed to represent all the population, 
the influence of Marxism – with its emphasis on public action’s socio-economic goals – 
and the emergence of economic interests led to a “materialization of politics.” The 
proportional system – he continued – had caused this intermingling of political parties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Moritz J. Bonn, “The Crisis of German Democracy,” The Forum, vol. 72, no. 3 (May 1924), 313-314.  
87 Theodor Heuss, “Parteien und Bünde,” Wille und Weg (April 15, 1928), in Politiker und Publizist. 
Aufsätze und Reden (Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1984), 178.  
88 See for example Hans Simons, Politische Schulung und Hochschule: Nach einem im Deutschen 
Auslandsinstitut in Stuttgart gehaltenen Vortrag (Berlin: Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, 1926), 3 and 
Carl H. Becker, “Geleitewort,” in Politische Propädeutik als Erziehungsfaktor, Band 1, edited by Johann 
Strunz (Leipzig: B. G. Tuebner, 1930), iii-iv.    
89 Bonn, “The Crisis of German Democracy,” 311-313. 
	   127	  
and economic interests. Doctrinism and multitude characterized Germany’s system of 
representation, which stood in sharp contrast to a two-party system and its ability to 
integrate all tendencies and factions. As a result, Germany’s political society had, 
“unconsciously, sacrificed the system of rule to the search for ideal justice.”90 Hence, the 
proportional system as a technique designed to assess the will of the people was 
transformed into a tool fragmenting this will and thus jamming the political system. 
Accordingly, the Jäckh circle emphasized the importance of political engagement 
because “the fate of the nation compels each and every citizen to political activity, if he 
does not want to experience and soon personally feel that from a subject of politics he 
becomes only its object.”91  
The liberals around Naumann’s and later Jäckh’s endeavors beheld the collapse of 
Imperial Germany and the communist revolution with a mixture of distress and 
expectation. Ambivalently, they endorsed the new parliamentary republic because of 
monarcy’s failures, rather than out of principled conviction. Nonetheless, they supported 
the new democratic state and trusted in the new political system’s ability in preserving 
and enhancing individual responsibility and liberty. These intellectuals sought the roots 
of Germany’s democratic tradition in the past, although acknowledging alternative 
cultural-political traditions. Consequentially, the greatest weakness of Germany’s society 
was not the lack of democratic tradition but rather the radicalization of political discourse 
in the aftermath of the war and the communist revolution. Voluntary associations’ failure 
to establish a culture of compromise and the inability of the new republican state to 
integrate Germany’s factionalized political society pushed these intellectuals to seek new 	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solutions to the tension between private interest and the common good. Influenced by 
Naumann’s activities, Jäckh and his closest associates would turn to political education 
and a cultivation of “civility” as the means to strengthen Weimar’s civil society.                  
The Young Conservatives and Politics as Religion 
 
The Jäckh circle was aware of the appeal of other, alternative solutions to 
Germany’s problems. In fact, as these intelletuals recognized, the Great War had been 
“the triumph of the theory of violence” and created a new “type of man gifted for action 
and nothing else.”92 The war created an appeal to “national emotion” and a hatred of 
“reason and common sense,” and thus produced a mentality that yearned for “a hero, a 
leader who is not responsible to anybody, who does not reason, who merely acts.”93 
Inevitably, therefore, the intellectuals of the Jäckh circle would be involved in an 
acrimonious debate with the young-conservative intellectuals around Moeller-Bruck, 
Gleichen, and Boehm. 
A group of intellectuals began to informally meet at Gleichen’s private house in 
the spring of 1919. These meetings became the seedbed of the circle of young 
conservatives. They later adopted the official name of “June Club,” as a form of protest 
against the German delegation’s acceptance of the Versailles Treaty in that month.94 The 
Club had emerged out the associational network centered on Gleichen and developed 
under the ideological leadership of Moeller-Bruck.95 It was “an attitudinal community for 
the care of political education through the use of the club form,”96 and was part of a 	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broader, informally organized, network of small right-wing groupings and associations 
that was commonly referred to as the “Circle” (Ring).  
With the end of the war, the young conservatives had to come to terms with a 
military defeat that they had not foreseen. They combined the need to explain the 
downfall with a criticism of the political as well as social developments that had 
characterized Imperial Germany – developments that they believed the war experience 
had only momentarily interrupted. The German nation had responded as a united Volk to 
the challenges of the war but defeat and revolution had fragmented this unity. This 
moment of either annihilation or survival also offered the opportunity to purify the 
German national body of the remnants of Western influence and build a truly Germanic 
state. To this end, it was necessary to collect all the national forces for the rebuilding of 
Germany’s national power.  
Young conservatives dreaded that the exceptional conditions that the war 
emergency had created would pave the path to a normalization, and hence to a return to 
pre-war socio-political relationships. In their eyes, Germans were returning to old 
bourgeois conventions and renouncing the activism that had characterized the war 
years.97 Consequentially, young conservatives renewed their attacks against late-
nineteenth-century “materialization” and “mechanization.”98 The nation – they 
denounced – had lost the capacity to act because of its relying on the monarchy during 
the Wilhelmine Empire. “The enemy doesn’t stand on the right. The enemy doesn’t stand 
on the left.” – Moeller-Bruck decried – “He is in us. Our docile nature, our dispassionate 
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nature, our undemonic nature.”99 Young conservatives thus saw the danger of the times in 
an end of the emergency situation and emphasized the necessity to force Germans to 
action because of their inability to recognize the tragedy of the times.100  
The rejection of the monarchic system and the emphasis on activism led to an 
acceptance of revolutionary transformations. The revolution appeared to renew the 
emergency situation and thus became the only hope for a national renewal.101 In fact, it 
had broken the hold of the past on the present and thus – if channeled in a nationalist 
direction – offered the possibility to shape Germany’s future. It was therefore the task of 
the young conservatives, the “Circle of the Builders,” to give the revolution a real, 
nationalist meaning.102 The revolution provided the opportunity to nationalize socialism 
and, at the same time, to overcome nineteenth-century “formal democracy.”103 In this 
way, the nationalization of the revolution promised to unify German society, which 
political parties and classes had dismembered.104      
Young conservatives thus developed influential analyses that sought a truly 
Germanic form of societal organization. They rejected Marxist socialism and were 
careful in setting their position apart from “reactionary” conservatism. Socialism had to 
be freed from the “curse” of Marxism, which had reduced history to economic 	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relationships,105 hence degrading workers to proletarians.106 Consequentially, they faulted 
Marxism for having awakened the “drives of the masses” rather than “positive national 
forces.”107 While Marxism robbed proletarians of their sense of belonging to the nation, 
reactionism stood between the nation and the proletariat, and did not recognize that the 
war of liberation had been a war of the whole nation, aiming at the establishment of an 
“Empire of us all.”108 In so doing, young conservatives rooted Germany’s strength in the 
integration of all social strata in the nation and sought to win the working classes back to 
the nation through a “national socialism,” an ideology distinct from both Marxism and 
later Nazism.  
At the same time, young conservative aimed to purge the German nation of 
Western liberalism’s influences. Liberalism had weakened the German state by making 
parliaments rather than estates the foundational blocks of the state.109 As a result, the 
German state had been based “on a mechanical counting of votes, instead of an organic 
union of its members” and on mediocrity in its attempt to find a mean between monarchy 
and democracy.110 The state, however, could not be based on a plurality of individuals 
but only on the wholeness of the Volk.111 This rejection of parliamentarism therefore did 
not mean discarding democracy.112 Rather, young conservatives sought a form of 
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political participation that was more democratic than the formalistic parliamentary 
system.   
Inevitably, political parties became the symbol of Western influence and liberal 
parliamentarism.113 Young conservatives rejected party politics and viewed nationalist 
nonpartisanship as the road to “break away politics from all party politics.”114 The party 
system exemplified nineteenth-century “formal democracy,” that is, “The basic idea that 
people’s sovereignty lies in the atomized, individualized electorate, [and] that the ‘will of 
the people’ thereby comes to expression.”115 Political parties were un-German forces 
destroying the unity of the Volk because they stood between the nation and its destiny.116 
Overcoming party politics could be possible only through a Volk “that forces the parties 
to submit to its will.”117 In post-war Germany, “Left and Right” – Moeller-Bruck asserted 
– “became words that have lost their meaning since all what matters is the whole.”118 The 
political party was a point of view able to see only itself and hence fragmenting the 
German nation’s nourished unity. Old politics had focused on programs and political 
parties were primarily concerned with getting the maximum political profit out of a given 
situation rather than to – as Gleichen urged politicians to do – react to the needs of the 
times.119    
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At the beginning of 1920, anti-republican sentiments were widespread and rumors 
of right-wing efforts to violently overthrow the government sounded convincing.120 
Insurgent military units under the command of General Walther von Lüttwitz entered 
Berlin on March 13 and occupied all major government offices in reaction to the 
government’s decision to dissolve those paramilitary units that the government had 
tolerated until then and used in the repression of communist uprisings. Lüttwitz was in 
contact with Kapp, who during the war had founded the German Fatherland Party and 
until October 1918 had been a member of the “German Society 1914.” The government 
fled first to Dresden and then to Stuttgart because the army could not guarantee its 
security. Although initially it appeared to succeed, the putsch failed because of a general 
strike called by the socialist members of the government and the willingness of the 
working class to defend the republic. While by March 20 the putsch had collapsed, 
revolutionary uprisings by the industrial working class continued in the Ruhr.121     
 In the wake of the Kapp Putsch and the Ruhr conflict, the elections of June 6, 1920 were 
transformed into a referendum on the achievements of the Weimar coalition. The 
elections resulted in a clear victory of the right parties – which the extra-parliamentary 
activities of the network of associations and clubs overlapping the young-conservative 
circles had also contributed revitalizing. From a general perspective, the election testified 
to the radicalization of the political spectrum with the hardening of the positions and the 
success of the parties to the left and to the right of the Weimar coalition. The liberal 
electorate clearly shifted from the DDP to the more conservative DVP. Similarly, the 	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Majority Socialists and the Catholic Center Party lost respectively half and one third of 
their vote in the 1919 elections. The Independent Socialists, the DNVP, and the DVP 
were the clear winner of the elections.122  
Against the background of general disorder and of the first parliamentary 
elections in 1920, young conservatives related the chaos to the parliamentary system and 
the lack of political leadership rather than to the Kapp Putsch.123 The chaos and disorder 
that followed the Kapp putsch confirmed the bankruptcy of the party system and thus of 
parliamentarism. Gleichen and Stadtler condemned the existing “program-driven” 
political parties and stressed the young conservatives’ “Attitude-Program,” which would 
replace the multitude of parties with a “Unitarian front” that could be established only by 
men above the parties and would be the political movement of the future.124  
The leading members of the circle – Moeller-Bruck, Boehm, Gleichen, Stadtler, 
and Martin Spahn – primarily agreed on the analysis of the negative tendencies disrupting 
Germany’s national unity. They rejected the foreign ideologies of Western liberalism and 
Eastern Marxist socialism because they fragmented the national body either by focusing 
on individuals’ freedom as pluralist expression of society or on class struggle as the 
necessary road to a proletarian dictatorship. The mythic war experience of the “civic 
peace” and of the “trench community” became the point of reference for an idealized 
“people’s community,” which they juxtaposed to both the new parliamentary republic 
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and Marxist socialism. Consequentially, the task of the young conservatives became the 
conceptualization not of formalistic – that is, liberal parliamentary – but of truly 
democratic forms of political participation. They struggled, however, to develop a 
positive message for the future of the German nation beyond the idealization of 
community and Volk.  
As the ideologues of the group, Moeller-Bruck and Boehm attempted to merge 
nationalism and socialism. By the end of the war, Moeller-Bruck had become the silent 
center of the “June Club.” In writings that often had the tone of an oracle’s 
pronouncements, he envisioned a new synthesis of nationalism and socialism in the form 
of a third party that, by cutting across all party lines, would appeal “to the man in every 
German, and to the German in man.”125 This party would eventually establish the “Third 
Reich” in which all society’s social tensions would be solved in the mythological 
solidarity of the Volksgemeinschaft (people’s community).126 Symbolically, Moeller-
Bruck committed suicide in May 1925 when the progressive stabilization of the Weimar 
Republic momentarily put an end to the hopes for an imminent overthrow of the 
Republic. 
Against Germany’s socio-political fragmentation, the young-conservative 
ideologues argued that for Germany, salvation could only come on the path to unity.127 
Most consistently, Boehm attempted to define the idea of the Volk,128 which he contrasted 
to both the “dull, docile mass” and the “organized, mechanical mosaic of 	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individualities.”129 Marxism had to be transformed into corporatism because the estate 
would cancel the class. The individual could recognize the sense of “community” in the 
Marxist ideal of the “class,” and his longing for it would drive him to “society.” 
Nonetheless, the focus on “society” could only lead to the state and never to the Volk. 
The Volk emerged from a continuum between past and present and in it “the ancestors 
live on.” With corporatism “the path is shown, out of the portfolio of social traditions to 
overcome the hardening of the social stratifications and of the atrophying of the classes 
through the new total estates.”130 
By contrast, Martin Spahn symbolized the tension, on the one hand, between 
nonpartisanship and party allegiance and, on the other hand, between propaganda and 
scientific research. Spahn was part of a group of Catholic conservatives within the “June 
Club.”131 He was the son of a prominent Catholic politician and had grown up under the 
influence of the Kulturkampf. At the turn of the century, however, Spahn entered in 
conflict with the Catholic Center Party’s line under Mathias Erzberger.132 He joined the 
DNVP after the war because he saw the only way out of political parties’ particularism in 
the creation of a broad political right.133 The analysis of the historical penetration of 
Western civilization in central Europe was at the center of his academic interests.134 	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Spahn characterized eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Germany as torn between the re-
emergence of the strength of the German nation with the wars of liberation and the 
spreading of bureaucracy, democracy, and parliamentarism within single German 
states.135 In a familiar topos, Spahn sought a third way between Western liberalism, 
which emphasized individual freedom over the connectedness to the whole, and Slavic 
communism stressing only the collectiveness over the individual sphere.136 
Conversely, Gleichen expressed an elitist nonpartisanship concerned with 
political leadership that contrasted with Spahn’s party politics and Stadtler’s appeal to the 
masses. Combining idealization of the community and fears of the unorganized mass, 
Gleichen coupled a celebration of a solidaristic community with a call for responsible 
leaders.137 In fact, “If not all future should be renounced and the German disintegration 
should be prevented at the last hour, then the doctor, the expert, the learned coxswain 
must to the oar and the dilettante, the agitator and editor, the profiteer has to go from the 
captain’s bridge.”138 His appeal to “experts” from the economic sector symbolized the 
attempt to combine communitarian notions with leaders that by being placed above party 
struggles could guarantee the independence of political leadership from political 
interests.139 
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 The emphasis of young conservatives on experts’ objective leadership, and in particular 
on economic elites, radicalized their conflict with Jäckh’s circle, which – at the same time 
– was reaffirming politics’ supremacy over economics.140 The conflict became more 
acrimonious and personalized after the Spa Conference of July 1920. The Conference 
was the German government’s first official meeting with the Entente and addressed the 
pressing question of the Reparations that the Versailles Treaty had condemned Germany 
to pay. The industrialist Hugo Stinnes, who was part of the German delegation and one of 
the most prominent financial backers of the young conservatives, disrupted the 
Conference with vetriolic statements.141 
Bonn, who had been appointed advisor to the Chancellor on the reparation 
question and in this function participated in the Spa Conference, expressed the criticism 
of liberal intellectuals by condemning Stinnes’s inflammatory comments. He stated that 
Stinnes’s role in the negotiations at Spa epitomized the problems that the penetration of 
economic thinking in political affairs caused.142 In fact, the pressures of big business and 
the tendency to believe that “politics was nothing but economics” had caused – Bonn 
continued – this progressive intermingling of politics and economics.143 In reaction, 
Gleichen attacked Bonn, who was – according to Gleichen – “ignorant of the actual 
forces of the German nation and knows only the dogma of the fulfillment of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty.” By making Bonn a symbol of the scorned parliamentary 
government, he concluded, “Do you know, you who call yourself government, that 	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Germany is to be a theater of war, on which the thunderstorm shall unload again? Don’t 
you know, that there is war?”144   
Gleichen’s attack not only symbolized the tensions between two groups of 
intellectuals that – in the summer and fall of 1920 – were establishing competing 
educational institutes, it also expressed of the peculiar “personal politics” of the young 
conservatives. Gleichen had expounded on this political attitude a year earlier. He had 
argued that he aimed for a “personal dispute” rather than for a discussion in the 
“technical domain” because all current events were “more questions of character rather 
than questions of programs.”145 Consequentially, he stated, “Therefore I consider it a 
necessity that, in the first place, we conduct a personal critique in the public discussion 
and, in it, proceed with all the personal acrimoniousness.”146 Referring to the dispute he 
was involved in at the time, Gleichen emblematically concluded, “this letter to you is not 
a personal dispute in the common understanding of the word, not an improper jostling, 
which you can rebuff as un-objective. The personal is the factual in my view.”147       
Like the liberals of the Jäckh circle, young conservatives analyzed the roots of 
Germany’s problems and proposed new forms of societal organizations. Germany’s 
defeat was rooted in society’s socio-political fragmentation and in the inability of the 
political system to bridge the tension between private interest and the common good. 
True democracy, however, was grounded in the idealistic notion of a Volk, which a 
responsible leadership had to guide and represent. This conception of democracy, 	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however, deliberately bypassed those liberal institutions aiming to form a common will 
through mediation and negotiation. By contrast, maintaining a sense of emergency 
became the key to force the German nation to activism. This emphasis on action 
paralleled the peculiar “personal politics” of the young conservatives. Activism and a 
personal, total commitment had to drive the responsible leader’s political action, which 
deemed objective political discourse and readiness to compromise as a sign of weakness.            
Conclusion 
 
After the initial shock, German public intellectuals viewed the collapse of the 
monarchic state as an opportunity. The military defeat and the communist revolution of 
the winter of 1918-19 fostered these elites’ public engagement and heightened their 
readiness to take personal responsibility amid the revolutionary turmoil. This political 
participation was the logical continuation of their politicization in the plethora of 
organizations that had emerged during the war. The shared concern with Bolshevism, 
however, did not survive the radicalization of socio-political differences. As the cases of 
the Volksbund and the “German League” showed, the revolution and the national outrage 
in reaction of the Versailles Treaty only generated an ephemeral unity. Both the liberals 
of the Jäckh circle and the young conservatives viewed the doctrinism of party politics as 
the cause of German society’s new fragmentation. Consequentially, they developed 
contrasting understandings of political participation and democracy to counter these 
worrisome trends.     
Naumann, Weber, and Meinecke developed theoretical and historical frameworks 
that provided a point of reference for those liberal public intellectuals that went beyond 
the break represented by the war, defeat, and collapse of the Empire. Before and during 
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the war, they had dreaded the influence of the Marxist “class struggle” ideology. 
Consequentially, they had aimed to integrate the working class into the national body in 
order to break the exclusive ties of socio-cultural milieus. In the aftermath of the war, and 
in particular after the Kapp Putsch and the murder of Walther Rathenau (June 24, 1922), 
these intellectuals became aware of the dangers from the right.148  
Liberal democrats were involved in not only a metaphorical but also real debate 
with the young conservatives. In fact, the “action” and “deed” that liberals minimized 
were at the center of young conservatives’ discourse.149 In their writing and speeches, the 
liberals around Jäckh adopted the language of elders who wanted to convince their 
audience of the need to support the Republic through rational arguments. As his post-war 
writings show, Heuss addressed the major issues of the day with an objective and 
dispassionate style, and aimed to convince the reader by presenting as objectively as 
possible the “facts” at hand. Conversely, Meinecke’s is often considered the paradigmatic 
example of the Republican of Reason. Meinecke’s “monarchic vocabulary,” however, not 
only signaled initial hesitations toward the new constitutional system, it also had a 
propagandistic value since he addressed those bourgeois circles that most struggled with 
coming to terms with the collapse of the monarchy.  
By contrast, the young conservatives adopted a powerful language that 
emphasized action, youth, and change. They identified themselves with the force that 
would awaken and save Germany in their speeches and writings. This rhetorical approach 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 On the occasion of the second anniversary of the DHfP, Jäckh celebrated Rathenau, whose “fall and 
destiny is for us one more commitment to do everything we can to achieve a decontamination of the 
diseased national body through an objectivation of politics, through the will for a state ethos.” Jäckh, “Zwei 
Jahre Deutsche Hochschule für Politik,” 34-35.  
149 Emblematic is Eduard Stadtler, “Der Weg zur Tat,” Das Gewissen, vol. 1, no. 10 (June 17, 1919), 1. In 
this article, Stadtler attacked critics who only protest without trying to “do it better” and called for action 
against the government and the old party system.  
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was at the center of both their positive and negative messages. While they self-styled 
themselves as the “Circle of Builders” and their first two publications with programmatic 
value were clearly self-centered,150 also their attacks against political adversaries became 
highly personalized and acrimonious. Like in the case of Bonn, Gleichen used Mathias 
Erzberger as a symbol of the lack of will and character of Germany’s political leadership. 
Erzberger, who since the beginning of the Versailles peace negotiations had argued that 
Germany had to sign the treaty, symbolized in Gleichen’s words “The policy of caving 
in, of protests, behind which stands no spirit, no will, no character.”151 Similarly, in the 
aftermath of Rathenau’s assassination and the popular outcry against right-wing circles, 
the Gewissen published an open letter by a German American who attacked Chancellor 
Joseph Wirth for stating that the enemy of the republic sat on the right and argued that 
even German Americans in the United States during the war had not been treated like 
Wirth was treating the “best part” of German population.152   
Both groups, however, inserted their arguments and attacks in a broader narrative 
that testified to the conviction of the intrinsic rightness of their respective positions. 
Characteristically, liberals worried over the lack of a foundational myth for the republic 
(and in this sense urged to a rediscovery of 1848) but remained convinced that no viable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 On the circle of builders see Boehm, “Was wir wollen!” 1-2. The first two publications with 
programmatic value are title “What we want!” and The New Front. Boehm, “Was wir wollen!” 1-2 and 
Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Heinrich von Gleichen, and Max H. Boehm, eds., Die Neue Front (Berlin: 
Verlag Gebrüder Paetel, 1922).  
151 Hutten, “Die Versklavung Deutschlands,” Das Gewissen, vol. 1, no. 36 (December 17, 1919), 1. For a 
similar case see Max H. Boehm’s attack against Philipp Scheidemann. Max H. Boehm, “Scheidemanns 
Revolutionsbilanz,” Das Gewissen, vol. 1, no. 32 (November 18, 1919), 1. When Erzberger was murdered 
in the summer of 1921 because his attitude at the Versailles negotiation was regarded as a betrayal by 
nationalist circles, Spahn downplayed the popular protests and decried the weak attitude of the parties of 
the right, which, in the aftermath of the assassination, seemed to move to the center. Martin Spahn, “Zur 
innenpolitischen Lage” (1921), in Martin Spahn, Für den Reichsgedanken. Historisch-politische Aufsätze, 
1915-1934 (Berlin/Bonn: Ferd. Dümmlers Verlag, 1936), 308-317. 
152 Fred W. Elven, “Das Urteil eines amerikanisachen Republikaners,” Gewissen, vol. 4, no. 29 (July 17, 
1922), 1. 
	   143	  
alternatives existed to the parliamentary system.153 In a typical optimistic approach, Bonn 
suggested that dictators would be forced to reestablish some form of parliamentary 
system because they were never able to solve the problem of succession, since modest 
men can guide democracies but not dictatorships.154  
Like liberals, also young conservatives used history to detail the emergency of the 
present age. Nonetheless, these historical parallels while stressing the tragedy of 
Germany’s condition placed the German nation in a broader narrative characterized by 
national ascension and redemption. Spahn’s case is emblematic.155 He repeatedly 
compared Germany’s critical situation to past events such as the aftermath of the Thirty 
Year’s War or the Napoleonic invasion.156 He used these historical comparisons to stress 
the challenges and obstacles of the time and to push Germans to action. In his writings, 
however, Spahn used German history to illustrate how the German nation had 
successfully summoned all forces and regained national and international power. In this 
way, Spahn skillfully constructed a historical parallel that aimed to push the German 
nation to action by presenting it with a tragic national narrative of doom and redemption. 
Emblematically, in a speech held on occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the German 
Reich he stated  
at this day of commemoration, the worry about what may become of 
Germany is so big in us that we look backwards just to be able, by 
observation of the past, to look further and deeper into the future … Volk 
and state hardly can endure a collapse like ours if they conceive their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 On the lack of a founding “legend” and reference to 1848 see Heuss, Zwischen Gestern und Morgen, 
Heuss, Deutschlands Zukunft, and Heuss, “Schwarz-Rot-Gold,” 1475-1479. 
154 Bonn, The Crisis of European Democracy, 90-93. 
155 A similar case can be made for Otto Hoetzsch. See in particular Otto Hoetzsch, “Deutschland als 
Grenzland, Deutschland als Reich,” Deutsch-Akademische Schriften, issue 7 (1925), 3-16.  
156 See for instance Spahn, “Mitteleuropa,” 2-38 and Martin Spahn, Denkrede am 50. Gedenktage der 
Reichsgründung (Köln: Oskar Müller Verlag, 1921). 
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existence only as an existence from yesterday and think to have a history 
of barely 50 years.157           
 
 Both circles of intellectuals reacted to the defeat and revolution by 
conceptualizing new forms of societal organization. Against a background of crisis, these 
intellectuals constructed narratives that, although employing contrasting rhetorical 
devises, aimed to rebuild a strong nation and state by recurring either to the strength of 
rational argumentation or the power of the deed. By conceptualizing forms of societal 
organization based on the new centrality of the Volk, both groups recognized the 
centrality of political education in the aftermath of the war. Education and educational 
institutes thus soon became the center of these intellectual circles and – at the same time 
– their most ambitious plans to transform into reality their conceptualizations. The violent 
polemics between the two groups that accompanied the founding of the Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik and Politische Kolleg over a period of few weeks in the fall of 
1920 would testify to the importance of these institutes in the plans of both liberals and 
young conservatives.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Spahn, Denkrede am 50. Gedenktage der Reichsgründung, 1. 
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CHAPTER 4: EDUCATING GERMANS: BETWEEN CIVIL POLITICS AND 
VOLKSGEMEINSCHAFT 
 
World War One and the revolutionary unrest of the winter of 1918-19 had swept 
away Imperial Germany and questioned social conventions. Germany’s cultural elites 
beheld these socio-political transformations with shock and alarm. Nonetheless, at the 
same time, they also viewed defeat and revolution as a new beginning. Consequentially, 
they investigated the causes of the collapse and proposed new forms of societal 
organization. Politicized by the war, Germany’s public intellectuals became involved in 
the post-war political debates and, in a radicalized public sphere, aimed to influence 
political developments. These intellectuals faced different challenges in their efforts to 
transform into reality their ideological constructs, as these were grounded in contrasting 
conceptualizations of democracy. Paradoxically, however, these contrasting conceptions 
of democracy were rooted in the common recognition that Germany’s societal 
fragmentation was one of the major causes of the crisis.  
The massification and democratization of politics modified the role of 
intellectuals in society. The total war had further enlarged political society. While the 
revolution had confirmed long-rooted fears of the masses, politicians and intellectuals 
recognized the need to legitimize political systems in front of the people. In this new 
context, public intellectuals were at the center of the political arena in their mediating 
role between political systems and politicized masses. Public intellectuals became 
synthesizers and in-between figures in a highly politicized society in which every vote 
counted. In fact, they simplified political ideologies and made them accessible to the 
masses, and in so doing aimed to influence public opinion.   
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In the aftermath of World War One, the intellectuals at the center of this study 
viewed political education as the solution to Germany’s problems. War and revolution 
had radically altered German society’s socio-political equilibrium. Extreme politicization 
and radicalization of public discourse accompanied the penetration of the masses in the 
public sphere. The rancorous debate between the leadership of the “Political College” 
(Politische Kolleg, or PK) and that of the “German School of Politics” (Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik, or DHfP) epitomized broader debates on the tension between 
private interest and the common good in a modern society. Both founded in the fall of 
1920, these two educational institutes became central to these intellectuals’ efforts that 
aimed to transform their socio-political visions into reality. These educational programs 
and their goals replicated the contrasting understandings of democracy that their 
leaderships had advanced.  
For young conservatives, political education had to develop a national 
consciousness that was able to transcend political factionalism and thus integrate the 
individual into the broader national community. To this end, the PK organized special 
courses in several German cities in cooperation with like-minded organizations. In 
addition, in open competition with the DHfP, it founded a regular educational institute in 
1922, the “College of National Politics” (Hochschule für nationale Politik). The PK was 
the most ambitious endeavor of the young-conservative milieu and prided itself with 
“being above the parties” and “nonpartisanship” (Überparteilichkeit). Paradoxically, 
internal dissent over the relationship between the masses and the leadership and the 
influence of political parties disrupted the group’s unity.  
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By contrast, the leadership of the DHfP viewed political education as a tool to 
counter the radicalization of political discourse in Germany’s public sphere. For the 
faculty of the DHfP, objective political knowledge was the precondition for a civil 
political discourse that averted the dangers of political doctrines and ideologies. To this 
end, in the first half of the 1920s, the DHfP developed as an institute that primarily 
focused on the political education of men and women active in the political world. As 
Germany’s first school of public affairs, it emphasized practical learning and working 
groups, and prided well-known democratic leaders among its faculty. In this context, the 
leadership of the DHfP conceptualized Überparteilichkeit as a political principle rooted 
in the respect of the political adversary and the willingness to compromise.      
Accordingly, in the first section, I analyze the renewed attention to political 
education in the aftermath of World War One. Political education provided the means to 
counter Germany’s socio-political fragmentation and thus aimed to reestablish German 
international status and role in world affairs. The acrimonious debate centered on 
contrasting understandings of the concept of Überparteilichkeit provided the background 
for the development of the educational programs of the intellectuals at the center of this 
study. Secondly, I detail the educational philosophy of the Deutsche Hochschule für 
Politik. The leadership of the DHfP solved the tension between endorsement of the 
Weimar Republic and criticism of German society’s polarization by conceptualizing 
Überparteilichkeit as civility in political discourse. Finally, I analyze the founding of the 
Politische Kolleg, which aimed to strengthen the German Volk’s collective 
consciousness. In the eyes of the young conservatives, the juxtaposition between the PK 
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and the DHfP mirrored – on a practical level – the either-or scenario that they had 
established between “pure” democracy and “formal” democracy.    
The Weimar Republic and Political Education 
 
Political education had become a central issue in the reformist milieu, as Friedrich 
Naumann’s activities in the decades preceding World War One had shown.1 With the 
transformation of the political system the old structure of the “party of notables” 
appeared unprepared to face the challenges of an enlarged political society in which – 
through the socialist mass party – the working classes had become conscious of their role. 
In addition, Germany’s rising international status, and the resulting political tensions, had 
emphasized in the eyes of many commentators the amateurness of Germany’s political 
leadership in foreign affairs.  
War and revolution had validated the pre-war invocations for a broader political 
education. Against the background of the communist uprising in the winter of 1918-19, 
the general calls for political education expressed a common concern with the Social 
Democratic Party’s ability to influence the youth and to form cadres of young party 
members. Conversely, during the war, the Social Democratic press had vehemently 
reacted to laws that, for the fear of a dangerous politicization, forbade the youth from 
attending political meetings.2 Consequentially, against the background of the swift 
collapse of the “civic peace” and the swelling civil unrest, the executive committee of the 
“Intelligence Service for the Homeland” had discussed the importance of political 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Particularly tense also was the debate on the reform of the elementary school system. See Marjorie 
Lamberti, The Politics of Education. Teachers and School Reform in Weimar Germany (New York: 
Berghahn Books, 2004), chapter 1. 
2 See the newspaper clippings in GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 77 CB S, Nr. 89, Bd. VI-VII. 
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education and, through Jäckh, had decided to contact Naumann, who had recently 
founded the “Citizens School.”3     
Although further contacts between the “Intelligence Service” and Naumann’s 
educational institute are not documented, the “Citizens School” was clearly rooted in this 
general apprehension for the influence of socialists on the youth. Naumann had 
recognized that the “politics of notables” were hardly adequate to the necessities of mass 
societies. In the past, the masses had elected men rather than programs, whereas now 
political parties were being transformed from “personal followings, circles of friends and 
regulars’ tables” into “communities of principles and representations of programs.”4 The 
penetration of the masses in politics hence required a well-developed party organization. 
In contrast to the SPD and Catholic Center Party, however, liberals did not have an 
organizational infrastructure aiming to foster political consciousness.5 These concerns 
with the educational infrastructure of socialists were shared across the political spectrum, 
and paralleled the political and military offensive against Marxist socialism in the 
aftermath of the war. For instance, after Stadtler’s ousting, the “Anti-Bolshevist League” 
– under the guise of the “League for the Protection of German Culture” (Liga zum 
Schutze der deutschen Kultur) – organized political courses in the attempt “to mitigate 
the harshness, or rather eliminate, class struggle.”6 
 Political education – and more in general educational policies – became therefore 
the means by which Germany’s cultural elites aimed to cultivate the unity of the German 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Aufklärungsdienst in der Heimat, Bericht über die bisherige Tätigkeit der Zentralstelle für 
Heimatsaufklärung, May 23, 1918, p. 4, BArch, R 703/111.   
4 Naumann, “Vier Reden an Junge Freunde,”18.  
5 Wilhelm Heile, “Nutzen und Notwendigkeit einer politischen Volkshochschule,” in Friedrich Naumann 
and Wilhelm Heile, Erziehung zur Politik (Berlin: Buchverlag der “Hilfe,” 1918), 31-32.  
6 Liga zum Schutze der deutschen Kultur to Arbeitsamt Berlin Steglitz, August 20, 1919, Landesarchiv 
Berlin, A Rep. 042-05-03, Nr. 412. See also Die Tätigkeit der Liga zum Schutze der deutschen Kultur e.V., 
Summer 1919, Landesarchiv Berlin, A Rep. 042-05-03, Nr. 412.  
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nation, which was threatened by class politics as well as territorial losses. Carl H. Becker 
became a key figure in the development of educational policies in Germany during the 
1920s. In 1916, Becker had joined Prussia’s Ministry of Culture to work on the 
preparation of courses in foreign affairs at Prussian universities and, a year later, had 
stressed the limits of Germans in understanding foreign affairs in a noted memorandum, 
“On the Improvement of Foreign Affairs.”7 Later, Becker directed Prussia’s Ministry of 
Education for some months in 1921 and from February 1925 to January 1930. He was 
close to both Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch, and sought cultural, educational, and 
scientific means to bridge Germany’s socio-political divisions. Accordingly, he 
envisioned an ethical-political as well as civic education as a “synthetic” science.  
Becker defined “cultural and educational policy” (Kulturpolitik) as “a conscious 
creation of spiritual values in the service of the nation or of the state for internal 
consolidation and externally for contentions with other nations” in a 1919 memorandum 
submitted to the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly.8 Against the 
backdrop of Germany’s political and economic collapse, he argued that, “Unconcerned 
by the praise and criticism of other countries, out of ourselves we must create in the 
cultural areas the new spiritual Germany.”9 Crucially, therefore, Kulturpolitik had the 
task to create a common ground on which all political parties as well as the majority of 
the German people could find their way back to national unity.10 To this end, Becker 
envisioned a new cultural and educational policy that aimed to create a cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Carl H. Becker, “Über die Förderung der Auslandstudien” (1917), in Internationale Wissenschaft und 
nationale Bildung: ausgewӓhlte Schriften (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1997), 157-170.    
8 Carl H. Becker, “Kulturpolitische Aufgaben des Reiches” (1919), in Internationale Wissenschaft und 
nationale Bildung: ausgewӓhlte Schriften (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1997), 225.   
9 Carl H. Becker, “Kulturpolitische Aufgaben des Reiches,” 236. 
10 Carl H. Becker, “Kulturpolitische Aufgaben des Reiches,” 255.    
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consciousness that could be shared across political factions in a period in which party 
politics seemed to fragment national unity.11   
From this perspective, political education offered the means by which one could 
counter Germany’s fragmentation and even reestablish Germany’s international prestige. 
Across the political spectrum, intellectuals viewed the French “Free College for Political 
Science” (École libre des sciences politiques) as a model for Germany. While before the 
war this reference had served to denounce German leadership’s lack of political 
expertise,12 after the war, commentators celebrated the École libre, which they believed 
had formed those French political leaders who had guided France in the victorious war.13 
In this way, political education became a tool for the rebuilding of the German state. 
Lastly, the debate on political education also mirrored a dual political concern of 
these intellectuals. For liberals, the focus on political education was primarily part of a 
general search for new analytical frameworks that could provide a better understanding of 
the democratization of state and society. In fact, the Weimar Constitution contained a 
declaration on behalf of (religious) tolerance and a commitment to civic education with 
Article 148.14 The focus on civic education emerged in the eyes of the Constitution’s 
drafters from the need to integrate the German population into the new republican state. 
In fact, the new German democracy did not emerge from the conviction of the entire 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Carl H. Becker, “Eine Forderung an die neue Erziehung” (1919), in Internationale Wissenschaft und 
nationale Bildung: ausgewӓhlte Schriften (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1997), 278.   
12 Plehn, “Eine Hochschule für Politik,” 265-272. 
13 See the speeches in Politische Bildung: Wille, Wesen, Ziel, Weg. Sechs Reden gehalten bei der Erӧffnung 
der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 
1921), Spahn, “Die Pariser politische Hochschule,” and Paul M. Rühlmann, “Das Problem: Politische 
Führer, eine Bildungsfrage,” Preussische Jahrbücher, vol. 181, no. 2 (1920), 234-235. Although referring 
to the model of the Ecole libre, in other writings Rühlmann criticized the centrality of revanchist thought in 
France’s educational system. See for example Paul M. Rühlmann, Der Revanchegedanke and der 
französischen Schule (Berlin: Gebrüder Paetel, 1920). 
14 Marjorie Lamberti, The Politics of Education. Teachers and School Reform in Weimar Germany (New 
York: Berghahn Books, 2004), 56-64. 
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German people and therefore had not yet been totally internalized.15 From this 
perspective, political education had the role to educate Germans to democracy and 
complete the integration of all social strata in the new state. 
Conversely, for some intellectual circles, political education primarily aimed to 
address the perceived lack of political leadership in Germany, which the defeat in the war 
had tragically confirmed. This elitist concern with political leadership was also shared 
across the political spectrum, as the pre-war writings of Naumann and Weber 
demonstrated. Nonetheless, Gleichen’s and Stadtler’s post-war invocations of political 
experts testified to the centrality of elites’ political education in the educational programs 
of young conservatives. Gleichen repeatedly decried the lack of leadership and 
“statecraft” in Germany.16 The power of the state, he asserted, had been destroyed after 
the war because political leaders did not grasp the depth of Germany’s crisis.17 The 
challenges of the time could be overcome only once the problem of political leadership 
was solved,18 and hence the key task – as Boehm wrote – was “the selection of the leader 
and, further, the advancement and correct approach of the capable.”19 Young 
conservatives therefore saw the proof of leadership’s dilettantism in the lost war, whereas 
the reaction of Germans to the outbreak of the war in August 1914 had testified to the 
strength of the nation as a whole.  
The young-conservative call for a new political leadership was part of their 
general criticism of Western civilization, which – in their eyes – had replaced the great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Rühlmann, “Das Problem: Politische Führer, eine Bildungsfrage,” 233-241.  
16 Heinrich von Gleichen, “Politisches Führertum,” Gewissen, vol. 2, no. 49 (December 12, 1920), 3. 
17 Heinrich von Gleichen, “Staatsführung in Krisis,” in Die Neue Front, edited by Arthur Moeller van den 
Bruck, Heinrich von Gleichen, and Max H. Boehm (Berlin: Verlag Gebrüder Paetel, 1922), 380-382.  
18 Stadtler, Die Revolution und das alte Parteiwesen, 18-20. 
19 Boehm, “Was wir wollen!” 2.   
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Persönlichkeit (person of influence or importance) with impersonal mechanisms.20 
Consequently, they juxtaposed the leadership of the Persönlichkeit to the politics of the 
interests-driven parliamentary system.21 In so doing, they viewed the war as the end of an 
old style of political leadership. The tragedy of the present age, Spahn argued, was that 
the youth, hardened by four years in the trenches, had come home and found the places of 
power occupied by the old generation. The war youth could only rebuild Germany as a 
nation if it was allowed to act in peace as it had in war.22 The solution to Germany’s 
leadership problem was therefore the replacement of the pre-war generation that was still 
in command with a young generation of political leaders.  
As the debate in the aftermath of the war showed, political education promised to 
be a tool for the reestablishment of Germany’s international status by forming a new, 
more effective political leadership. At the same time, however, by stressing the 
nonpartisan character of their endeavors, both young conservatives and the Jäckh circle 
explicitly addressed political factionalism and thus aimed to educate the masses to 
responsible political action. In post-war rhetoric and polemic, the common reference to 
Überparteilichkeit assumed slightly different meanings, which, however, pointed to 
radically contrasting forms of societal organization.  
Hence, inevitably, an acerbic dispute between the Jäckh circle and the young 
conservatives exploded. Educational plans aiming to strengthen the solidity and solidarity 
of the Volk inevitably clashed with educational approaches rooted in pluralist visions of 
society. The verbal violence of the debate also symbolized the general radicalization of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 On a more general level, Persönlichkeit may also refer to “personality” and “person of character” or 
“towering individuality.”  
21 Max H. Boehm, “Die Grenzen des Versicherungsgedankens,” 19. 
22 Martin Spahn, “1648 und 1918,” in Die Neue Front, edited by Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Heinrich 
von Gleichen, and Max H. Boehm (Berlin: Verlag Gebrüder Paetel, 1922), 1-4.   
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political discourse, in particular considering that it involved public figures that until 
recently had cooperated in the same cross-partisan organizations, such as the “German 
Society 1914” and the Kulturbund.   
Young conservatives furiously reacted when in the summer of 1920 Jäckh 
unveiled his education plan. In late July 1920, in an angry letter to Becker, Gleichen 
accused Jäckh of disloyalty because he allegedly had betrayed a previous agreement and 
was now planning to establish a political college similar to the one Gleichen was 
developing with Spahn. He argued that the two endeavors would be rivals and noted that, 
“It almost appears as if the DEMOCRATIC PARTY, to which particularly close links are 
commonly attributed to you [Becker], was in a hurry to throw this anchor before the 
nonpartisan movement of my friends could make further progress.”23 Gleichen thus 
clearly contrasted his allegedly nonpartisan endeavor to the partisanship of Jäckh, who he 
assumed to be close to both Becker and the DDP. Furthermore, accusing Becker of 
supporting Jäckh, he noted that, “the YOUTH is excluded and the dead old hand is 
supported.”24 In this way, Gleichen raised the second point of contention. The young 
conservatives juxtaposed their political action to the pre-war political system, which – in 
their view – Jäckh and his associates personified.  
In the following weeks the conflict was radicalized and personalized. Gleichen 
renewed his attacks against Jäckh, who he deemed unable to awake a new political will in 
the youth and lacking “the spirit of political renewal.”25 Furthermore, in an article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Heinrich von Gleichen to Carl H. Becker, July 31, 1920, p. 2, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 
430. Emphasis in the original.  
24 Heinrich von Gleichen to Carl H. Becker, July 31, 1920, p. 3, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 
430. Emphasis in the original. 
25 Heinrich von Gleichen to Carl H. Becker, August 11, 1920, p. 2, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 
430. Emphasis in the original. 
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published in the Gewissen on August 18, 1920, Gleichen stressed that Jäckh had never 
developed a “clear political line” in his endeavors (citing as examples the Werkbund and 
the “German Society 1914”).   
Professor Jäckh is still the amiable, diplomatic go-between for everyone 
and everything. He possesses an unusual ability for inspired formulations 
and middle lines, which to the parliamentary minister … made him 
indispensable. Indeed, this led his path from season to season to the closest 
leaning towards the knowledge and will of the leadership.26  
 
In Gleichen’s attack, Jäckh became the symbol of liberal parliamentarism’s essence. 
Indeed, his willingness to compromise and negotiate sharply contrasted with the activism 
and the celebration of the deed that characterized young conservatives’ political rhetoric.   
Soon after the publication of this article, Jäckh met with Gleichen at the “June 
Club,” with Heuss and Moeller-Bruck present as witnesses. With Becker, Jäckh claimed 
that Gleichen had withdrawn his accusations of “disloyalty” during this meeting.27 
Nonetheless, paticipants clearly restated the differences between the two groups. 
Gleichen pointed out that young conservatives saw in the DHfP “the spirit of the lack of a 
national guiding principle,” which the DDP embodied. Conversely, Jäckh had retorted – 
according to Gleichen’s account – by arguing that the young conservatives’ endeavor had 
a clear “party-character” because it supported a specific political attitude.28 Symbolically, 
therefore, both groups viewed the rival venture as the emblem of party politics, which 
they deemed responsible for Germany’s weakness.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Heinrich von Gleichen, “Führer-Ausbildung,” Gewissen, vol. 2, no. 32 (August 18, 1920), 1. 
27 Besprechung bei Staatssekretär Dr. Becker im Kultusministerium am Montag, den 30. August 1920, 
September 1, 1920, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 2, Tit. X, Nr. 200. 
28 Heinrich von Gleichen to Carl H. Becker, September 9, 1920, p. 5, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, Va, Sekt. 
2, Tit. X, Nr. 200. 
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At first, Becker – who was close to several personalities of the young-
conservative milieu – tried to mediate between Gleichen and Jäckh.29 On August 30, 
Becker hoped to find a form of coexistence between the two institutes in a meeting with 
Jäckh and Gleichen. During the meeting, Jäckh again pointed out the nonpartisan 
character of the Board of Directors and Faculty Council of the DHfP, and Becker 
characterized the difference between the DHfP and the PK as extensive as well as 
intensive political education of the German people in the former, and intensive focus on 
the individuality in the latter.30    
Notwithstanding these attempts of mediation, young conservatives continued their 
attacks against the DHfP and its leadership. Announcing the opening of the Politische 
Kolleg, Gleichen attacked the “political professors” of the DHfP who “collected in their 
heads worldviews, and who now would like to prove also that the real developments 
validate these worldviews.”31 In commenting on the opening ceremony of the DHfP, 
young conservatives condemned its liberal and pacifist tones.32 In an article in the 
Gewissen, Hans Röseler argued that political education was only possible if limited to the 
provision of technical knowledge. This, however, was possible only – and here Röseler 
expressed the essence of young conservatives’ accusations – “if it succeeds in being 
really above the parties, and not only in-between the parties or even center party-like.”33 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Still in August 1920, Becker expressed his support to Hans Röseler’s magazine, Die Hochschule, which 
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PK, VI. Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 3548. 
30 Besprechung bei Staatssekretär Dr. Becker im Kultusministerium am Montag, den 30. August 1920, 
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Röseler’s critique thus points to the emergence of two contrasting understandings of 
Überparteilichkeit. True Überparteilichkeit meant being above and beyond party politics, 
whereas equal distance to political parties simply equaled to a lack of political 
consciousness and direction.        
These attacks resulted in the definitive rupture between Gleichen and Becker. 
Becker noted that Gleichen’s statements “do not inspire confidence in your movement.”34 
In addition, he characterized Gleichen’s juxtaposition between old and young as “easy 
demagogy” and pointed out that, “The problem lies not in having ideas, but rather in the 
implementation of ideas. Who comes from the praxis knows how difficult it is to 
implement in reality even the smallest of the ideas.”35 In his reply, Gleichen asserted that 
“youth” referred to the “oppositional stand against the political impotence of a previous 
generation.” Hence, he restated his distrust in “your [Becker’s] works of the Political 
School and your mandatory, Mr. Jäckh.”36  
For young conservatives, therefore, Überparteilichkeit referred to a “stand above 
the parties.” From this perspective, they coupled Überparteilichkeit to an ideal form of 
societal organization that integrated the individual into the national community. The 
Volk, as an organic unity, linked the individual to the nation’s destiny and provided a pre-
political unity able to transcend socio-political differences. By “being above the parties,” 
a political leadership or a political position was literally placed above the political fray 
and thus immune to the corruptions of political processes. In so doing, it by-passed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Carl H. Becker to Heinrich von Gleichen, October 16, 1920, p. 1, GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl Becker, C. H., 
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35 Carl H. Becker to Heinrich von Gleichen, October 16, 1920, p. 2, GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl Becker, C. H., 
Nr. 430.  
36 Heinrich von Gleichen to Carl H. Becker, November 19, 1920, p. 2, GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl Becker, C. H., 
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republican intermediary institutions and opened the door to a search for alternative forms 
of popular political legitimization.          
By contrast, although not immune to the appeal of a mythical people’s 
community, the Jäckh circle defended a conception of society that was rooted in the 
plurality of contrasting interests. Not without caution, these liberal reformers viewed 
political institutions – in particular parties and the parliament – as structures able to 
educate the individual to a life in common. In this context, Überparteilichkeit was at 
times characterized as an equal distance to political parties. Most consistently, however, 
they conceptualized Überparteilichkeit as a socio-political ethos. It referred to a political 
attitude and mode of action that were rooted in the acceptance of differences and respect 
for the political adversary. In fact, as Becker suggested with his comment on the 
implementation of ideas, the praxis of the political process required a willingness to 
sacrifice the purity of the idea to the realities of a polycentric political system. For the 
leadership of the DHfP, Überparteilichkeit thus became the key element for the good 
working of a liberal republican state.   
The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik and the Politics of Civility 
 
Jäckh and his associates inaugurated the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik on 
October 24, 1920, against the background of the diatribe with the young conservatives. 
Federal President Friedrich Ebert and other high-ranking government officials attended 
the opening ceremony. Becker was instrumental in politically supporting the new 
institute, thus partially validating Gleichen’s accusations.37 In fact, Becker would rarely 
refuse to give guest lectures, and his lectures on “Problems of Middle Eastern Politics” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Theodor Heuss, Ansprache des Bundespräsidenten bei der Gedächtnisfeier für Carl Heinrich Becker am 
11. Februar 1953, p. 2, GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 1701. See also Heuss, Erinnerungen, 
1905-1933, 301. 
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recurred every fall semester.38 Furthermore, in an internal note, Prussia’s Ministry of 
Education declared, “to morally support this endeavor at the best of his possibilities.”39 It 
soon became a tradition that representatives of either the federal or state government 
would attend the DHfP’s annual ceremonies as a sign of the institutional interest in the 
School.40  
Jäckh was successful in including personalities from a broad network of 
reformers, intellectuals, politicians, and industrialists and bankers in the leading organs of 
his new venture. Hence, he made the DHfP the center of an influential circle of public 
figures. The Board of Trustees primarily had financial tasks and included well-known 
personalities such as wealthy industrialists Carl Friedrich von Siemens and Robert Bosch, 
economist Hjalmar Schacht, diplomat and industrialist Richard von Kühlmann, President 
of the Court of Justice Walter Simons, and banker and co-founder of the DDP Theodor 
Vogelstein.41 The School was directed by a Board of Directors (until 1927, chaired by 
Wilhelm Drews – president of the Higher Administrative Court and former Prussian 
Minister of the Interior), which counted among its members the reformers Bäumer and 
Heile, the historians Delbrück and Meinecke, and the politicians Heuss and Schiffer. 
Significantly, it also included representatives of the Foreign Office, Ministry of the 
Interior, and Prussia’s Ministry of Culture. First Heuss and then Arnold Wolfers (from 
1925 to 1930) served as the Director of Academic Programs, who was in charge of the 
academic curriculum. From 1925 Hans Simons and then, after the elimination of the role 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 See the general correspondence in GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 190. 
39 Prussian Minister of Education, Internal Communication, September 29, 1920, GStA PK, I. HA, Rep. 76, 
Va, Sekt. 2, Tit. X, Nr. 200. 
40 Carl H. Becker, Ansprache des Preussischen Kultusministers für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung 
bei der Jahresfeier der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, 5 November 1927, GStA PK, VI. HA, Nl Becker, 
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41 Jäckh, “Das Dritte Jahr,” 5-6. 
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of Director of Academic Programs in 1930, Wolfers served as the Administrative 
Director. In 1930, the role of president would also be created, to which Jäckh was 
appointed.  
Jäckh’s new venture had multiple – in part also contradictory – roots. The DHfP 
emerged out of liberal reformers’ debates on political education, lack of political 
leadership, and educational reforms.42 In particular, Naumann’s short-lived “Citizens 
School” influenced Jäckh’s plans.43 At the same time, the DHfP was also a product of 
World War One, the “great educator of a new Germany.”44 The DHfP played a crucial 
role in providing political education and teaching political tolerance,45 because regular 
universities avoided political education “out of fear from party politics or out of 
incapacity for nonpartisanship.”46 It was therefore a reaction to political life’s 
radicalization and a partial answer to the necessities of the new republican state. 
In the post-war context, the debates on Germany’s role in world affairs 
necessarily influenced the School’s establishment. In a memorandum on the founding of 
the DHfP, Heuss argued that the new School was “an important tool for the restoration of 
the German state” because Germany’s destruction continued to be the goal of the former 
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war enemies’ peace policy.47 German elites thus did not only conceive science and 
culture in relationship to a recovery of industrial and economic competitiveness, but also 
as the only fields where German dignity could be re-asserted – as Becker’s political 
thought also confirmed.  
The relationship between science and national power – a theme that crisscrossed 
official addresses and writings of the faculty members – had its historical antecedent in 
Prussia after the Napoleonic wars. Jäckh indirectly established this connection by 
viewing the Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität (founded in 1810) as the model of the French 
Ècole Libre, in which he had found inspiration for his own venture. He linked France’s 
reconstruction after 1870 and its victory in the World War to the establishment of the 
Ècole Libre in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71. He thus viewed 
political education as functional for the rebirth of Germany’s honor and development 
and, conversely, its lack as the main cause of the lost war.48 
Jäckh contrasted, however, his School’s internationalism to the “revenge 
chauvinism” of the Ècole Libre. The DHfP would aimed “for the intellectual and spiritual 
reconstruction of Germany – of a new Germany and through it also of a new Europe in a 
new spirit (though not the senseless, violent 'spirit' of Versailles), so that the dead of this 
war have not been sacrificed in vain.”49 The ability to attract foreign students and in 
particular the fact that several foreign governments started sending civil servants for 
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training to the DHfP rather than to the French Ècole Libre, as they had done in the past, 
confirmed this internationalist outlook.50 
Most importantly, however, the DHfP was rooted in its leadership’s conception of 
liberal democracy. In fact, “the parliamentary system is senseless and barren of results 
unless the opposition is recognized from inner conviction and equal rights are accorded to 
it.”51 It was necessary to overcome the influence of a mentality associated with the 
Prussian state and to establish “democracy as a form of life.”52 In fact, democracy – as 
Jäckh later described to an international audience – was a “mentality,” which implied 
“responsibility of the people towards the community, not towards any class or caste, and 
responsibility of the leaders not towards any Party, but towards the community.”53 The 
new German democracy could survive only if Germans developed a “political-democratic 
sense of duty,” without which democracy risked degenerating “into demagogy … into 
rule of the street, of the most one-sided class interests.”54 The radicalization of domestic 
conflicts, the “madness of the disputes,” and the “brutality of the lazy common sense” 
gave urgency to Germans’ political education, as well as to the formation of a mature 
political will.55 Germany’s fragmented political society required a “chivalrous attitude” 
that could only be rooted in an objective understanding of political dynamics.56  
Indeed, political education could de-radicalize political conflicts by creating a 
mature political will. Political education thus had to conceptualize politics as a science 
and not purely as an art. During the opening ceremony of the DHfP, several speakers 	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pointed to the “artistic” side of politics and acknowledged that not all the characteristics 
of the political genius could be taught or learned. Nonetheless, Walter Simons (at the 
time Foreign Minister and later president of the Court of Justice) stressed the possibility 
to free Germans from the blinders that had narrowed their political views in the previous 
years through the study of politics.57 It was possible to conceptualize politics as a science 
when referring to the scientific basis of politics, to the examination of problems of 
politics, and to the examination of politics from a historical perspective.58  
The unity of political knowledge and political will could help Germany overcome 
its internal provincialism.   
Knowledge without will, must remain unproductive; will without 
knowledge, may become productive. A will that grows wild imbrutes, 
foams, destroys like a torrent; also the assassin’s misdeed refers to the 
“best will,” to the “best intention.” … Then: even will needs and requires 
knowledge. … A knowledge of facts, without illusions and sympathies, 
clear and hard, impartial and incorruptible, judicious and farsighted; free 
of the nonsense of slogans, free of the absurdity of prejudices, free of the 
anomaly and degeneracy of all “ism”; a knowledge of the relationships of 
events, of the connection of the present with the past and with the future.59  
 
Knowledge had to regulate and direct political will. Indeed, “Nothing is more dangerous, 
both in theory and in practice, than to confound the will to politics with the political will” 
because interest in politics was not necessarily the ability to give proper form and 
direction to this interest.60 Hence, political maturity required “nonpartisan and calm, 
therefore scientific” knowledge of the state and its institutions. Political capacity of 
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judgment pre-supposed both will and education. Accordingly, the “first duty” of the 
intellectual was to familiarize Germans with the working of the state and its institutions.61  
The Jäckh circle conceptualized political education as the cultivation of the spirit 
of Überparteilichkeit. This nonpartisanship did not simply refer to an equal distance to 
political parties, but rather to a “state ethos” and “will of duty.”62 In other words, as Hans 
Simons argued, political education was the education of the will in order to awaken a 
“particular ethos” and to introduce the individual to “objective, comprehensible facts,” 
which could lead to “conclusions with general validity.”63 Since individuals could not be 
de-politicized, objective political education had to de-radicalize politics and contain their 
negative effects. In fact, the more politically educated a person was, the more politically 
neutral he would become, that is, “by renouncing one’s own tendency, to fit themselves 
into a chain of events codetermined with others.”64 The liberals of the Jäckh circle thus 
linked the good working of the liberal democratic system to the establishment of a certain 
political ethos, which they rooted in the concept of Überparteilichkeit, intended as the 
politics of civility.   
Überparteilichkeit was a key aspect of these intellectuals’ conceptualization of 
political discourse. The essence of a liberal parliamentary system was the willingness to 
view political contrasts as negotiable. This in turn demanded a political discourse that, by 
being rational and argumentative, was based on an objective discussion of political facts. 
This politics of civility required a political imagination that would help to see “the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Hermann Heller, “Arbeiter und wissenschaftliche Politik” (1919/20), in Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 1, 
edited by Christoph Müller (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1971), 581.   
62 Ernst Jäckh, “Zwei Jahre Deutsche Hochschule fuer Politik,” in Ernst Troeltsch, Naturrecht und 
Humanität in der Weltpolitik (Berlin: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1923). 
63 Simons, Politische Schulung und Hochschule, 5. 
64 Simons, Politische Schulung und Hochschule, 10.  
	   165	  
opponent in the political game” as a person and thus to “discover that even an opponent 
and his view have some inner right.”65 Accordingly, the politics of civility entailed an 
“attitude of correct distance,” that is, a distance from one’s own “emotions, motives, and 
aims” and thus “the inner freedom … is nothing else than the freedom I have won toward 
myself, my ideas, and my passion.”66 The liberals of the Jäckh circle developed through 
the principle of Überparteilichkeit a conception of civil society, and attempted to instill 
the ideal of civic discourse in Germany’s fragmented society.  
Civility, however, could only de-radicalize politics if it was combined with an 
acceptance of the new political system. Unable or unwilling to endorse democracy 
whole-heartedly, which most considered a historical necessity rather than the absolute 
best form of government, these intellectuals appealed to the “enemies” of the republic 
with what was an “appeal to reason, to political judiciousness, to the national sense of 
duty.”67 In a conference of the “Democratic Student’s Union,” Meinecke emblematically 
stated      
The calm, objective debate will be the best way to distinguish positive and 
arguable arguments from mere ill-considered moods and perceptions, on 
which to a large extent is based their [the enemies of the democratic state] 
cool attitude. To prepare such an arena for the peaceful competition of 
opinions and to create through this competition new commonalities 
between us and those still hesitant and vacillating, this I consider the 
practical goal of our conference.68 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Haas, “Political Education,”604. 
66 Haas, “Political Education,” 606 and 607. 
67 Friedrich Meinecke, “Zweiter Referat,” in Die deutschen Universitäten und der heutige Staat, edited by 
Wilhelm Kahl, Friedrich Meinecke, and Gustav Radbruch (Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1926), 18.  
68 Friedrich Meinecke, “Zweiter Referat,” in Die deutschen Universitäten und der heutige Staat, edited by 
Wilhelm Kahl, Friedrich Meinecke, and Gustav Radbruch (Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1926), 18-
19.  
	   166	  
The key point was – Meinecke argued – to rationally decide about the less harmful form 
of state, which he believed to be the republic. Hence, he aimed to broaden the support for 
the republic.69  
Meinecke participated in a series of conferences that focused on German 
universities’ role in public life. The intention of the organizers including Meinecke and 
Delbrück was to reunite all those personalities who supported the Republic either because 
of the post-war era’s necessity or because of enthusiasm for popular sovereignty’s ethical 
value. The signatories deemed this task to be urgent because of academics’ rejection of 
the new state form and of their influence on the youth.70   
Not everybody appeared able or willing to make the famous second step from 
acceptance out of necessity to full-hearted endorsement that Meinecke hoped for, “who 
has done the first step, must now, again because of the state’s needs, also make the 
second step and wish that the new form of government also grows in the nation’s heart in 
order to take deep roots.”71 To this end, Jäckh and his closest associates developed the 
DHfP as a practical school of public affairs. The cooperation with men of praxis had been 
their goal since the institute’s inception. In fact, on occasion of the founding of the DHfP, 
both Heuss and Jäckh expressed the hope that the republican political elites would serve 
as faculty members and hence gave visible expression to the link between theory and 
practice.72 Jäckh described the School’s approach as the “method of the working group – 
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a working group between the experience of the practitioners, the research of the 
scientists, and the intuition of political art.”73 The involvement of political practitioners in 
the teaching activities thus confirmed the School’s practical orientation.  
The practical goal of the DHfP was therefore to provide vocational training to 
men and women of the political practice, or whose work was influenced by political 
dynamics.74 The first published program confirmed the practical rather than academic 
orientation of the DHfP by positively contrasting “the position of the responsible citizen 
who stands at the center of the stream of events and is called to act” to “the distance of 
survey-like scientific observations.”75 Accordingly, Heuss identified as central to the 
School’s mission “the education of men and women who are willing and able to judge 
objectively [and] act bravely wherever work and social duty may place them.”76 
Consequentially, the School’s prospective students were politicians in the strictest sense, 
teachers that had to address civic education, social workers and members of interest 
groups, and – broadly speaking – civil servants interested in the field.77 Specifically, the 
DHfP focused on the political education of crucial categories such as the journalist, the 
engineer who, as the person in charge of the day-to-day manufacturing processes, had to 
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deal on a daily basis with an increasingly politicized working class, and of the worker 
himself.78 
The heterogeneity of students’ professional background testified to the broad 
scope of the DHfP.79 The School took the difficult path of finding an equilibrium 
between an institute of higher education and a center for vocational training in trying to 
fulfill its different aims.80 In the first years, political education was centered on general 
politics, sociology and social policy, economics, cultural policy and civic education, and 
sciences of the state.81 In a memorandum of December 1923, the “Student Committee” 
restated the goals of the DHfP of providing “an opportunity for the acquisition of 
systematic knowledge, the understanding of key problems, and the ability of independent 
thinking, without being limited like any other university to the academic community.” In 
addition, however, it also pointed out the need to develop the educational program.82  
With the end of the post-war political and economic crisis, the leadership of the 
School stabilized the institute. During the foundational phase, until the winter semester 
1923-24, the School’s emphasis on history and political theory responded to the need to 
come to terms with the war and the revolutionary experience of the winter of 1918-19, as 
well as to establish a continuity with the pre-war period.83 In 1924-25, the DHfP 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Goetz Briefs, “Ingenieur und Politische Bildung,” in Politik als Wissenschaft. Zehn Jahre Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik, edited by Ernst Jäckh (Berlin: Verlag Hermann Reckendorf, 1931), 165-172, Emil 
Dovifat, “Die Politische Schulung des Journalisten,” in Politik als Wissenschaft. Zehn Jahre Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik, edited by Ernst Jäckh (Berlin: Verlag Hermann Reckendorf, 1931), 151-164, and 
Carl Mennicke, “Die politische Bildung des Industriearbeiters,” Berichte der Deutschen Hochschule für 
Politik, vol. 2, no. 1 (1924-1925), 1-5.  
79 Lehnert, “‘Politik als Wissenschaft’,” 447.  
80 Numerous scholars have analyzed the structure and development of the general curriculum of the DHfP. 
The scholarly debate has primarily focused on when – and if at all – modern political sciences were 
developed at the DHfP. For references, see notes 59 and 60 in Chapter One. 
81 See the curricula in GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303 neu, Nr. 1-9.   
82 Denkschrift des Hörerausschusses der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, December 1923, GStA PK, I. 
HA, Rep. 303, Nr. 239. 
83 Lehnert, “‘Politik als Wissenschaft’,” 451.  
	   169	  
systematized the curriculum in a regular two-year program with a final exam,84 hence 
signaling its progressive consolidation. With the stabilization of the republic, the DHfP 
consolidated its position in Weimar society, and domestic politics (with an emphasis on 
practical training) played a central role in its educational programs by the mid-1920s.85  
The generous financial support of a network of philanthropists close to the 
Naumann circle made possible consolidation of the DHfP. The founding circle had 
established School as a “free” (that is, private rather than public) institute. As Drews 
argued on occasion of the opening ceremony, this “free self-activity and free 
cooperation” reflected both the “material needs of the coming times” and the “willingness 
to make sacrifices” in support of the education of the German nation.86 The DHfP, 
therefore, primarily relied on the private support of “democratic friends and supporters” 
such as Robert Bosch and Walter Siemens,87 whereas the Reich and Prussian state only 
provided for various types of infrastructure.88 The School was a public benefit 
organization, which – according to its by-laws – aimed to support “the political and civic 
education of all strata of the population.”89    
The School also developed special courses in close association with state and 
federal ministries. These special courses addressed specific interest areas, as for example 
the decried lack of expertise in foreign policy.90 In 1923, the DHfP reached an agreement 
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with the Foreign Office for the training of candidates for the diplomatic service.91  
Consequentially, leading personalities of the DHfP drafted memoranda on the training of 
civil servants for the Foreign Office. They stressed the importance of understanding 
politics’ broad basis and of relying on instructors with practical experience in 
diplomacy.92 In 1926, the Ministry of the Interior stressed the importance of general 
political education for civil servants and recommended the work of the DHfP. In a 
circular letter to federal agencies, the Ministry even suggested to include attendance and 
certificates gained at the DHfP in personnel files.93  
 Jäckh could, therefore, legitimately affirm that the DHfP “practically cooperated” 
with the German state by assisting the government in crucial areas. The School 
established the “Seminar for Youth Welfare” (Seminar für Jugendwohlfart) for the 
training of men and women for the new youth welfare offices that the 1922 Reich Youth 
Welfare Law had created. In addition, it participated in the “Civic Week” 
(Staatsbürgerliche Woche) organized by the Federal Minister of the Interior, in the 
“Administrative Week” (Verwaltungswoche) organized by the Prussian Ministry of the 
Interior, and the “Vocational-Pedagogic Week” (Berufspädagogische Woche) (providing 
civic training to teachers at professional and vocational schools) organized by the 
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Prussian Ministry of Commerce.94 Hence, the DHfP could claim, “It is not saying too 
much that the German School of Politics has become more and more the central 
department to which the new tasks that emerge from the needs of the new state for the 
different agencies and ministries are assigned.”95 
This close relationship with practical politics, however, also caused difficulties. 
During the academic year of 1924-25, three electoral cycles disrupted the activities of the 
School because faculty members were involved in political campaigns and the student 
body was “hit by the artificial sharpening of contradictions [and] the joint efforts for 
knowledge were alienated by the comfortable and confident slogans of propaganda.”96 In 
addition, while in the aftermath of the revolution students had been eager to learn about 
politics, now – in the words of Hans Simons – almost everyone had a “political 
viewpoint” and “everywhere we see the fear of new insights, the preoccupation of being 
thrown by knowledge and awareness of the calmness of [party] programs in the unrest of 
problems.”97 These difficulties foreshadowed the complexity of clearly separating party 
politics from Überparteilichkeit in an educational institute that, by being conceived as a 
school of public affairs, inevitably was involved in the political life and controversies of 
Germany’s young democracy.  
In the first half of the 1920s, therefore, the concept of Überparteilichkeit – 
coupled with a specific understanding of the working of a liberal parliamentary 
democracy – guided the development of the DHfP. In addition, the practical direction of 	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the School found expression in the numerous collaborative efforts with both state and 
federal agencies. Regular curriculum, special courses, and seminars provided practical 
training and “objective” knowledge and thus aimed to create a common basis for a 
political discussion that averted ideologies and was rather rooted in a factual and 
objective understanding of political processes. From this perspective, therefore, the 
faculty of the DHfP attempted to insert a notion of “civil discourse” rooted in 
Überparteilichkeit and able to support the working of Germany’s young democracy in 
Weimar’s radicalized public sphere. 
The Politische Kolleg and the Education of the Volk 
 
The young conservatives of the “June Club” viewed the Politische Kolleg and 
later the Hochschule für nationale Politik as the tools to awaken the German nation’s 
communitarian bonds. These intellectuals rooted their educational philosophy in the 
persistence of the war emergency, which they viewed as the key precondition for any 
new form of societal organization. In fact, only the emergency could allow young 
conservatives to revive the German nation’s collective political will. Educators had 
therefore the task to instill the urgency to act in the nation. In so doing, young 
conservatives placed themselves at the center of the Weimar Republic’s radicalized 
public sphere. At the same time, however, they also linked the effectiveness of their 
conception of political education to the outside political context. Inevitably, these 
educational endeavors would lose appeal with the stabilization of the Weimar Republic, 
as would be the case for their political rhetoric in general.      
Young conservatives viewed the political education of the youth as the solution to 
the dilettantism of Germany’s political class and to society’s fragmentation. Like the 
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liberals of the Jäckh circle, Moeller-Bruck decried the fact that politics was still trapped 
in the “domestic political quarrel.” In fact, “all our German politics ultimately is nothing 
else” – he lamented – “than a continuation of miserable party politics with all the 
attending ills of envy, jealousy, vote catching, in the process it is totally forgotten that 
politics is a matter of the nation.”98 Similarly, Boehm repeatedly stressed that Germany’s 
public opinion lacked an understanding of political problems, which resulted in Germans’ 
“apolitical obtuseness.”99 Political education thus became the means by which to rebuild 
the German nation and to reestablish its international prestige.  
The Volk and “the emergency” were key elements in young conservatives’ 
educational plans. In fact, they aspired to recreate the emergency situation of the war and 
renew the German nation’s spiritual community through education. Boehm had addressed 
the question of the war’s educational ideals already towards the end of the conflict. He 
argued that educational reforms alone were unable to maintain the “nation’s experience 
of the war,” and hence suggested that it would be the task of educators to transmit these 
values.100 Consequentially, young conservatives viewed it as their task as educators and 
thought leaders to awaken the German nation and instill the spiritual and communitarian 
values of the war in it.   
These intellectuals aimed to develop the German Volk’s collective political 
capacities. While a “wild demonical possession” could drive the political genius to act 
when confronted with the “emergency,” collective political action – Karl Hoffmann 
asserted – required an ongoing effort based on collective work. It was therefore crucial to 
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create an “atmosphere” in which collective political forces could develop. In the absence 
of a political genius, thought leaders – Hoffmann concluded – could have the “insight” to 
set in motion the process that would create a collective political sense.101  
Hoffman viewed Spahn’s work on the German Volk and on its Central European 
destiny as the “insight” that could awaken Germany’s collective political sense.102 The 
concept of the Volk and its connections to the “space” (Raum) were central elements of 
young conservatives’ educational philosophy. Communities – Spahn argued – were not 
the simple sum of individuals, but “conduct[ed] an existence beyond the individuality.”103 
Education had to build the cultural and spiritual bonds that could integrate the individual 
into the broader national community, which economic developments and individualism 
had weakened already in the years preceding the war.104 The Volk, however, could 
develop only if aware of its linkages to the Central European “space.”105 Spahn thus 
linked the German nation’s spiritual and cultural unity to the Central European space. 
These “roots” served to avert the multiplicity that characterized modern societies.   
From this perspective, Germany’s weak position in central Europe confirmed both 
the incapacity of its political leadership and the deficiencies of its political education. 
Even Spahn linked France’s military victory to the activities of the École Libre. He saw 
Germany’s future path in Prussia’s educational policies of 1809 and in France’s 
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experience of the previous fifty years.106 The German nation’s “will and reason” needed a 
goal or an “insight,” which for Spahn could only be one.  
Do the French mold Mitteleuropa against us, then with it will have an end 
our historical worth. … By contrast, do we mold Mitteleuropa, then 
through it we will become again Europe’s leading nation. … The mission 
is: Mittel-Europa!107 
 
At the center of the educational program of the young conservatives was therefore the 
need to awaken the political will of the German nation, which was intended as a 
collective entity. In the absence of a strong political leadership, the thought leaders of the 
“young Germany” had to lead Germans’ politicization. The state of emergency and crisis 
of the post-war years had created the conditions that Hoffmann deemed necessary to form 
a collective political will. The confrontation with the forces of Versailles and the 
historical Mitteleuropa destiny of the German Volk became the means young 
conservatives aimed to mobilize and politicize the nation. 
The Politische Kolleg was thus firmly rooted in the ideals of the “June Club.” 
Spahn had aimed to create an Institute of Foreign Policy at the University of Strasburg 
during the war. The experience of the conflict and revolution, however, had moved him 
towards broader efforts that could address the connections between foreign policy and all 
other political dimensions.108 Against the background of revolutionary unrest, the PK’s 
founding group aimed to “save the last authoritarian bonds in the midst of the general 
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disintegration” and strengthen the nation’s capacity to resists its enemies.109 The PK thus 
aimed to overcome political parties and focus on the “whole” through “the education of a 
specific kind of German political will.” The sequence of war, collapse, and ongoing 
emergency – they believed – made this approach necessary and possible.110   
Under the direction of Spahn and – for the first four years – Gleichen, the PK 
aimed to overcome the fragmentation of Germany’s political society by means of 
political education.111 The PK focused on Germany’s internal fragmentation and aimed to 
contribute to the defense of Germany’s borders and to the ideals of Großdeutschland as 
well as Mitteleuropa.112 This focus on Germany made the PK “no place … in which the 
foreigner can feel at home as the German does. It aims at Germans, it wants to help the 
German nation.”113 This ideological focus also clearly emerged from the trenchant 
comments about students such as the one about a Graf Brockdorf-Würzburg defined as 
“intellectual, decadent, crass individualist, corrosive effect on the lectures as well as on 
the social gatherings.”114 The PK was therefore an educational institute aiming to 
strengthen the political will of the German nation and resist the disrupting penetration of 
Western ideals.  
To this end, the PK established a series of “working groups” to discuss and 
research questions deemed to be crucial for the nation’s political life. Boehm directed 
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group focusing on “the problems of nationalities,” which was the most active of these 
“working groups.” This group, focusing on Volk and irredentism, soon gained a certain 
level of independence and moved out of the rooms of the PK in January 1921.115 In 
addition, the PK organized “working groups” focusing on “foreign policy” (directed by 
Spahn and Hoffmann) – initially, until the illness that led to his suicide, Moeller-Bruck 
directed an offshoot of this group investigating the war guilt question on the basis of war 
propaganda.116 Another “working group” focused on “corporatism” and soon developed 
an offshoot group investigating questions regarding trade union and political parties.117 
The other “working groups” focusing on publications on civic education, liberal arts 
education, and propaganda were less successful for changes in leadership and lack of 
financial support.118 These “working groups” aimed to identify specific issues out of 
which the “organism of the German Empire” could develop.119  
In addition, the PK established regular courses that aimed to strengthen the roots 
of the German nation. In the second year it instituted the “Spandau Courses,” in which 
personalities from different social groups discussed the economic, social, and political 
issues over a period of 8-10 weeks.120 The special “national-political courses” confirmed 
the importance of national awakening for the circle of the PK. Indeed, the PK organized 
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39 courses with 1190 participants between October 1, 1921 and October 1, 1925.121 
These courses developed in various German areas in cooperation with like-minded 
organizations and thus represented an attempt to extend the influence of the political 
ideas of the young conservatives beyond the city of Berlin.  
The Politische Kolleg merged with the “June Club” in January 1921 with the aim 
to enlarge their sphere of influence and be more effective in their tasks.122 The “June 
Club” ended its activities as a separate entity in conjunction to this merger,123 and 
Gleichen and Spahn constituted the Board of Directors of the newly established 
association of the PK.124 This unity, however, did not last long and the “June Club” was 
reestablished by the end of the year, hence foreshadowing the internal dissents that 
eventually would disrupt the circle of the young conservatives. 
In January 1922, a special assembly of members decided to exclude from the PK 
those members who were not actively collaborating with its activities.125 By accepting 
these members in the re-founded “June Club,” the leaders of the circle sharpened the 
distinction between the educational institute and the “June Club.”126 The goals of the 
“June Club” consisted of working “in the service of the political, cultural, and economic 
renewal of Großdeutschland,” as the new by-laws restated. At the same time, the by-laws 
reiterated the nonpartisan character of the association, “Sectarian, party, and class 
differences are excluded. Party tactics and party politics will find no place in the life of 
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CLUB.”127 At the beginning of 1923, the “June Club” had 150 members and the PK 30 
members.128  
The relationship between the PK and the School of Politics remained ambiguous. 
Young conservatives continued to accuse the DHfP of being a stronghold of liberalism in 
Germany.129 At the same time, Alfred Hugenberg – who substantially financed the PK – 
tried to assume control of the DHfP in 1921-22 through a fifty-one percent participation 
and on the condition that Spahn would become its new director.130 Jäckh, however, 
restated the political independence of his institute during the celebrations for the second 
anniversary of the DHfP.131 Nonetheless, Gleichen also pointed to the cooperation 
between the two institutes symbolized by the figure of Röseler,132 who would become a 
member of the Board of Directors of the DHfP in 1920-21. While initially co-opted by 
Jäckh – and hesitating to withdraw because of Vögler’s advice – Otto Hoetzsch 
eventually joined the PK in which he saw a tool to counter the crisis of the DNVP.133 
After Hugenberg’s failed attempt to take over the control of the DHfP, the 
leadership of the PK decided to establish an institute in Berlin that would more closely 
resemble the traditional university format.134 The speakers at the two-year anniversary of 
the DHfP defined this new institute as a “school of the party” because of its association 
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with Hoetzsch and saw in it a reaction to the failed attempt to gain control of the DHfP.135 
Spahn, however, stressed the practical approach of the new Hochschule für nationale 
Politik, which stayed “in exchange and intercourse with other organizations, worked with 
them and agreed to organic collaborations with them.” In particular, the “June Club” was 
the “forecourt” of the institute where new friends could be won and where the “practical 
world” could inspire instructors.136  
Spahn restated the necessity to address the collapse of the state, the oppression of 
the nation, and the occupation of German territories on the occasion of the opening of the 
Hochschule für nationale Politik on November 13, 1922. The new institute would 
develop, in his words, “a nonpartisan national education, which was truly focused on the 
people’s community.” The other speakers reiterated the theme of national unity and 
internal solidarity by stressing – in the words of Reinhold Georg Quaatz – the guiding 
principle of the “national community of the German people” and the need – as Otto de la 
Chevallerie stated – to reconnect the academic world “with the remaining activities of the 
political society and of the civil community.”137 The curriculum of the new institute 
described Germany’s return to international power as a path between East and West that 
had its roots in centuries-old historical developments.138   
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Republican authorities closely monitored the violent and aggressive rhetoric of 
the young conservatives.139 In January 1925, Gleichen informed Spahn that the political 
police had a dossier on the “June Club,” the PK, and the Hochschule für nationale 
Politik. He added, however, that he was able to control the information that would be 
included in the agency’s files through a “connection with an official.”140 Perhaps, as a 
result, the actions of the authorities against the organizational activities of the young 
conservatives remained limited.141 As the only exception, the Gewissen had to 
temporarily suspend its activities for publishing accusations against Chancellor Joseph 
Wirth in the aftermath of Rathenau’s assassination,142 
By contrast, Stadtler was repeatedly at the center of public controversies. He 
attacked what he deemed to be the dishonest policy of the Wirth government in October 
1921.143 Accused of treason because allegedly revealing secret military plans, Stadtler 
was acquitted.144 Testifying on his behalf, Gustav Stresemann deemed Stadtler to be 
incapable of treason but added that he was “unwise as a politician and frequently unaware 
of the implications of what he writes and says.”145 In contrast to Stresemann’s judgment, 
the republican press as well as politicians saw in Stadtler’s inflammatory rhetoric an 
attempt to provoke a radicalization of socio-political conflicts. On the occasion of a 
meeting of the newly founded “Union for German Freedom” (Deutsche 	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Freiheitsbund),146 Stadtler had attacked the government, renewed the appeal to strong 
men and “national deed,” and allegedly aimed to provoke the left in order to legitimately 
be able to respond with violence to violence.147     
Personal contrasts and conceptual differences soon disrupted the unity of the 
circle centered on the “June Club” and the Politische Kolleg. The leaders of the “June 
Club” soon marginalized Eduard Stadtler despite his initial celebrity. Stadtler was not 
among the editors (Boehm, Gleichen, and Moeller-Bruck) of the young conservatives’ 
first programmatic volume, The New Front (1922), although he contributed to it with one 
essay.148 By the end of 1923, in a letter to Spahn, Gleichen commented on the contrasts 
with Stadtler, who he had invited to “bury his ambition to become a statesman à la 
Mussolini.”149 At the same time, the number of Stadtler’s contributions in the Gewissen 
diminished, until he lost the editorship of the young conservatives’ main magazine in 
December 1925.150 While Stadtler’s violent rhetoric and focus on the masses had been 
attractive during the revolutionary upheavals of the immediate aftermath of the war, he 
lost his appeal with the progressive stabilization of the republican state.  
At the same time, the relationship between Spahn and Boehm rapidly worsened. 
Spahn grew concerned with the increasing independence of Boehm’s “working group,” 	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which the physical distance between the PK and the seat of Boehm’s group also 
symbolized.151 In addition, Boehm’s activities and, at times, cooperation with federal 
agencies contrasted with Spahn’s growing involvement with the DNVP, which was 
pursuing a course of rigid opposition to republican governments.152 After an acrimonious 
diatribe, Boehm broke with the PK and established his independent institute, the 
“Institute of Border and Foreign Studies” (Institut für Grenz- und Auslandsstudien).153 
The contrasts continued because Spahn – who had moved the “working group” on 
nationalities back to the PK – refused to financially support Boehm’s new institute out of 
the fund that the PK administrated.154 Upon Hugenberg’s insistence, who grew concerned 
with the duplication of educational efforts,155 Spahn eventually reached an agreement 
with the Board of Trustees of Boehm’s new institute.156  
The end of the “June Club” was also manifested in the rupture between Spahn and 
Gleichen. In a special assembly of members, the “June Club” decided to end its activities 
in April 1924.157 Consequently, the collaboration between the Politische Kolleg and 
Gleichen’s two new endeavors – the “Young Conservative Union” (Jungkonservative 
Vereinigung) and the “German Gentlemen’s Club” (Deutscher Herrenklub) – 
loosened.158 Gleichen developed more elitist forms of societal organization that were 
rooted in the traditional aristocratic fears of the masses. Referring to the Herrenklub, 	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Spahn expressed his concerns with Gleichen’s decision to establish a “luxurious and even 
game club.”159 The estrangement was complete when Stadtler attacked Gleichen’s new 
activities at an event organized by the PK.160 His break with the “drummer” Stadtler and 
the “politician” Spahn, as well as his at least partial repudiation of earlier positions on an 
“idealistic” socialism and a decreasing emphasis on corporatism symbolized the failure of 
young conservatives’ visions for Germany’s future.   
The “golden years” of the Weimar Republic relegated the Politische Kolleg and 
the “June Club” to a marginal role in the public sphere. Young conservatives’ political 
approach was grounded in the post-war emergency and lost its appeal with the republic’s 
stabilization. Different views on the role of the masses and tensions about the role of 
political parties in the PK broke the unity of the circle. Eduard Stadtler had been 
gradually excluded from the “June Club” because of his inability to move beyond the 
attempts to mobilize the masses. By contrast, Martin Spahn abandoned the group’s 
declared nonpartisanship and became an active member of the DNVP, whereas Heinrich 
von Gleichen turned to an elitist condemnation of democracy and renewed the call for a 
capable political leadership. The internal fragmentation of this milieu thus reflected its 
inability to gain political influence with the normalization of politics.  
The rapid fragmentation of the young-conservative circle coincided with the 
downsizing of the PK, which signaled the gradual disengagement of Spahn’s financial 
supporters. In the summer of 1924, Hugenberg informed Spahn that the group sponsoring 
the PK would reduce its support and requested a substantial restructuring of the 
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Politische Kolleg.161 Spahn had to dismiss all his collaborators and could re-hire only 
some of them on a different basis.162 By April 1925, the PK comprised only four 
members, as a result of these personnel reductions.163 The rhetoric of young 
conservatives had been attractive to their political and financial supporters as long as 
revolution and attempted putsches from the right had rocked the Weimar Republic. The 
downgrading of the PK activities in the fall of 1924 and the collapse of the “June Club” 
paralleled the stabilization of the Weimar Republic. 
With the stabilization of the Republic and the end of the years of emergency, 
Gleichen’s elitist message and careful tactical maneuvering appeared more apt to the 
period than Stadtler’s attempts to mobilize the masses through a nationalized socialism, 
which had lost its relevance with the end of an imminent Bolshevist threat. At the same 
time, however, Gleichen maintained the original extra-parliamentary and nonpartisan 
emphasis against the more traditional political route chosen by Spahn. 
Conclusion 
 
Intellectual as well as political elites moved political education to the center of 
public debates in the aftermath of World War One. Both the formation of capable 
political leaders and the education of the masses to the requirements of the new 
democratic institutions prominently figure in the writings of the intellectuals at the center 
of this study. Nonetheless, political education also contained the promise to reestablish 
Germany’s international prestige, as the repeated references to the French Ècole Libre 
showed. The writings of Prussia’s Minister of Education, Becker, expressed the general 
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hope to restore Germany’s unity on a cultural basis, which ambiguously could also 
include the German minorities living in the territories lost after the Versailles Treaty. 
Political education had therefore a clear foreign policy function.    
Political education also became the tool to transform into reality contrasting forms 
of societal organization, which were rooted in the common condemnation of national 
fragmentation and of the reduction of politics to party politics. The communist revolution 
of the winter of 1918-19 renewed the general appeal to nonpartisanship. 
Überparteilichkeit became a nourished ideal that was shared across the political 
spectrum. The acrimonious debate of the summer of 1920, however, showed that 
nonpartisanship could have radically contrasting meanings. Überparteilichkeit thus not 
only expressed the general rejection of party politics but also pointed to different 
understandings of democracy.        
The intellectuals of the Jäckh circle saw the major obstacles to the reestablishment 
of Germany international role in society’s fragmentation and political discourse’s 
radicalization. Like Naumann and the Wilhelmine reformers, although against the 
background of the new republican form of government, these intellectuals argued that 
only political education – that is, objective and scientific political knowledge able to 
direct political will and thus constrain ideologies and doctrinism – would allow Germans 
to cross those ideological, religious, and socio-economic dividing lines that were 
fragmenting, and thus weakening, Germany.    
The appeal to reason and the support of Überparteilichkeit and of “chivalrous 
attitude” in political discussion aimed to de-radicalize the republican public sphere and 
heal the nation. In their appeals to reason, these Vernunftrepublikaner (Republicans of 
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Reason) entered the public sphere as elders convinced of the need to persuade the youth 
with the power of rational argumentation over the unreliability of emotions and 
ideologies. Their understanding of democracy and the concept of Überparteilichkeit were 
two faces of the same coin. By conceptualizing democracy as a “method of government” 
– with notions of community and leadership as its key elements – the Jäckh circle 
attempted to win the educated middle classes over to the republic by appealing to both 
nationalism and reason. In so doing (as Rainer Eisfeld noted), they unconsciously began 
to narrow the gap between radical and liberal nationalism.164  
The rational approach of the Jäckh circle radically contrasted with the activism of 
the young conservatives. As Gleichen had repeatedly stressed in the acrimonious debate 
of the summer of 1920, young conservatives viewed the Jäckh circle as the 
personification of an old style of politics and as an embodiment of the old generation of 
cultural and political elites. By contrast, young conservatives presented themselves as a 
youthful movement that could re-unite Germany under the guidance of a responsible 
leadership because placed above the political parties. The violent rhetoric of the young 
conservatives expressed an emphasis on both “action” and “deed” and symbolized a 
specific form of personal responsibility.    
Young conservatives’ political vision (and accordingly their educational policies) 
was based on the necessity to maintain a high level of (perceived) crisis in German 
society. A collective political consciousness could emerge only in a context of emergency 
and crisis, as the key authors of the circle repeatedly stressed. Among the young 
conservatives, Stadtler had rooted most consistently his call to action in a mobilization of 	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the masses. Consequentially, as the investigations against him show, his rhetoric was the 
most violent as he repeatedly aimed to push the masses to action. Young conservatives 
lost much of the appeal of their message with the gradual stabilization of the republic.       
Moeller-Bruck had recognized the necessity to integrate all social segments in the 
national body and Stadtler had aimed to build a mass-based movement under the 
leadership of his “Anti-Bolshevik League.” While both had emphasized the problem of 
leadership and the need to find new leaders above the parties, Gleichen was the most 
explicit in his suspicion and skepticism of the masses. With the death of Moeller-Bruck 
and Stadtler’s progressive exclusion from the center of the young conservatives’ circle, 
Gleichen’s approach proved to be dominant in the second half of the 1920s as the 
Weimar Republic slowly stabilized.  
Notwithstanding violent and, at times, personal attacks, the DHfP and the 
Politische Kolleg maintained at least a minimal form of contact during the first half of the 
1920s and would eventually merge in 1926. Interestingly, the attacks mirrored each other 
and were rooted in the general suspicion towards political parties. Both leaderships 
accused the other institute of being a school that was closely associated with a specific 
political party and thus aimed for the indoctrination of public opinion. Paradoxically, 
these accusations therefore stressed a common understanding of the need of German 
society. In fact, both institutes stressed the need to provide an “objective” perspective on 
politics and thus bypass the contentious political fragmentation of German political life. 
However, while the leadership of the DHfP rooted this approach in an acceptance of 
socio-political differences, the leaders of the PK emphasized notions of unity and 
homogeneity. 
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The gradual stabilization of the Weimar Republic influenced the development of 
these two educational experiments. As I will describe in the following chapters, Jäckh 
and his associates celebrated the normalization of political society as a success of their 
rational approach to politics. Emblematically, the stabilization of Germany’s first 
democracy paralleled the consolidation of the German School of Politics. Supported 
during the first half of the 1920s by wealthy philanthropists, Jäckh established a notable 
institute that took over the ambitious task of education Germans to a pluralistic 
conception of democracy. Conversely, the Political College was swiftly relegated to a 
marginal role in Germany’s public sphere, as the activist rhetoric of the young 
conservatives appeared inadequate to the new political context.      
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CHAPTER 5: THE DEUTSCHE HOCHSCHULE FÜR POLITIK, 
INTERNATIONALISM, AND AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 
 
In the interwar period, American philanthropic foundations complemented the 
isolationist foreign policy of the U.S. government, thus becoming crucial actors in a 
semi-official cultural diplomacy. The leadership of these foundations viewed 
internationalism as a state of mind that had grown out of the practical recognition that the 
United States was part of a complex economic and political network that spanned across 
national boundaries. While these foundations’ international programs were thus grounded 
in the awareness of industrial societies’ transnational interconnectedness, they were 
nonetheless rooted in the conviction that the American balance between individualist 
tendencies and commitment to the common good represented the roadmap for all modern 
democracies. American ideals of democracy and public values therefore undergird U.S. 
international philanthropy, as international philanthropy represented a projection of 
values and institutional models abroad.   
Polity’s dramatic expansion had altered the socio-political equilibrium of 
industrialized societies at the turn of the nineteenth century. In Germany, socio-moral 
milieus and their associational networks had fragmented society. The tensions between 
conservative political institutions and the political pressures of a mobilized working class 
had provided the background for the emergence of a reformist movement that viewed 
objective research as the solution to societal fragmentation. Also in the United States, 
voluntary associations appeared to fragment society along religious and ethnic lines.1 
Mass membership organizations typified American society’s basic tension between 
traditional patterns of localism and broader, nation-wide social as well as political 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jason Kaufman, For the Common Good? American Civic Life and the Golden Age of Fraternity (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
	   191	  
movements.2 The faith of American reformists in scientific solutions to social ills thus 
developed against the background of the construction of a national political culture and 
the search for an effective political leadership in a mass democracy. 
World War One radically transformed American society. Like German reformers, 
American progressives had also hoped that the war would tighten social bonds and hence 
bridge the tension between individual rights and national needs.3 The war, however, 
hardened domestic conflicts and forced various social groups to redefine their identities 
and roles.4 The total war signaled the passage from a voluntaristic society to an 
industrialized one, as mobilization intensified the cooperation between business, 
philanthropy, and government.5 In this context, modern philanthropic foundations were 
strategically placed at the intersection of public and private action. Although they were 
relatively new actors in American society, philanthropic foundations would soon provide 
the institutional link between academic theory and practical implementation that was 
missing in Germany.      
Rockefeller philanthropic institutions and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (CEIP) became major financial supporters of the DHfP in the second 
half of the 1920s. The grants from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) 
and, later, from the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) supported the development of research 
programs at the DHfP in the belief – which was at the core of scientific philanthropy – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy. From Membership to Management in American Civic Life 
(Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 2004), 78-89. 
3 David Kennedy, Over here: The First World War and American society (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), 41-49. 
4 Christopher Capozzola, Uncle Sam wants you: World War I and the making of the modern American 
citizen (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
5 Peter Dobkin Hall, “A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and Nonprofit 
Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000,” in The Nonprofit Sector. A Research Handbook, 2nd ed., 
edited by Richard Steinberg and Walter W. Powell (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 49-50. 
	   192	  
that “objective” research could de-radicalize contentious social and political issues. These 
grants contributed to the gradual transformation of the DHfP from an institute devoted to 
practical and vocational training to a research center with a specific focus on foreign 
affairs. Conversely, the CEIP supported the internationalization of the DHfP in the 
conviction that the creation of an international, cross-border network of scholars and 
research centers could counter the climate of suspicion among European elites that CEIP 
officers believed had caused World War One.      
The relationship between the DHfP and American philanthropic institutions 
developed around a clear asymmetry. Ernst Jäckh and his associates were successful in 
securing grants from American philanthropic institutions, notwithstanding the School’s 
original focus on teaching. Ultimately, American financial support contributed to the 
development of research programs and, conversely, to the marginalization of civic 
education. This transformation points to the School’s need to adapt to the interests of its 
financial supporters. While research on the crucial role of foundation officers in 
mediating between grantors and grantees in foundations’ early phase relativizes 
Foucaultian interpretations, it cannot be underemphasized that the School’s progressive 
turn toward research was contingent on the need for financial support. Consciously, the 
School’s leadership would develop its research and academic programs. During the final 
phase of the DHfP, political education would be almost completely relegated to the 
“Civics Seminar,” one of the special seminars organized at the DHfP. In the early 1930s, 
both conservative faculty members of the DHfP and conservative media would 
increasingly attack this seminar and its director, as it was the only program that still 
explicitly aimed at strengthening Germany’s weakening democratic state. 
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At the same time, the emphasis by U.S. foundations on internationalization was 
not fully aware of the nationalist function of internationalism in inter-war Europe. In the 
first half of the twentieth century, scientific internationalism was based on the idea of 
acknowledging national scientific accomplishments by measuring them by international 
standards, a practice that scholars have aptly defined as “Olympic internationalism.”6 
“Science as a power substitute” was, therefore, implicit in the notion of internationalism, 
and in the aftermath of Germany’s military defeat and revolution the emphasis shifted 
from a passive to an active Kulturpolik.7  In fact, in the inter-war period, as Giuliana 
Gemelli suggested, “scientific cooperation … [did] not mean necessarily scientific 
integration” because “asymmetries” developed between American and European 
institutions, as well as among the European participants in these networks.8  
The scientific internationalism supported by American philanthropic foundations 
did not reflect the goals of the internationalism of the School’s leadership. The new 
centrality of international relations was part of the desire to reestablish Germany’s 
international role by revising the Versailles Treaty, which from a traditional Naumannian 
perspective appeared possible with the stabilization of republican institutions. 
Emblematically, the leadership of the DHfP adapted their domestic strategies to foreign 
policy goals. Just as at the individual level they were the foundational blocks for the 
development of a German civil society, personal contacts, knowledge, and willingness to 
compromise were also described as the roots of peaceful relationships among sovereign 
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states. This new internationalism was thus grounded in mutual understanding, personal 
exchanges, and international historical and geographical entanglements, yet its ultimate 
objective was the reestablishment of Germany’s international status. 
This asymmetric relationship between grantor and grantee points to the crucial 
role of foundation officers as well as of other individual actors. Foundation officers and 
local representatives played an important role in mediating between interests that often 
overlapped, but not infrequently contrasted. In line with Volker Berghahn’s work on 
Shepard Stone and the Ford Foundation, Giuliana Gemelli and Roy MacLeod have 
pointed out that foundation officers operated “on the borders of continents, cultures, and 
disciplines” and acted as “bridge-builder” between “people, cultures, and disciplines.”9 
Hence, they suggest the fruitfulness for researchers to analyze the (at times) relative 
freedom of maneuver of officers in negotiating the asymmetries between grantors and 
grantees.  
Accordingly, I first discuss the emergence of scientific philanthropy in the United 
States at the turn of the twentieth century and point to the similarities between the 
approaches of the leadership of the DHfP and those of U.S. foundations. Secondly, 
through the prism of the CEIP, I detail the emergence of a basic asymmetry between the 
internationalism of U.S. foundations and the nationalist internationalism of the DHfP. 
Jäckh and his associates viewed the cooperation with American foundations and with 
other international organizations as a tool to break Germany’s international isolation, 
reestablish its role in world affairs, and pursue the revision of the Versailles Treaty. 
Lastly, I detail the paradoxical effects of American financial support to the DHfP through 	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the analysis of the relationship between the School and Rockefeller institutions. The 
research-oriented grants from Rockefeller institutions gradually moved the DHfP away 
from its original focus on vocational training, thus supporting the development of 
research in international affairs that eventually favored the integration of conservative 
elites into the School. 
American Scientific Philanthropy, Internationalism, and Germany 
 
In Germany, the new figure of the public intellectual aimed to gain a certain level 
of political influence by mediating between political leaders, economic elites, and 
“masses.” The relevance of the DHfP lied exactly in its leadership’s ability to effectively 
connect the worlds of academic theory and political practice. American reformers – like 
their German counterparts – struggled in coming to terms with industrialized society’s 
technological requirements and need for expertise, as well as with the pressures arising 
from political society’s massification. The rapid emergence of a cultural, economic, and 
political system that crossed regional and national borders threatened well-established 
patterns of localism and America’s nourished weak state tradition. In this peculiar 
context, American philanthropists viewed the modern philanthropic foundation as the 
best institutional form to address the socio-political challenges of the times. Philanthropic 
foundations thus developed as crucial in-between institutions that connected the world of 
academic research and the sphere of (socio-political) action.     
The transition from charity to philanthropy symbolized the shift from an 
emotional and religious act of piety to scientific approaches to social problems. Charity, 
which was regarded as an immediate and inefficient alleviation of social ills, paved the 
path to scientific philanthropic interventions that aimed to address the roots of social 
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problems.10 At the turn of the century, scientific philanthropy developed in reaction to 
both the awareness of religious charity’s limits and the need for social reforms with a 
national scope.11 This development expressed the need for institutions that were able to 
connect actions and ideas.12 In other words, scientific philanthropy addressed the training 
of elites and experts who could “run a modern democracy effectively.”13 
Modern philanthropic foundations epitomized the transition from charity to 
philanthropy. Foundations soon formed a “national system of social reform” that operated 
privately in place of the government,14 and addressed industrial society’s problems by 
focusing on the training of leadership.15 Foundations explicitly aimed to influence social, 
economic, and political life by substituting partisan politics with policy processes, which 
would rely on a network of academic experts, professional bodies, business, and 
government.16 In the peculiar American context, therefore, philanthropic foundations, 
with their intrinsic celebration of private initiative, provided the possibility to hide the 
necessity for a strong federal government by maintaining a nominal distinction between 
private action and public sphere.17   
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At the beginning of the twentieth century, therefore, “general-purpose 
foundations” became central actors in the political, cultural, and socio-economic life of 
the United States.18 They were the midpoint of a peculiar American “institutional matrix” 
because they linked academic theory, the empiric investigations spurred by these 
theories, and the policy processes based on the resulting findings.19 In the first third of the 
century, foundations thus contributed to the creation of a “culture of experts,” although 
many of their programs failed to influence public policy.20 Philanthropists aimed to solve 
socio-political problems through objective research, which averted partisanship by 
developing an apolitical professional class that could govern a modern, democratic 
society. In so doing, on a basic level, their approach paralleled the one of the circle that 
had formed around Ernst Jäckh and the German School of Politics. 
Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller, Sr. personified the shift to scientific 
approaches to philanthropy. Carnegie had condemned “indiscriminate charity” already in 
1889, and thus set the rules for scientific philanthropy.21 Likewise, by the 1880s, 
Rockefeller, Sr. had developed a business-like approach to philanthropy that preferred 
wholesale giving to small, uncoordinated gifts, and which was based on experts’ advice.22 
Industrialists like Carnegie and Rockefeller, Sr. hence transferred rules and 
organizational models that had made their businesses successful to their foundations. In 
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particular, with their philanthropies, both developed links between philanthropic 
organizations, researchers, and social reforms and government.23 As a result, they 
influenced the form of the modern philanthropic foundation.24  
The CEIP and the RF were – during the interwar years – the only American 
foundations with an explicitly international orientation. Furthermore, both were 
committed – the CEIP directly and, more indirectly, the RF – to the promotion of 
international peace. The CEIP was characterized by an elitist, legalistic, and conservative 
effort to support peace by creating an international community of scholars. Conversely, 
the strategy of the RF was based on a characteristic American belief that economic 
liberalism, political pluralism, and scientific empirism were the conditio sine qua non of 
the world’s peaceful evolution.25 These philanthropic institutions thus institutionalized a 
(largely private) system for the conduct of international cultural relations and, in so 
doing, symbolized the opposition of American cultural and political elites to a strong 
federal government.26  
After World War One, foundations exported abroad their scientific approaches, in 
a development that paralleled America’s growing isolationism. The original distance 
between diplomacy and philanthropy had been rooted in the separation of state and 
church, which meant that public relief operated separately from, and independently of, 	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24 Kenneth Prewitt, “Foundations,” in The Nonprofit Sector. A Research Handbook, 2nd edition, edited by 
Walter W. Powell and Richard Steinberg (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 361. 
25 Malcolm Richardson, “The Humanities and International Understanding: Some Reflections on the 
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Perspective, edited by Kathleen D. McCarthy (Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania Press, 1984), 
25-41. 
26  Frank A. Ninkovich, The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), chapter 1. See also Steven Heydemann and Rebecca 
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religious charity. Consequently, the emergence of secular, scientific philanthropic 
institutions narrowed the gap between official foreign policy and private initiatives,27 
although private-level encounters had always co-existed with state-to-state interactions.28 
The Great War accelerated the shift from relief to more strategic interventions, in 
particular in public health.29 Philanthropic foundations thus became major actors in 
“spreading the American dream” abroad,30 as well as in a semi-official cultural 
diplomacy.31 During the first decades of the twentieth century, foundations were at the 
center of “philanthropic projection of institutional logics abroad,”32 and acted as 
transatlantic bridgers.33 The Weimar Republic soon became one of the major testing-
grounds for the approaches of American foundations. 
This projection of American presence across the Atlantic was not simply a 
unidirectional process but also responded to the increasing fascination of European elites 
with American culture and business practices.34 Since the constitutional debates in the 
spring of 1919, the United States had become a point of reference for German liberals 
who were seeking models for forms of societal organization that were able to guarantee 	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levels of individual liberty while strengthening the national bonds of Germany’s 
fragmented society.35 Interestingly, while Ernst Troeltsch characterized the growing 
influence of German economic elites in political decision-making as a dangerous 
“Americanization,” Arnold Wolfers praised the U.S. economic system’s alleged ability to 
contain class struggles.36 Furthermore, by analyzing political education in the United 
States, Wolfers pointed out the importance of debates and discussions in fostering “a 
lively inner participation of all and a sense of co-responsibility,”37 hence implicitly 
establishing a parallel to the DHfP. Implicitly, therefore, both positive and negative 
references to “America” primarily had a domestic function.  
The DHfP and scientific philanthropy emerged from common concerns with the 
tensions between the requirements of a technological, industrial society and the demands 
of mass democracy. The paths of American scientific philanthropy and the DHfP 
therefore quite naturally crossed. Nonetheless, the relationship between U.S. foundations 
and the leadership of the DHfP soon developed around a basic asymmetry between the 
American ideals of science and democracy and the realities of Germany’s political 
culture and democratic institutions. 
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the “International Mind” 
 
Founded in 1910, the CEIP embodied the scientific approach of a new generation 
of philanthropists. In fact, while in the words of Andrew Carnegie the CEIP was 
committed “to hasten the abolition of international war, the foulest blot upon our 
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civilization,”38 its leadership aimed to counter the “bodies of enthusiasts” that were 
“decrying war” and circulating “the more emotional type of pacifist literature.”39 
Therefore, although it provided a previously unknown financial support and prestige to 
the peace cause, well-known peace activists of the time criticized the CEIP because of its 
conservative philosophy.40 The Endowment exemplified the American peace movement’s 
shift to the practical approach of businessmen and academicians who conjugated the 
conviction in the link between prosperity and peace, America’s perceived superiority, and 
the distrust for the European balance of power in a new, elitist pacifism.41  
Nicholas M. Butler was an instrumental figure in the establishment of the 
Endowment, of which he became president in 1925 after having directed its Division of 
Intercourse and Education. In 1909 he had proposed the establishment of an international 
peace trust, which Carnegie had, however, initially rejected.42 He primarily was an 
organizer and educator and, as its president since 1902, he contributed to the 
transformation of Columbia University into a leading educational institution. He also 
advocated for the professionalization of administration and teaching in his role as both 
president of the New York-based Industrial Education Association and editor of the 	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Educational Review. Legitimately, therefore, a New York Times correspondent could 
assert that Butler united “in a rare degree, the qualities of the student, the educator, and 
the statesman.”43 He was therefore a public figure strategically placed at the intersection 
between academia and politics. 
Butler made public the plans of the CEIP at the opening address of the 
seventeenth Lake Mohonk Conference. He defined the CEIP as a “great institution for 
research and public education” addressing “the juristic, the economic, and, broadly 
speaking, the educational aspects of the problem.”44 Indeed, the Trustees had organized 
the work of the Endowment in three broad divisions. The “Division of Economics and 
History” primarily focused on the study of the effects of wars on men, whereas the 
“Division of International Law” analyzed existing legal principles and investigated the 
role of international law and international tribunals in solving international conflicts. 
Finally, Butler himself directed the “Division of Intercourse and Education,” which was 
the most clearly internationally-oriented and was devoted to educational efforts aimed to 
foster international friendship, tolerance, and hospitality.45 
In the years surrounding World War One, the attitude of the leadership of the 
CEIP towards Germany was erratic. It moved from open sympathies and unrealistic 
hopes in Germany’s political leadership to – by ways of hostility and enmity during the 
war – a sense of responsibility for Europe’s reconstruction. Before the war, Carnegie and 
Butler had repeatedly stressed the pacifist intentions of the German state and, in 
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particular, of Kaiser Wilhelm II.46 After the outbreak of the war, the Trustees issued a 
statement to be published in several morning papers that asserted that the war was 
“teaching the gospel of peace” by demonstrating once again the “universal 
interdependence of nations” and discrediting “old paths of policy and suspicion.”47 Butler 
reaffirmed the commitment to internationalism by stressing American responsibilities “to 
bind up the war’s wounds, to soften the war’s animosities, and to lead the way in the 
colossal work of reconstruction.”48 Nonetheless, while initially the CEIP sustained a 
course of strict neutrality, over the years it clearly endorsed the war against Germany as a 
war for democracy.49  
In the aftermath of World War One, the CEIP approached the new situation in 
Europe with the conviction that the traditional approach of governments could not solve 
the new world’s problems. The 1915 CEIP Yearbook had already pointed to the necessity 
“to devise and to put in operation new plans for the great and doubtless long task of 
reconstruction which must be entered upon just as soon as the present work of destruction 
comes to an end.”50 During a Board Meeting in December 1920, Elihu Root (the 
president of the CEIP) reaffirmed the Endowment’s commitment to internationalism and 
the necessity to complement the work of governments.   
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See for instance Andrew Carnegie, “Kaiser Wilhelm II, Peacemaker,” New York Times, June 8, 1913, 
New York Times, “Forced on Kaiser, Says Carnegie,” September 26, 1914, New York Times, “Kaiser Pays 
Honor to Dr. N. M. Butler,” October 16, 1910, and Nicholas Murray Butler, “The International Mind. 
Opening Address at the Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, May 15, 1912,” 
International Conciliation 55 (June, 1912), 3-14.  
47 Statement of the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 17, 1915, 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) Records, Series VIII, Box 342, Folder 4, Rare Book & 
Manuscript Library, Columbia University in the City of New York (hereafter designed as RBML). 
48 Butler, “The Great War and Its Lessons,” 8. 
49 New York Times, “Butler Says War Aim is to Punish Germany,” February 3, 1918. See also Howlett, 
“Nicholas Murray Butler's Crusade for a Warless World,” 107-108.  
50 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Year Book 1915 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1915), 55-56. 
	   204	  
We are impressed by the inadequacy of everything that is being attempted, 
the League of Nations, Supreme Council, peace organizations, – the 
inadequacy of it all is the great fact that we have to deal with … We are 
beating around on the mere surface of things, and by ‘we’ I do not mean 
this organization; I mean governments. What has been done hitherto is a 
mere attempt to bind the giant with silk ribbons.51  
 
These comments and the involvement of philanthropic foundations in European relief 
testify to the international consciousness of the leadership of these philanthropic 
institutions, and point to the readiness to complement official American foreign policy’s 
isolationism.  
The international activities of the CEIP were rooted in the awareness that the 
United States was part of an interconnected world system. Butler gave resonance to the 
term “internationalism” during his presidency of the Lake Mohonk Conference on 
International Arbitration in 1907 and 1909-1912. He complained about the lack of 
interest in the United States for foreign affairs and stressed the need to develop such an 
international consciousness. He called for the development of an “international mind,” 
which he defined as  
nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign relations and business, 
and that habit of dealing with them, which regards the several nations of 
the civilized world as free and co-operating equals in aiding the progress 
of civilization, in developing commerce and industry, and in spreading 
enlightenment and culture throughout the world.52  
 
By pointing to the international interconnections that characterize modern societies, the 
“international mind” was a mindset rooted in the capacity to understand other people and 
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to adopt their point of view. In fact, he was careful in stressing that it was a mindset that 
was not identical with the idea of superiority of one state over others.53  
In support of the development of the “International Mind,” Butler organized a 
European Bureau of the Division of Intercourse and Education. The Division established 
a Bureau in Paris under the presidency of Baron d’Estournelles de Constant, who was 
supported by an Advisory Council comprising of distinguished European statesmen and 
publicists. This Bureau aimed to make the work of the Division “truly international” and 
to counter critics who described the CEIP as “a purely American undertaking[,] which 
aimed to instruct and influence the opinion of Europe from outside.”54 The work of the 
Bureau consisted of “the general education of public opinion” and aimed to encourage “a 
spirit of real international understanding.”55 After the death of Baron d'Estournelles de 
Constant in 1924, the leadership of the Division reorganized the European Bureau, which 
came under closer supervision of the New York City office.56 To this end, the Executive 
Committee of the CEIP appointed Earle B. Babcock as the Assistant to the Director of the 
Division of Intercourse and Education to be assigned to the European Bureau.57  
Butler was particularly conscious of the political dimension of the work of 
philanthropic institutions. By the end of the war, Butler stressed the challenges for a 
“voluntary association” like the CEIP to approach public debates when “sharp differences 
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of opinion” develop between, and within, nations.58 Thus, the European Bureau and 
Butler relied on Special Correspondents in foreign countries. These trusted persons 
reported monthly on “significant events in their respective countries,” as well as on “the 
movement of public opinion regarding these events.”59 For Germany, the CEIP relied on 
two well-known pacifists, Hellmut von Gerlach and Friedrich W. Foerster.60 The 
relationship between the CEIP and its two German correspondents epitomized the 
problematic approach of American philanthropy to Germany’s contentious public sphere. 
In this context, the development of the cooperation between the CEIP and the DHfP does 
not only reveal the asymmetry that existed between two different approaches to 
internationalism but also points to the Endowment’s difficulties in identifying partners in 
Germany who were, at the same time, politically reliable and effective.  
The case of Friedrich W. Foerster symbolized the political tensions surrounding 
the work of the CEIP in Germany and pointed to the intrinsic nationalism of Jäckh and 
his associates. The Executive Committee of the CEIP nominated Foerster as the Special 
Correspondent of the Division of Intercourse and Education in April 1923.61 However, 
while describing Foerster as Germany’s critical conscience, the 1924 CEIP Yearbook 
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also included Butler’s warning against “an excess of zeal which would be interpreted by 
any government or by the public as an interference by private initiative with public 
policy.”62 In fact, Foerster was a highly controversial public figure in Germany. He had 
denounced the militarism of Germany’s political elites already during World War One,63 
and in the aftermath of the war he published a pamphlet emblematically titled My 
Struggle against the Militaristic and Nationalistic Germany,64 which forced him to seek 
refuge in Switzerland after receiving numerous death threats from right-wing circles.65 
While Gerlach primarily reported on political developments such as government 
formations and crises, as well as foreign policy, Foerster discussed in much more detail 
societal dynamics. Both correspondents, however, repeatedly denounced Germany’s 
secret rearmament in violation of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty.66 The CEIP 
was, however, eager to relativize these developments and seemed worried with its special 
correspondents’ excessive criticism.67 At least initially, both Foerster and Gerlach had 
viewed the nationalist parties’ electoral successes as a sign of a growing sense of political 
responsibility of Germany’s political class.68 Paul von Hindenburg’s election to Reich 
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President in April 1925 appeared, however, to both as a wakeup call. Although Foerster 
saw in the election’s result an event that could force conservative elites to take political 
responsibility, he defined it as the “triumph of Prussian nationalism and militarism.”69  
Foerster’s reports rapidly became more pessimistic. He described the existence of 
two Germanys, one democratic and the other under the yoke of Prussian militarism. He 
warned that in Germany, 
civil society itself was built upon the discipline and the spirit of the army, 
all civil and professional relations and all the methods of discipline and 
education being penetrated by the military mentality. Therefore it must be 
understood that the freeing of the people from those traditions and the 
replacement of their disciplinary power by other binding forms and 
methods is naturally to be a very slow process[.]70    
  
Foerster thus stressed the militant nature of Germany’s civil society and pointed to the 
weakness of its democratic elements. Accordingly, he grew concerned with what he 
viewed as the international community’s passive approach to German rearmament and 
advocated for an energetic, anti-armament policy by the Allied Powers.71 Consequently, 
he encouraged Butler to convince President Calvin Coolidge to issue a statement of 
condemnation of Germany’s violations of the Versailles Treaty.72   
Against the background of its Special Correspondents’ growing pessimism, the 
Division of Intercourse and Education sought more moderate voices in Germany. At a 
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time when Foerster and Gerlach grew concerned with the militarism of Germany’s 
political elites, Jäckh celebrated the growing sense of political responsibility of Germans 
and elevated President von Hindenburg to a symbol of the “New Germany.”73 In lecture 
tours organized by the CEIP,74 Jäckh criss-crossed the United States in 1925 and 1926, 
successfully raising the interest of the American public for the “New Germany.”75 During 
these first tours and in a meeting with President Coolidge,76 Jäckh reported on his efforts 
to educate Germany’s new political leadership, described the crucial role of the DHfP, 
and discussed efforts to deepen the mutual understanding between Germany and United 
States.77 The Assistant Director of the Division of Intercourse and Education, Henry S. 
Haskell reported to Foerster and Gerlach on the positive impression of Jäckh and his 
lectures.78 At the same time, Haskell and Butler asked Babcock to explore the 
possibilities of cooperating with the DHfP.79  
Almost inevitably, the development of the relationship between the CEIP and the 
DHfP led to the rapture between the Division of Intercourse and Education and its two 
German correspondents. In fact, the protests of Foerster, who had denounced the 
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nationalism of German democratic circles,80 confirmed in the eyes of Butler, Haskell, and 
Babcock the need to seek out new contact persons in Germany. In March 1926, Babcock 
described the DHfP as “an opportunity … to do something for Germany which will be of 
the first importance,”81 and a few days later, during a meeting of the Advisory Council of 
the European Bureau, Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron (German delegate of the Advisory 
Council and brother of the German Ambassador to the United States) advocated for the 
cooperation between the CEIP and the DHfP.82 At the same meeting, Prittwitz-Gaffron 
also criticized the relationship with Foerster and Gerlach who were, however, vigorously 
defended by the Austrian representative Josef Redlich.83  
Babcock reported on the discussion to Butler and pointed out that financially 
supporting Gerlach and Foerster might expose the CEIP to “justifiable suspicion.”84 In 
his reply, Butler stressed the necessity to “balance” the relationship with the two 
notorious pacifists “with some representatives of a different type and viewpoint.”85 In 
addition, by referring to both his and Babcock’s approaching trips to Berlin, he stressed 
that “it might be important to make some geste in Germany that will correct the 
impression that we are not sympathetic with the new political forces in the German 
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state.”86 The CEIP leadership was concerned with the political repercussions of the 
Endowment’s associations with politically controversial figures such as Gerlach and 
Foerster. The CEIP thus developed its relationship with the DHfP out of the necessity to 
establish connections with German political and intellectual circles that were not isolated 
because of their criticism against national political and social developments.  
Babcock organized a visit to Berlin, which he hoped would “place us in a position 
for vigorous and concrete action.”87 Emblematically Jäckh and Prittwitz-Gaffron 
organized this visit.88 Under the guidance of Prittwitz-Gaffron, Babcock repeatedly met 
with Jäckh and Hans Simons, and remained impressed by the teaching activities at the 
German School of Politics.89 During a concluding meeting with the leadership of the 
DHfP, Babcock discussed the possibility to support the special courses of the School, the 
establishment of an exchange program, and the development of a long-term cooperation 
with the DHfP through the establishment of a Berlin Carnegie Chair.90 After this visit, the 
leadership of the School of Politics prepared for the reception of Butler, whose visit in 
Jäckh’s words represented the final point of a series of conversations regarding forms of 
cooperation that had started in the fall of 1924.91    
Butler visited Berlin shortly after Babcock and left with the impression that the 
DHfP should replace Gerlach and Foerster as the Endowment’s representative in 	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Germany. Writing Babcock, Butler stressed his conviction that the DHfP should become 
the “official or at least unofficial agency and representative in Germany” and that the 
CEIP should “strengthen their hands in all possible ways.”92 A few days later, he added 
that, “for the benefit of our prestige and effectiveness in Germany,” Babcock had to 
establish an administrative center in Berlin, headed by Prittwitz-Gaffron and based at the 
DHfP, which both Carl H. Becker and Gustav Stresemann had recommended.93 By 
contrast, he reported on the negative impression raised by the association of the CEIP 
with Foerster.94 In the following days, Prittwitz-Gaffron expressed his satisfaction with 
Butler’s positive impression of the DHfP,95 and viewed the establishment of the Carnegie 
Chair in Berlin as a proof of the new work of the CEIP and of “Germany’s active 
cooperation to the solution of international problems.”96 While the leadership of the 
DHfP therefore viewed the cooperation with the CEIP as a way to break Germany’s 
international isolation, Butler and Haskell saw a particular value in the School’s plans to 
develop relationships with the French International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation 
and the Royal Institute of International Relations in London.97 
In October, the Board of Trustees of the CEIP passed the resolution establishing a 
Carnegie Chair in International Relations at the DHfP and invited James T. Shotwell to 	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accept the position for the academic year of 1926-27.98 The leadership of the DHfP 
viewed the Chair as a way to strengthen the relationship between Germany and the 
United States.99 High-ranking German political leaders including the Chancellor, the 
President of the State of Prussia, several Reich ministers, and the State Secretary of the 
Reich President attended Shotwell’s address on occasion of the inauguration of the 
Carnegie Chair.100 In addition, the nomination of Moritz J. Bonn as an additional German 
delegate to the Advisory Council further strengthened the relationship between the CEIP 
and the DHfP.101       
Butler, Haskell, and Babcock sought out politically pragmatic voices in Germany 
who had the opportunity to make a difference in the country’s socio-political 
development. Pragmatically, therefore, the leadership of the CEIP gradually turned away 
from the radical criticism of the two German Special Correspondents and made the DHfP 
the official face of the Endowment in Germany. Butler grew convinced that, “If we are to 
work with the new Germany, we must work with her spokesmen and representatives and 
should make no progress if we tried to work only with the Foersters,” although he noted 
that Foerster’s supporters denounced Jäckh’s lack of a “sincere liberal opinion.”102 
Similarly, Babcock argued that while Foerster and Gerlach had been “of great service to 
the Endowment at the time when they were the only Germans with whom it was possible 	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to collaborate,” the CEIP could not cooperate “with only one element, especially as such 
an attitude would neutralize our efforts for collaboration with Germany at the present 
time.”103 Emblematically, with the establishment of the Berlin Carnegie Chair, a Special 
Committee of the Trustees reviewing the work of the Endowment concluded that all 
obstacles for a full cooperation with Germany had been removed.104 
The change of policy of the CEIP flared up Foerster’s anger, whose growing 
criticism of Germany’s political leadership had exposed him to political repercussions. In 
a letter received by Butler in July 1927, Foerster accused the CEIP Trustees to have 
leaked one of his confidential reports to the German Foreign Office, which had ordered 
his arrest at Germany’s frontiers.105 Noting the “desire” within the Endowment “to be in 
good relation with the official world of Germany,” he enquired whether his services were 
still needed.106 In the tone of a J’accuse, he stated,  
Germany will be thrown by her Prussian warlords into a new catastrophe. 
… 6-8 years later you will remember my words today! Kindly think a little 
about the question, whether the attitude, which the Carnegie-Dotation is 
taking towards my work and towards the very enemies of my work, will 
not be regretted in the future. … It is not I who is damaged by this attitude 
– I am a king without your crown. I only want to put the question whether 
your Carnegie-people are not putting on the false horse and will regret that 
one day, when it will be too late, to repair the damage caused by such 
encouragement of an absolute disloyal set of people?107  
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He then concluded his letter by issuing the warning that Germany could not be helped 
“by shutting simply your eyes to the criminal undertakings to which she is enslaved.”108 
Personal animosity certainly motivated Foerster’s attacks against Jäckh and the 
leadership of the DHfP. Nonetheless, he correctly drew attention to Jäckh’s pragmatic 
approach to the new political regime. Furthermore, he clearly saw the nationalism that 
was peculiar of the liberal circle that had formed around Friedrich Naumann and was the 
basis of the approach of the German School of Politics.  
Confronted with these accusations, the CEIP leadership gradually downgraded the 
relationship with Foerster. In a conjoined reply to Foerster’s “queries,”109 Babcock and 
Haskell, although expressing their appreciation for Foerster’s frankness and the hope in a 
continuation of the cooperation, stated that it was not CEIP policy to “adopt any attitude 
towards questions of internal politics in any country even the United States.”110 The 
number and regularity of Foerster’s reports sensibly decreased in the following years.111 
Eventually, in the summer of 1929 Haskell informed Foerster of the end of their working 
relationship because of both a change in the CEIP policy and Foerster’s lack of direct 
contact with Germany, as he was living in Switzerland and France.112    
The relationship between the DHfP and the CEIP developed in the peculiar 
context of the second half of the 1920s. The DHfP naturally attracted the interest of U.S. 
foundations. Jäckh and his associates had developed the notion of the “New Germany” 	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and celebrated its democratization.113 Quite consequentially foreign public opinion 
viewed the DHfP as a stronghold of democratic forces in the Weimar Republic.114 The 
rhetoric of the “New Germany” was part of a general turn to internationalism and foreign 
affairs, as the stabilization of republican institutions appeared to create the preconditions 
for a new foreign policy. The celebration of the new democratic Germany paralleled, 
however, a renewed emphasis on Germany’s leading role in Europe. The leadership of 
the DHfP linked Europe’s political stability to the reestablishment of Germany’s 
international role. Like in the immediate aftermath of the war, internationalism aimed to 
revise the Versailles Treaty and break Germany’s international isolation.  
Jäckh expounded on the position of the leadership of the DHfP in a series of 
lectures held between October and November 1927 in Berlin’s radio broadcasting.115 He 
pointed to Germany’s peculiar geopolitical position in Europe, which contributed to its 
political and diplomatic isolation.116 Nonetheless, he argued, Germany was connected to 
the international community through its population and economy. Germany was 
integrated in Europe’s economic system because of its central role in continental 
commercial routes.117 In addition, numerous, large German communities were living in 
other European countries, hence connecting Germany to its neighboring states.118 It was 
Germany’s task, and the task of its politicians, to unify the German people and rebuild 	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the country’s power, although this must be done through the League of Nations.119 Jäckh 
viewed Germany as “the symbol not only of a German destiny of her own, but also of a 
joint European destiny.”120 Germany’s entanglement with Europe through population and 
economy therefore connected Germany’s future and Europe’s fate. 
Jäckh related the transformation of Germany and of international relations to the 
“Spirit of Locarno.” The Locarno Treaties (October 1925) normalized international 
relations with Germany and guaranteed post-war western borders, whereas eastern 
borders remained open to revisions. In September 1926, the ratification of the treaties in 
Geneva opened the door to Germany’s membership in the League of Nations. In this 
context, foreign affairs became one of the biggest challenges for the Weimar 
governments, as the DNVP continued its attacks against Stresemann’s foreign policy, the 
Locarno Treaties, and Germany’s membership in the League of Nations.121 By contrast, 
Jäckh viewed the international spirit of Locarno and Geneva as both a necessity of 
Germany’s isolation and a product of interconnections that once again were centered on 
Germany.122 As they had temporarily done in the immediate post-war period, Jäckh and 
his associates believed that membership in the League of Nations and the Locarno 
Treaties would pave the path to a new German foreign policy. The normalization of 
foreign relations had followed internal stabilization, and thus it seemed possible to re-
insert Germany in the international community.   
In the second half of the 1920s, Germany’s political elites viewed international 
treaties and the League of Nations as tools for a revision of the provisions that were 	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limiting German sovereignty.123 The liberal leadership of the DHfP, however, stressed the 
necessity for a peaceful revision of the Versailles Treaty and pointed to a political 
conduct that had also been at the center of their analysis of domestic policies. Walter 
Simons celebrated the legal principle dominating political thought in the aftermath of the 
war and the ideal of international arbitration, which would protect weak and disarmed 
countries such as Germany. Consequentially, he supported Germany’s membership in the 
League of Nations but also warned that the League was a political organization, and the 
essence of politics was the willingness to compromise rather than the certainty of 
“rights.”124 Similarly, Becker argued that direct contacts and knowledge of national 
ideologies were the best ways to foster international understanding.125 Compromise, 
political education, and personal contacts thus were at the center of the foreign policy 
approach of these intellectuals, as they had been in their attempt to counter German 
political society’s radicalization in the immediate aftermath of the war. 
German elites viewed cultural policy, foreign policy objectives, and scientific 
internationalism as profoundly entangled, as their approach to U.S. foundations 
confirmed. Emblematically, Becker noted in regard, “Of course all these organizations 
[U.S. philanthropic foundations] fundamentally are private, but nonetheless they are the 
most important power tool in the government’s diplomatic struggle for decisive cultural 
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Politik, Festvortrag des Reichsgerichtspräsidenten Dr. Walter Simons (Berlin: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 
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125 Becker, “Internationaler Gedanke und nationale Erziehung,” 365-366. 
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influence.”126 Two memoranda in possession of Friedrich Schmidt-Ott (the president of 
the “Emergency Association of German Science”) confirm the general interest in the 
activities of U.S. philanthropic foundations in Germany, thus pointing to the attention of 
German cultural elites to this form of cultural policy.127 At an anecdotal level, but with an 
emblematical value, a German engineer, after having been awarded a Rockefeller travel 
fellowship to the United States, inquired with the “Association of German Universities” 
whether Rockefeller institutes had participated in the “cultural war” against Germany.128 
In his reply, the chair of the Association stressed the “objective scientific attitude” of the 
Rockefeller Foundation,129 although he wondered whether the fellowship was an attempt 
to “discover German technological secrets.”130 From the German perspective, therefore, 
there was no doubt that foundations were at the center of a system of cultural policy, and 
cultural policy was clearly entangled with cultural diplomacy.           
Consequently, German elites linked the internationalization of cultural policy to 
foreign policy goals. By the mid-1920s, these public intellectuals articulated the 
international tasks of the DHfP, as well as of political education in general, with renewed 
emphasis.131 The leadership of the DHfP viewed the institute as a tool for the 
reconstruction of Germany’s international role. For the School, Wilhelm Hass stated, 
internationalism was the “means” to achieve the goal of national liberation. At the same 	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Solf’s 70. Geburtstag in der Lessing-Hochschule, n.d., p. 2. GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 8133. 
127 These two memoranda detailed the 1929 reorganization of Rockefeller philanthropy and, in regard to its 
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Schmidt-Ott, F., Nr. 915. 
128 [?] Denker to Otto Scheel, August 8, 1925, BArch, R 8088/705. 
129 Otto Scheel to [?] Denker, August 13, 1925, BArch, R 8088/705. 
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131 On occasion of the sixth anniversary of the DHfP, Walter Simons requested a meeting with Chancellor 
Wilhelm Marx to discuss the “international tasks” of the DHfP. Walter Simons to Wilhelm Marx, October 
13, 1926, BArch, R 43-I/773. 
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time, he continued, the creation of a sphere of commonality among nations was a “goal” 
of this internationalism.132 In the same edited volume, Otto Hoetzsch distinguished 
between two types of foreign policy education. Foreign policy Bildung provided 
knowledge, understanding, and methods, whereas Erziehung aimed to create the 
precondition for a transformation of will into practice.133 Accordingly, the leadership of 
the DHfP clearly linked the re-establishment of the state’s international power to political 
education.  
It was again Becker who stressed the interconnections between cultural policy and 
cultural diplomacy.134 He argued that “a distinguished cultural-political propaganda” 
must be conducted through exchange programs, the founding of new national research 
institutes, the contribution to international scientific debates, and the participation in 
international conferences.135 Emblematically, Prittwitz-Gaffron immediately informed 
Becker about his nomination as German delegate to the Advisory Council of the 
European Bureau of the CEIP.136 In addition, the reference letters for the LSRM 
fellowships in the social sciences testify to the close connection between internationalism 
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and foreign policy objectives in the eyes of Germany’s cultural elites.137 In what became 
a standard practice, reference letters served to discuss whether a potential candidate could 
“represent German scientific striving abroad and, in so doing, be a part of the propaganda 
for the cultural Germany.”138 Furthermore, the correspondence between Walter Simons 
and Becker on the need to coordinate their lecture tours in the United States in the 
summer of 1930 confirms this strategic approach.139 These examples point to the 
understanding of Germany’s cultural elites of scientific and cultural internationalism. 
International scientific and scholarly networks provided venues for a cultural propaganda 
that aimed to re-establish Germany’s role in the international community.   
These comments pinpoint the specific German perspective on the relationship 
between cultural policy and foreign policy. In different ways, they pointed to the 
entanglement of cultural institutions and foreign policy goals. With the stabilization of 
the Weimar Republic, the leadership of the DHfP viewed international connections as the 
path for the re-establishment of Germany’s role in Europe. While U.S. foundations 
became the drivers of American internationalism in the aftermath of the war and aimed to 
support democracy by spreading American values and institutional models, Germans 
viewed international cultural relationships as part of foreign policy, which aimed to 
reestablish Germany’s centrality in European affairs. 
Rockefeller Philanthropic Institutions and “Objective” Social Sciences 
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The study of society and the support of the social sciences became a crucial part 
of the activities of U.S. foundations. Empirical social sciences provided the tools to 
analyze society, its ills, and capitalism’s problems. Private philanthropy became 
increasingly involved in the social sciences because, based on empirical research and 
quantitative data, they embodied the new faith in “scientific knowledge” for the good life 
and the good society.140 Established in 1913 amid nation-wide polemics,141 the 
Rockefeller Foundation had, however, only reluctantly approached the social sciences. It 
had commissioned a study on industrial relations after the “Ludlow Massacre,”142 which 
was followed by a general outcry against the connections between the philanthropies and 
the business activities of the Rockefeller family.143 As a result, the Rockefeller 
Foundation carefully avoided the social sciences until the end of the 1920s, and rather 
emphasized its focus on objective research and knowledge.  
Nonetheless, the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial (LSRM) embodied the 
interest of Rockefeller philanthropies in social welfare, and hence in the social 
sciences.144 The LSRM was established in October 1918 in memory of John D. 	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Rockefeller, Sr.’s wife and remained in existence until January 1929. The nomination of 
the relatively unknown Beardsly Ruml as director (May 1921) and the relative secrecy of 
its grant-making activities testified to its cautious approach to social issues. Nonetheless, 
Ruml enjoyed considerable freedom of maneuver, and developed a comprehensive 
strategy for the support to the social sciences that was rooted in the belief that social 
welfare required a better understanding of the factors influencing human actions and 
societies. Ruml aimed to break disciplinary boundaries and to support specific 
institutional centers in order to foster the development of the social sciences in both the 
United States and abroad. Furthermore, he created a network of institutes with a common 
approach to research in the social sciences by establishing a social science fellowship 
program. 
In the second half of the 1920s, the LSRM and, after the reorganization of 
Rockefeller philanthropies, the RF supported the DHfP. The grants from the LSRM 
supported the DHfP in a period of financial emergency. The decline of private support 
and the uncertain access to public funds made American grants vital for the School’s 
survival. Officers of the LSRM recognized the democratic value of the School but 
attempted to spur research in the social sciences. The grants from Rockefeller 
philanthropic institutions contributed to the School’s gradual shift from vocational 
training to research. In so doing, the DHfP slowly abandoned its original emphasis on the 
“politics of civility,” which had been rooted in objective, practical education. 
Ernst Jäckh had devoted much energy and time to court potential foreign investors 
in 1924 and during the winter of 1925-26. The American Ambassador to Germany 
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Alanson B. Houghton had introduced Jäckh to the RF and the CEIP,145 and served with 
his predecessor Ellis Loring Dresel and Professor Borchert (Yale University) as reference 
for the School’s application for a grant from the LSRM.146 The School’s democratic 
outlook (in addition to the potential for future scientific research) was crucial for securing 
an initial grant. Nonetheless, the correspondence between the leadership of the DHfP and 
the officers of the LSRM highlights both Jäckh’s skills as a fundraiser and the role of 
LSRM officers in negotiating between program requirements and the realities of 
Germany’s political context.  
Jäckh and his associates presented the DHfP as the embodiment of the “new 
Germany” and stressed its practical approach. Jäckh highlighted the School’s emphasis 
on the combination of theory and practice,147 and argued that the Treaty of Locarno had 
originated in round-tables organized by the DHfP.148 He celebrated the School as the first 
institute bringing together “members of all parties” and as a place where the only 
requirement of instructors was knowledge and readiness, “while criticizing the republic, 
not to destroy it.”149 He pointed out the support to the “new democratic state” and the 
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active cooperation with state agencies and ministries.150 In this initial contact with the 
LSRM, therefore, the leadership of the DHfP emphasized the democratic nature of the 
School and pointed to the connections between objective approaches to knowledge and 
practical impact on public affairs. 
The LSRM was aware of the School’s focus on democratic education rather than 
on empiric research. In a widely cited report, August Wilhelm Fehling, the German 
advisor of the Rockefeller Foundation for the social sciences, pointed to the numerous 
limits of the DHfP in developing “serious research” in the social sciences. He suggested 
that the School was unable to attract young scholars because of its unclear standing in 
German academia. Furthermore, Fehling stressed the low quality of students, and 
rhetorically asked, “Who are the students? Are they indeed the prospective political 
leaders of the country? May be, may not be. As things are now, it may be doubted.”151 
Nonetheless, he noted that the DHfP was “a foundation of the republican time with the 
aim of creating among German youth a spirit of understanding of the republic and its 
needs,” in which a “liberal and democratic atmosphere” prevailed.152 Fehling’s report 
therefore pointed to the tension that developed between the goal of funding empiric social 
sciences and the conviction of program officers that the DHfP was one of the few, 
genuinely democratic forces in Weimar Germany.  
As skillful fundraisers, Jäckh and his associates pointed to the similarities 
between the DHfP and other institutes supported by the LSRM. Walter Simons stressed 
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that the LSRM had already supported institutes like the DHfP in Germany, and defined 
the London School of Economics (LSE) – one of the major European grantees of the 
LSRM – as the “sister institution in London.”153 Similarly, Jäckh compared the DHfP to 
the LSE,154 and pointed out that the funds requested did not reach half of the support 
given to the LSE, the “English parallel of our German institute.”155 Strategically, the 
leadership of the DHfP placed the School at the center of Ruml’s grand strategy by 
emphasizing the similarities with other grantees of the LSRM. 
In applying for the grant, the DHfP proposed a 1926 budget that showed a 
significant expansion of activities. Compared to 1925, public funds remained stable, 
whereas income from patrons slightly increased (from M 400,000 to M 422,500), as did 
lecture fees (from M 58,000 to M 61,500). Conversely, expenses swelled from M 
724,000 to M 960,000. This increase primarily depended on the expansion of research 
activities (from M 64,000 to M 109,000) and the creation of a new German-American 
exchange program (M 120,000), although the expenses for publications (from M 30,000 
to M 52,000) and library and archives (from M 22,000 to M 27,000) also increased.156 In 
a second letter, Jäckh stated that, “as a consequence of the great crisis in Germany,” 
seven contributors had withdrawn their pledges for 1926, diminishing the income by M 
108,000, and thus increasing the total deficit to M 311,000.157 Consequentially, American 
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philanthropic support would compensate the falling of other private donations and be 
primarily used to expand the School’s research activities.   
Jäckh combined the plans of broadening the School’s scope with an emphasis on 
financial difficulties. He expounded on these plans by detailing the creation of academic 
chairs in American subjects and international economics and the establishment of a 
German-American exchange program for both instructors and students.158 Surprised, 
Ruml noted that the need for external funds stemmed from the intention to expand the 
School’s activities, rather than from a “temporary falling-off of your contributions,” as 
Jäckh had suggested during a previous meeting.159 In his reply, Jäckh intertwined the 
School’s new tasks, financial difficulties, and “the necessities of the New Germany, 
internationalized education and work for World Peace.”160 Likewise, Simons pointed to 
the tension between the increase in quantity and quality of attendants and the financial 
difficulties.161 Nonetheless, reacting to Ruml’s comments, Jäckh agreed to cut the 
exchange program in order to secure the LSRM grant.162  
In March 1926, Ruml communicated that the Trustees of the LSRM had 
appropriated a grant of up to $50,000 for 1926 and 1927. The LSRM agreed to contribute 
$1 for each $5 received from other sources but the grant could not exceed $25,000 in one 
year. Ruml pointed out, however, that it was a one-time grant made “in consideration of 
the emergency situation now existing.”163 The grant supported the new activities of the 
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DHfP, primarily research seminars and research work, publications, and the completion 
of the library.164 Although the LSRM considered this two-year grant a one-time 
appropriation made because of the School’s financial difficulties, it represented – by not 
being exclusively driven by scientific considerations – a precedent in the relationship 
between Rockefeller philanthropy and the DHfP.  
The leadership of the School reorganized the educational program against the 
background of declining private donations and the influx of American grants and public 
funds. By the winter semester of 1925-26, the DHfP had expanded its special seminars. 
Wolfers directed the new “Political Seminar,” which aimed to discuss the major political 
questions of the day. Under Adolf Grabowsky’s directorship, the “Geo-Political Seminar” 
explored geo-politics in connection to world economy and world politics, hence moving 
beyond the traditional field of political geography. Lastly, Carl Mennicke directed the 
new “Socio-Political Seminar,” which unified the “School of Social Services” and the 
“School of Economics.” The former aimed to prepare new social workers, whereas the 
latter trained officials of trade unions.165 The following year, Johann Strunz opened the 
“Youth Seminar” (in 1929 transformed into the “Civics Seminar”), which took over the 
School’s work in civic education.166 
This systemization led to an institutional reorganization in 1927 and 1928. The 
main course of studies was divided in an “Academic Department,” which awarded a 
degree, and a “Seminar Department” (the previous “Political Seminar”). Under the 
direction of the Faculty Council, the “Academic Department” included the concentration 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Hans Simons to Frank B. Stubbs, June 11, 1927, folder 537, box 51, RG 3.6, LSRM Archives, RAC. 
165 DHfP, Vorlesungsverzeichnis WS 1925/26, pp. 20-23, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303 neu, Nr. 11. 
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areas of general politics and political history (with Friedrich Meinecke), foreign policy 
and international law (with Otto Hoetzsch), domestic policy and constitutional law (with 
Herman Heller), political psychology and foreign policy (with Wilhelm Haas), and 
economic and financial policy. Arnold Wolfers directed the “Seminar Department,” 
which had Georg Cleinow, Adolf Grabowsky, Theodor Heuss, and Richmond Lennox as 
full-time faculty, and focused on the philosophical basis and theory of politics, political 
history and foreign policy, the legal basis of politics, the economic basis of politics, press 
and cultural and educational policy, and foreign languages.167 
By the late-1920s therefore the DHfP had gradually abandoned its early focus on 
civic education and vocational training. The grants from the LSRM favored this 
development with their emphasis on research. An analysis of the disciplinary focus of the 
DHfP confirms this shift. While domestic politics played an important role for a couple 
of years with the stabilization of the republic, political theory and political history were 
marginalized by the mid-1920, and civic education disappeared from the main course of 
studies, as it was relegated to the “Youth Seminar” (and later “Civics Seminar”). 
Conversely, the exponential growth of foreign politics reflected the possibilities of the 
new international context and the integration of conservative scholars.168 American grants 
allowed the expansion of the activities of the DHfP, which private German sources could 
not support. Quite naturally, therefore, the LSRM influenced the direction of the School’s 
expansion because the leadership of the DHfP strategically selected programs that were 
in line with the interests of the American donors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 DHfP, Vorlesungsverzeichnis WS 1927/28, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303 neu, Nr. 15. 
168 Lehnert, “‘Politik als Wissenschaft’,” 451-454.  
	   230	  
In the following years, the leadership of the DHfP skillfully courted the 
representatives of the LSRM and emphasized the scientific and research work supported 
by the grant.169 Jäckh pointed to the reorganization of the main course of studies, stressed 
the cooperation with the Paris-based Institute of International Cooperation, and argued 
that the incorporation of the PK fostered cross-party cooperation.170 Nonetheless, 
although the expenses had been kept even in 1926, 1927, and 1928, he stressed that the 
financial problems were not solved because of a lack of both private and public 
support.171 Emblematically, in the estimates for the fiscal year of 1928/29, it was argued,  
It must be stressed that the establishment of the “Academic Department” 
would not have been possible without the help of the Rockefeller 
Foundation, .... Precisely for this department, however, expenditures 
accrue from faculties’ payroll … and extra expenses, which amount to the 
Rockefeller Foundation’s contribution over the past two years.172        
 
The DHfP leadership therefore justified the request of additional funds by pointing to the 
School’s development in the direction envisioned by the LSRM. Strategically, they 
linked the expenditures of the School to the programs developed with American grants. 
By stressing this connection, Jäckh and his associates described the essence of the 
School’s development in the second half of the 1920s. In fact, because of financial 
difficulties, the DHfP was able to develop those programs, which corresponded to 
American goals and could be sustained only by additional American grants (to the 
detriment of other programs).      
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Ruml welcomed the School’s new developments and forwarded the request for 
new funds to the Executive Committee, although stressing that the initial grant had 
explicitly been a one-time appropriation.173 In the spring of 1928, however, the LSRM 
renewed the grant for an additional year, on the condition that the gift would not be 
publicized.174 Nonetheless, although noting the positive developments of the DHfP, 
Fehling again commented, “Most of the items for which funds are requested cannot be 
classified as research; some are purely instructional in nature and others are definitely 
political in implication.”175 By the end of the 1920s therefore the DHfP had established 
strong ties with the LSRM. Officers and advisors of the Memorial, however, pointed to 
the limited development of social science research, although acknowledging the 
developments in that direction. At the same time, the DHfP had systemized its course of 
studies and expanded its research work with the support of American grants. 
At the end of the 1920s, Rockefeller philanthropic institutions were reorganized 
and, in January 1929, the LSRM ceased to exist.176 Since 1926, John D. Rockefeller, Jr. 
had aimed to restructure Rockefeller philanthropy, and a committee of three trustees – 
Raymond Fosdick, Arthur Woods, and Ernest M. Hopkins – reviewed the activities of the 
Memorial and made recommendations for its incorporation in the RF. Ruml’s former 
assistant, Edmund E. Day (a statistician and economist trained at Harvard) was named 
director of the new Division of Social Sciences (DSS). Day continued the pattern of 
support to the social sciences that Ruml had developed. After the reorganization, 	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however, hierarchical control on programs was tightened and the RF withdrew from 
interdisciplinary approaches (through the support to research centers) and focused on 
specific programs. By 1933, the DSS had shifted its strategic focus on “economic 
stabilization,” “international relations,” and “community organization and planning,” and 
thus replaced Ruml’s original interdisciplinary strategy. 
Jäckh approached the RF for additional funding after the reorganization of 
Rockefeller philanthropy. In a now established strategy, Jäckh presented an impressive 
list of personalities from the academic, diplomatic, and philanthropic worlds supporting 
his endeavor, and emphasized the international achievements of the DHfP. He argued that 
“our work and duties” had increased because they were rooted in “the needs of the times 
and the world, [and were] the creatures of the necessities of a new age and a new 
world.”177 In line with the internationalist shift of the School, these tasks focused on 
international understanding in Europe,178 and to this end Jäckh requested an annual 
support of $30,000 for two years.179 This time, however, the RF rejected the 
application,180 in part because Fehling’s report had stressed the research limits of the 
DHfP and pointed to the politically controversial nature of some of its programs such as 
the French-German Exchange of scholars and statesmen.181      
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After the rejection, the DHfP’s leadership stressed that, with Germany’s difficult 
financial situation, the institute would have to struggle to survive.182 Hans Simons argued 
that the DHfP had been planned both as an educational and a research institute since its 
establishment in 1920. He then claimed that the current crisis had renewed the emergency 
situation that had warranted the initial support of the LSRM, hence risking limiting the 
institute’s research activities.183 Consequentially, he suggested that, without a new grant, 
the leadership of the DHfP would have to curtail the research work that had been 
supported by the LSRM grants in order to balance the budget. This time, however, the 
RF’s officers confirmed the application’s rejection because of the “restrictions that our 
program necessarily imposes upon us.”184 This decision reflected a general change in 
policy that had emerged with the reorganization of Rockefeller philanthropic institutions. 
In fact, RF officers had criticized Ruml’s significant level of independence during the 
brief existence of the LSRM.185   
Nonetheless, Jäckh’s contacts within the RF prolonged the discussions within the 
Foundation over ways to support the DHfP. In his 1929 application, Jäckh had explicitly 
mentioned Beardsley Ruml, Raymond Fosdick, and John D. Rockefeller, Jr. as 
references.186 The vice president of the RF, Thomas B. Appleget recorded in his officer’s 
diary how the application had been forwarded to the president of the RF, Max Mason, 
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through “various references and circumlocutions,” and betraying a certain annoyance 
concluded, “Certainly no obligation on the RF to make arrangements to consider every 
interest – many marginal requests will suffer – and should.”187 The attempt to support the 
DHfP through the General Education Board failed,188 and by the end of September the 
application of the DHfP was definitely rejected because it was “Thoroughly outside 
program at the present time.”189 Nonetheless, Jäckh was able to secure a private grant 
from John D. Rockefeller, Jr. for the year 1931.190 These developments testify to Jäckh’s 
remarkable capacity to win the support of individual program officers, in addition to the 
ability of the DHfP leadership to frame applications for financial support according to the 
expectation of the RF. 
RF officers were caught between program directives and the sympathies for the 
DHfP. On February 4, 1932, after a dinner conversation with Jäckh and Wolfers, Selskar 
Gunn (the vice-president of the Foundation in Europe) wrote Day expressing a positive 
opinion on the DHfP and pointing out, “The essential point seems to be that students of 
all political fields can mingle in this school and consider political facts in a real objective 
manner,” yet he noted that the institute was chiefly “devoted to teaching.”191 In his reply, 
noting that the RF trustees had loosened the research requirements for awarding funds, 
Day expressed his interest in the DHfP because it was “doing work of far-reaching 
importance in the development of objective attitudes in international relations.”192 
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Against the background of the radicalization of political contrasts in Germany, 
foundation officers viewed the DHfP as a democratic stronghold and as a center with 
potential in research in foreign affairs, which was the new focus of the DSS after the 
reorganization of Rockefeller philanthropy.    
Consequentially, Gunn met with Jäckh and Wolfers in March of 1932 in Berlin. 
In a letter to Day, Gunn pointed out, “the orientation is more and more in the direction of 
research,” although, he continued, this research “could hardly be considered research in 
the sense that we use the word.” Nonetheless, he identified potential roots for significant 
future research and – in supporting Jäckh’s application – argued, “One of the most vitally 
important phases of the whole question is that this Hochschule represents in the best 
sense of the word a liberal spirit in Germany.”193 In April 1932, the RF made a new 
appropriation to the DHfP.194   
This last grant helped the DHfP to complete its development from an institute 
devoted to vocational training to a center with academic ambitions and a growing 
emphasis on research.195 The course of study was now organized in a curriculum with 
three stages, that is, the “Pre-Seminar” (1-2 semesters), the “Seminar Department” (4 
semesters), and the  “Academic Department” (3 semesters). The “Pre-Seminar” had been 
established in 1931 in order to limit the access to the “Seminar Department” (which until 
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then had been free). It is noteworthy that the RF grant helped to establish the “Research 
Department” in 1932 for which the conservative Fritz Berber served as general secretary. 
In addition, next to the “Socio-Political Seminar,” the “Civics Seminar,” and the “Geo-
Political Seminar,” the DHfP also developed the “Euro-Asian Seminar” (directed by 
Georg Cleinow), the “Deutschtumseminar” (later, “Ethno-Political Seminar,” directed by 
Max H. Boehm), and the “Volksbildnerseminar” (directed by Erwin Marquardt and 
Sigmund Neumann).196 By 1932-33, the DHfP had fully developed an academic program, 
a research department, and several research seminars. At the same time, vocational and 
practical training, as well as civic education, had been relegated to the special courses.    
Over the years, Rockefeller philanthropic institutions substantially supported the 
DHfP. In 1933, an internal report on the support to the social sciences in Germany 
categorized the activities of Rockefeller philanthropic institutions (thus adding LSRM 
grants and RF appropriations) in library grants ($137,5000), grants to research institutes 
($239,000), grants for support of cooperative research ($150,000), grants-in-aid to 
individual scholars ($4,150), and fellowships ($300,000). In total, the appropriations 
amounted to $830,650.197 RF officers considered this level of support rather modest,198 
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which they related to Germans considering the social sciences a “speculative rather than 
scientific discipline.”199 With $110,000, the DHfP received the largest share among the 
institutes supported.200 Nonetheless, this support paled in comparison to the total size of 
Rockefeller philanthropic support to the social sciences. The Memorial alone distributed 
around $20 million between 1924 and 1928, of which more than half went to five major 
centers (Chicago, Columbia, the Brookings Institution, the London School of Economics, 
and Harvard) and a further one-fifth to the Social Science Research Council.201     
Both Rockefeller philanthropic institutions and the leadership of the DHfP saw 
the solution to contentious socio-political issues in “objective” knowledge, yet their 
approaches significantly differed. In following the tenets of scientific philanthropy, the 
faith of the LSRM in the social sciences was grounded in the belief that objective 
research was apolitical and could support the “objective” policy decisions of a 
professional class of experts. In short, it aimed to replace the divisive politician with the 
objective policy-maker. By contrast, the leadership of the DHfP doubted that political 
society could be de-politicized. The emphasis on objective facts and knowledge was part 
of the “politics of civility,” which required the individual to participate in the political 
process and learn to respect the political adversary. The goal of the study of politics 
therefore was the development of a “mature political will” through knowledge and 	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understanding of political facts and processes, rather than the collection of “empirical 
data” that could support policy-making. The two approaches were not irreconcilable, yet 
in Germany’s radicalized public sphere knowledge and expertise could serve both to 
bolster specific socio-political interests and to bypass political institutions in the name of 
an alleged Überparteilichkeit, as the acrimonious debates between the young 
conservatives and the leadership of the DHfP had shown. 
Conclusions 
 
The leaders of the CEIP and of Rockefeller philanthropic institutions were 
internationalists who were aware of the broader social, political, and economic 
interconnections of the post-war world. Accordingly, they viewed their philanthropic 
efforts as a key part of a semi-official cultural diplomacy that in part balanced and in part 
compensated the isolationism of official American foreign policy. As the visits of 
Babcock and Butler in Berlin show, foundation officers and trustees had access to the 
highest echelons of German political society, thus testifying to the awareness among 
German elites of the key political role of U.S. philanthropic institutions. Conversely, 
aware of their roles, foundation officers tried to avoid politically controversial positions 
by either limiting, in the case of the LSRM and the RF, their work to the safety of 
“objective” social science or, after initial controversies, selecting local representatives 
who were well connected to the official political leadership, as in the case of the CEIP. In 
both cases, therefore, political, scientific, and diplomatic considerations played a role in 
these philanthropic institutions’ activities in inter-war Germany.            
The influence of philanthropic foundations depended on their peculiar position in 
American society. Indeed, foundations played a crucial socio-political role by linking 
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academic research, business, and government. Nicholas M. Butler exemplified this 
peculiar role by being close to the Republican Party (which considered him for the 
position of Vice-President), representing academia as President of Columbia University, 
and being part of the CEIP leadership. The intellectuals at the center of this study played 
a similar role in German society, as they were strategically placed at the critical 
intersection of the actions of philanthropists, academic theorists, and government 
officials. Consequently, Jäckh and his associates were ideal partners for American 
foundations because they were able to establish connections with the worlds of academia 
and politics.    
The working relation between American philanthropic foundations and the circle 
around Jäckh thus was, by the nature of this relationship, highly political. Both 
foundation officers and German intellectuals entered this collaboration with clear goals in 
mind, which at times overlapped and other times clearly diverged. On the one hand, 
therefore, the relationship between American philanthropy and the DHfP developed 
around a clear asymmetry between American internationalist and democratic ideals and 
the realities of German political culture, as the case of the CEIP shows. On the other 
hand, however, the Rockefeller support to research programs had a paradoxical impact on 
the development of the School of Politics and its role in Germany’s contentious public 
sphere.    
     By the second half of the 1920s, the leadership of the DHfP clearly voiced the 
internationalist goals of their institute. In truth, the restoration of state’s power had been 
the explicit goal of the DHfP since its founding days, as the repeated references to the 
French Ecole libre had shown. In the 1920s, the liberal leaders of the School remained 
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anchored to a Naumannian approach that rooted an energetic foreign policy in internal 
strength and solidarity. Only the stabilization of the republic had therefore created the 
preconditions for an effective foreign policy that aimed to revise the Versailles Treaty. 
Consequentially, this reality modified the task of the DHfP. The internationalism of the 
DHfP aimed to insert Germany and its intellectual elites in the international community 
and make them equal participants in discussions on a stable European peace. U.S. 
philanthropic foundations were important tools for these efforts.      
The diatribe between the CEIP and its German Special Correspondents points to 
the difficulties of American foundations to identify reliable partners in Germany’s 
contentious public sphere. The reports of Foerster and Gerlach had drawn the attention of 
the leadership of the Division of Intercourse and Education to the nationalism of Jäckh 
and his associates. Paradoxically, however, political consideration convinced Butler, 
Babcock, and Haskell to downgrade their association with the outspoken Foerster. They 
viewed Foerster’s criticism as a politically liability for the Endowment’s work in 
Germany despite his unquestionable democratic credentials. The correspondence of 
Butler and Babcock shows that the leadership of the CEIP was concerned with negative 
political consequences of their association with Foerster. In addition, however, it also 
suggests that Foerster’s and Gerlach’s marginal role in Germany constituted a key 
obstacle in the eyes of the CEIP for the development of programs with a clear and long-
term impact on the development of German political opinion.       
By contrast, the LSRM sought out institutions that could foster the development 
of empiric approaches to the social sciences in the hope that objective research would de-
radicalize political discourse. Paradoxically, Rockefeller officers initially supported the 
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DHfP more out of political than scholarly reasons. While pointing out the limited quality 
of the research conducted at the School of Politics, officers viewed the DHfP as an 
expression of the liberal spirit of the “New Germany,” which thus deserved sympathy and 
support. In the long term, however, Rockefeller philanthropy influenced the School’s 
development, which restructured its programs and emphasized the research and academic 
units because of the need for American financial support. Combined with political elites’ 
growing influence on the School, which will be described in the following chapter, these 
developments facilitated conservative scholars’ penetration in the DHfP.     
Paradoxically, Jäckh’s fundraising skills also facilitated the development of these 
asymmetries. The numerous interactions of the DHfP leadership with American 
economic, political, and philanthropic elites had helped them to identify the priorities of 
U.S. philanthropic foundations. By analyzing his correspondence with U.S. philanthropic 
institutions, it clearly emerges that Jäckh had initially shaped his applications for 
Rockefeller grants on his earlier experience with the CEIP. Only when he became aware 
of the LSRM’s emphasis on research, Jäckh abandoned the initial approach. 
Consequentially, he emphasized the similarities between the DHfP and other research-
intensive institutions supported by the LSRM such as the LSE. As a result, the DHfP 
leadership emphasized its research programs, which were increasingly developed with 
the help of Rockefeller grants.  
The case of the LSRM and of the RF points to the difficulties to export the 
American faith in objective, non-partisan public policy to Germany’s contentious public 
sphere. The emphasis on social sciences expressed the hope in the possibility that 
objective research could provide policy-makers with undisputable data and thus bypass 
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the factionalism of politics of a modern mass-democracy. The case of the DHfP, 
however, shows the dangers of an absolute faith in a culture of experts when policy 
decisions are not sustained by ethical, democratic values. The acrimonious debates 
between the DHfP and the PK described in previous chapters show that the expert and the 
nonpartisan policy maker could serve not only to veil particular socio-political objective 
but also to bypass those democratic intermediary institutions that by institutionalizing 
conflict guarantee political pluralism. This and the following chapter show how the 
gradual emphasis on research in international relations provided an “objective” and 
“nonpartisan” platform on which right-wing scholars could be integrated into the School 
of Politics.      
The impact of the policies of American philanthropic foundations, however, 
should not be overemphasized. Admittedly, in these decades, foundations had an 
influence on social, political, and economic developments in the United States that would 
remain unmatched in the decades to come.202 Nonetheless, quite naturally, scholars risk 
overemphasizing the role of philanthropic organizations when putting them at the center 
of historical enquiries.203 The policies of American foundations were only one factor that 
contributed to the conservative shift of the German School of Politics in the last ten years 
of the Weimar Republic. The domestic politics and the paradoxical modernity of civil 
society, which will be discussed in the following chapter, play a crucial role in the end of 
the DHfP and epitomized the withering of a conception of civil society rooted in civility 
in the last years of Germany’s first democracy.   
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CHAPTER 6: FROM CIVIL SOCIETY TO DICTATORSHIP: PUBLIC 
INTELLECTUALS BETWEEN REPUBLIC, NAZISM, AND EXILE 
 
The mid-1920s were the golden years of the Weimar Republic. Germany’s young 
democracy appeared to have survived the combined pressures of extremists’ attacks, 
economic crisis and hyperinflation, and foreign military presence. In this new context, 
political society gradually integrated into the political system parties that had initially 
opposed the republican state. In particular, the DVP accepted political responsibility by 
participating in governments, and thus renounced its stance of radical opposition to 
republican politics.1 Furthermore, under the energetic leadership of the DVP politician 
Gustav Stresemann, the Foreign Office broke Germany’s international isolation, hence 
facilitating Germany’s reintegration into the international community.2 Parliamentary 
democracy thus seemed to have set roots in Germany.  
Private philanthropy had guaranteed the political independence of the DHfP in the 
first half of the 1920s. After contributing to the establishment of the School, however, 
German philanthropists gradually withdrew their support in the conviction that it was the 
task of political institutions to guarantee the survival of Germany’s first school of public 
affairs. In line with a peculiar German tradition, private initiatives had a complementary 
role to state action. After failing to attract additional private funds, the leadership of the 
DHfP sought the support of Germany’s political elites. To this end, the DHfP started a 
working cooperation with the PK in order to broaden its cross-partisan appeal.     
Symbolically, the cooperation between the DHfP and the PK paralleled the 
attempt of political elites to co-opt conservative parties to the political process. The 
relative stabilization of political society had renewed the hope that political forces and 	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social strata that had previously opposed the republican form of government could be 
integrated into the system through compromise and the sharing of (political) 
responsibility. This approach also indirectly signaled that liberal elites – and among them 
the DHfP leadership – believed that a genuine democratic spirit was developing in 
Germany. From this perspective, the celebration of a democratic “New Germany” was a 
celebration of the DHfP. The faith in the possibility to successfully integrate all political 
forces into the republican state assumed the development of a sense of political 
responsibility, commitment to the common good, and willingness to compromise, which 
were civil society’s foundational blocks.   
The integration of adversarial political forces and the involvement of political 
institutions, however, inevitably paved the path to the penetration of party politics in the 
DHfP. The new emphasis on Überparteilichkeit – in the sense of equal distance from (or 
presence of) all political positions – testifies to the conviction of Jäckh and his associates 
that the DHfP had fulfilled its domestic tasks. Only trusting the development of a general 
democratic mindset could justify the faith in political institutions’ stability and in their 
capacity to integrate all political forces. The inability of the leadership of the DHfP to 
successfully cooperate with the conservative scholars of the PK epitomized, however, the 
ephemeral nature of the republic’s consolidation and the withering of civil society. 
Several conservative faculty members of PK remained at the DHfP, although the 
cooperation between the two institutes ended in 1930. By the early 1930s, therefore, the 
DHfP counted as faculty members some of the intellectuals that had formed the circle 
around Moeller-Bruck in the aftermath of World War One.      
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In the last five years of the republic, the DHfP became the venue for debates over 
the future of the parliamentary system and the limits of a conception of civil society 
rooted in civility. The debates between the conservative Carl Schmitt and the Social 
Democrat Hermann Heller on the legitimacy and justification of political authority 
epitomized the broader tension between contrasting conceptions of societal organization. 
Within the DHfP, Heller was one of the last voices defending a form of societal 
organization grounded in civility, tolerance, and pluralism. By contrast, often drawing 
explicitly on Schmitt, conservative political and intellectual elites viewed authoritarian 
forms of government as the solution to Germany’s problems because of their ability to 
bypass those intermediary organizations that institutionalized conflicts. Even the liberal 
leadership of the DHfP saw a needed counterforce to political society’s factionalism in a 
strong head of state, as Max Weber, Friedrich Meinecke, and Friedrich Naumann had 
done during the crisis-ridden years after World War One.  
Ernst Jäckh personified the limits and risks of a conception of civil society rooted 
in acceptance of conflict, compromise, and negotiation. In Germany’s radicalized public 
sphere of the early 1930s, a liberal conception of civil society was unable to defend 
Weimar’s parliamentary democracy against powerful, alternative forms of societal 
organization. The trust in political institutions’ stability, the readiness to compromise, and 
the confidence in rational argumentation led to a passive stance towards the National 
Socialist movement. Like most of the conservative-oriented liberals of the time, Jäckh 
viewed the authoritarian political turn under the chancellors Heinrich Brüning and Franz 
von Papen as necessary to secure state’s authority against a deadlocked parliament. After 
the seizure of power of the Nazis, Jäckh failed to maintain control over the DHfP, 
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notwithstanding his willingness to make numerous concessions to the new regime. 
Nonetheless, he continued to seek influence in Germany’s political society from exile and 
spent the rest of his life in an egotistical attempt to present himself and his venture as an 
uncompromised democratic bulwark.  
Accordingly, in this chapter I detail the process by which a liberal conception of 
civil society paved the path to alternative forms of societal organization. Therefore, I first 
analyze the cooperation between the DHfP and the PK. The integration of conservative 
scholars and the influence of public funds symbolized the progressive penetration of 
party politics in the DHfP and pointed to the general faith in the stability of political 
institution. Secondly, I point out the limits of the civil society discourse. Against the 
background of the socio-political crisis of the early 1930s, the liberal leadership of the 
DHfP gradually turned to authoritarian forms of government and viewed a strengthened 
political leadership as the only way out of social and political fragmentation. Lastly, 
Ernst Jäckh serves as a vantage point on the activities of German public intellectuals 
between accommodation and emigration in the 1930s. Jäckh’s ambivalences toward the 
Nazi regime were rooted in his liberal nationalism but, most importantly, pointed to the 
limits of a conception of civil society based on compromise and civility when confronted 
with powerful political alternatives.      
The DHfP and Party Politics 
 
Jäckh and his associates celebrated the “New Germany” and pointed out the 
successful democratization of Germany’s political system and society. The stabilization 
of the republic confirmed their trust in the co-opting capacities of democratic institutions. 
Furthermore, the integration into the political system of conservative politicians, whose 
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initial attitude toward the new state had been, if not of outright rejection, of skepticism at 
best, validated the emphasis of these intellectuals on responsibility and reason. By the 
mid-1920s, therefore, the leadership of the DHfP could legitimately celebrate the 
domestic successes of their institute and turn to foreign policy objectives.     
Jäckh viewed political stabilization as a proof of Germany’s strong democratic 
roots and of the successful democratization of both political system and society. He 
argued that the Weimar Constitution “incarnated” the spirit of the real Germany, which 
was the “fruit” of the revolution of 1848.3 In contrast to the immediate post-war period, 
Jäckh now clearly contrasted this democratic Germany to Imperial Germany, whose 
traditional elites, militarism, void parliamentarism, and monarchic system had blocked 
democracy’s development.4 Jäckh therefore pointed to a familiar theme among liberal 
democrats, who had attempted to legitimize the new republic by highlighting Germany’s 
democratic past. In so doing, he rooted current problems in a peculiar path that diverted 
from Germany’s democratic past, as well as from the political development of Anglo-
Saxon nations. The narrative of the “New Germany” therefore foreshadowed the 
Sonderweg thesis of the aftermath of World War Two. 
Against the background of the Republic’s stabilization, Jäckh considered the 
integration of parties in the political system as complete. The new republic had 
successfully fought against attacks from both the left and the right,5 and now, he 
optimistically concluded, the large majority of Germans supported the young 
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democracy.6 Gustav Stresemann personified this new Germany because he had 
abandoned old ambiguities “under the experience of responsibility.”7 Likewise, President 
Paul von Hindenburg was “the best example of education in responsibility by facts.”8 
Indeed, Jäckh asserted that, “Education by facts and responsibility to a new spirit is a 
characteristic feature of the majority in the new Germany, among leaders and among the 
people.”9 Political responsibility and the involvement in the political process – the praxis 
of politics – had had the upper hand against the doctrinism and irrationalism of slogans 
and propaganda, hence validating the approach of the DHfP. Jäckh’s analysis voiced 
liberals’ trust in the ability of republican institutions and, in particular, of the political 
process to neutralize what they deemed irrational political approaches. 
Nonetheless, at the same time, the leadership of the School faced a significant 
decrease of private financial support. Consequently, Jäckh and his associates multiplied 
their efforts to secure new sources of funding and, in seeking public funds, turned to 
Germany’s political leadership. The growing involvement of Weimar’s political class, 
however, led the DHfP to officially cooperate with the PK. This agreement mirrored the 
simultaneous attempt of the republic’s political leadership to counter the fragmentation of 
Germany’s middle class parties and to integrate conservative parties into the political 
process.  
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Private support for the DHfP had rapidly dwindled. By the end of 1925, the 
School was unable to cover all its expenses with private donations.10 The leadership of 
the School noted,  
After the collapse [of 1918], the establishment of this School was regarded 
as a valuable experiment for which a number of private individuals 
provided considerable resources. With the success of the experiment, the 
usual opinion developed in the circles that had financially supported the 
School that it would be now the task of Reich and state [that is, Prussia] to 
take over the expenses of the institution.11  
 
Significantly, the leadership linked the falling of private donations to a peculiar attitude 
of German philanthropists. German philanthropy had traditionally assumed a role that 
was complementary to the one of the state.12 The case of the DHfP therefore conforms to 
a peculiar German pattern of state-philanthropy relationships.   
Consequentially, the Board of Trustees of the DHfP sought new sources of 
financial support. In the name of the Board, Walter Simons (President of the Court of 
Justice and former Reich Foreign Minister) contacted both the Office of the Chancellor 
and President von Hindenburg.13 Emblematically, in writing the political leadership 
regarding financial support, Simons emphasized that the DHfP had relied on private 
funds during its first five years of existence, during which it had only received non-
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monetary support from state and federal agencies.14 In so doing, Simons also stressed the 
complementary relationship between private philanthropy and public funds, although he 
did so out of necessity. 
The leadership of the DHfP justified the request for public funds by pointing out 
the crucial role of political education in Germany’s young democracy and the cross-
partisanship of the School. Hans Simons stressed the need to counter the “political 
propaganda, the devious tactics, and the bogus idealism” with political knowledge and 
political commitment. In fact, he continued, a school of politics had a crucial task in a 
period in which party programs and methods of government were easily confounded.15 
Likewise, his father Walter Simons stressed the role of the DHfP in overcoming political 
contrasts, deepening political knowledge, and strengthening the political sense of 
responsibility by including students of all political perspectives in its seminars,16 and thus 
highlighted the School’s contribution to political cooperation and sense of 
responsibility.17  
The appropriation of public funds, however, increased the influence of political 
elites on the School. The Office of the President discussed the political repercussions of 
Simons’s request for financial support with the Chancellery. Significantly, it was decided 
to appropriate a one-time grant because Prussia’s attempt to gain control over the 
composition of the DHfP faculty made “an intervention of the Chancellor desirable.”18 
The parliamentary debates in the spring of 1931 would confirm the politicization of the 
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appropriation of public funds to the DHfP. Numerous parties voted against a new 
appropriation of 100,000 M from the Ministry of the Interior.19 Opposition parties decried 
the “arrogance” of academics and suggested alternative uses for these funds,20 although 
the democratic supporters of the DHfP defended the grant.21 Jäckh could only express 
concern for the cuts of public funds and stress the vital role of the DHfP in developing 
courses in civic education.22   
The particular standing of the DHfP in post-war Germany had been rooted in 
Jäckh’s ability to insulate the School from party politics. During the opening ceremony, 
speakers had celebrated the School as a “free” endeavor, which was politically 
independent because it was outside the regular academic system. Private philanthropy 
had therefore guaranteed the freedom and independence of the DHfP in its first years of 
existence. Although close to the DDP, the major donor of the DHfP, Robert Bosch, never 
played a leading political role like the main supporter of the PK, Alfred Hugenberg, who 
became the chairman of the DNVP in 1928. In the second half of the 1920s, the decline 
of private funds therefore threatened the independence of the DHfP and public funds 
translated into an increased politicization of the DHfP, although the support from U.S. 
foundations guaranteed a certain level of independence.   
Against this background, the DHfP and the PK started to officially cooperate in 
1927. This, Martin Spahn later claimed, allowed the DHfP to justify the appropriation of 
public funds.23 The negotiations between Hans Simons and Spahn focused on the 	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composition of the new Board of Directors and of the Faculty Council, as well as on the 
involvement of PK faculty in the activities of the DHfP.24 Organizationally, they agreed 
that the two institutes would share the same rooms, and that the DHfP would publicize 
the PK activities in its bulletins and involve the PK faculty in its activities.25 In addition, 
the negotiators agreed that the DHfP would support the application of the PK when 
applying for public funds.26 Finally, Spahn and Otto Hoetzsch joined the Faculty Council, 
and two members of the DNVP and a third “trust man” became members of the new 
Board of Trustees.27 The regular communications between Spahn and Reinhold Quaatz – 
a leading politician of the DNVP and close to Hugenberg – testified to the interest of 
conservative political circles in the negotiations between the two institutes.28   
The cooperation between DHfP and PK epitomized the difficulties – and resulting 
ambivalences – of Germany’s liberal elites in integrating conservative groups into the 
political process. The leadership of the DHfP remained ambivalent toward Spahn and his 
associates, yet it sought to broaden the School’s cross-partisan appeal by cooperating 
with the PK. In a private letter to Arnold Wolfers, Hans Simons argued that, by keeping 
the connection with the PK looser than originally planned, it would be possible to gain 
the necessary influence on the PK without getting involved in its political activities.29 
These hopes to influence the young conservatives of the PK paralleled the attempt of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Aufzeichnungen über die Unterredung mit Ministerialrat Simons am 9.VII.1927. Enclosed in Martin 
Spahn to Reinhold Quaatz, July 13, 1927, BArch, R118/28. 
25 Abkommen zwischen der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik und dem Politischen Kolleg zur Schaffung 
einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft angeboten 1927, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Solger, F., Nr. 164.   
26 Abkommen zwischen der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik und dem Politischen Kolleg zur Schaffung 
einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft angeboten 1927, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Solger, F., Nr. 164. 
27 Abkommen zwischen der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik und dem Politischen Kolleg zur Schaffung 
einer Arbeitsgemeinschaft angeboten 1927, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Solger, F., Nr. 164. 
28 Reinhold Quaatz to Martin Spahn, May 25, 1927, BArch, R 118/28. 
29 Hans Simons to Arnold Wolfers, August 25, 1927, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303, Nr. 45. 
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Weimar’s political society to integrate into the political process parties and social strata 
that had initially opposed the republican form of government.  
The new composition of the Board of Trustees revealed the increased role of 
politics within the DHfP. The Board had been established in 1923-24 and, during its 
existence, would count in total nine or ten members from the DDP, seven from the SPD, 
seven from the Bavarian People’s Party (BVP), four from the DNVP, three from the 
DVP, and one from the Reich Party of the German Middle Class (WP).30 Its 
reorganization in 1927-28 confirmed the enhanced role of political elites in the School; a 
development that paralleled the cooperation with the PK and the appropriation of public 
funds. In fact, only three out of nineteen new members were not directly active in 
politics.31 While during the first two years, representatives from several ministries had 
personified the connection between the DHfP and political institutions, the new Board of 
Trustees emblematically testified – in its attempt to balance political representation – to 
the penetration of party politics in the School. 
The cooperation with the PK and the integration of conservative scholars into the 
DHfP signaled a significant change in the attitude of Jäckh and his associates. In the 
aftermath of World War One, they had conceptualized Überparteilichkeit as a political 
ethos, which made the working of a liberal democracy possible. Slowly, however, the 
original emphasis on the training of a new democratic leadership paved the path to a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Mielke, Einzigartig, 11. 
31 The new members were: Emil Berndt (DNVP), Otto Braun (SPD), Johann Viktor Bredt (WP), Carl 
Duisberg (IG Farben), Wilhelm Kahl (DVP), Ludwig Kastl (executive director of the Federal Organization 
of German Industry and delegate at the negotiations on the Dawes-Plan and on the Young-Plan), Eduard 
Hamm (DDP), Hermann Kuenzer (Liberal Union), Hugo von Lerchenfeld (BVP), Wilhelm Marx (Catholic 
Center Party), Franz von Mendelssohn (banker), Carl Petersen (DDP), Erich Pritwitz-Gaffron (member of 
the Advisory Council of the European Bureau of the CEIP), Reinhold Quaatz (DNVP), Werner Richter 
(SPD), Friedrich Saemisch (close to the DVP), Oswald Oskar Schneider (close to Gustav Stresemann), 
Georg Schreiber (Catholic Center Party), and Carl Severing (SPD).     
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more inclusive understanding of Überparteilichkeit. The leadership of the DHfP used the 
cooperation with the PK as a proof of its enhanced cross-partisanship. Emblematically, 
when requesting a contribution from the Prussian Ministry of Education, Hans Simons 
asserted that with the cooperation with the PK “it has been conclusively carried out the de 
facto integration of all parties into the School.”32 This cooperation points to a shift in the 
understanding of Überparteilichkeit, which now referred to an equal presence of political 
parties and ideological perspectives in the institute. This shift epitomized a more general 
weakness of the Weimar coalition parties. As Dietrich Orlow has argued for the case of 
Prussia, candidates ran not on party labels but as representatives of nonpartisan 
coalitions, which usually veiled combinations of various bourgeois parties, thus pointing 
to their lack of “vertical depth.”33  
The PK clear political orientation caused contrasts about both the use of public 
funds and organizational cooperation. At the end of 1927, the Ministry of the Interior had 
granted M 120,000 to the DHfP.34 Out of this sum, the PK received a one-time 
contribution of M 50,000.35 Spahn thus applied for additional funds and protested against 
the alleged lack of cooperation by the DHfP.36 However, the Ministry of the Interior 
perceived the close relationship between the PK and the DNVP as an obstacle for the 
appropriation of public funds.37 At the same time, Hans Simons repeatedly protested the 
absence of references to the cooperation between the two institutes in the bulletins that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Hans Simons to preussischer Minister für Wissenschaft, Kunst und Volksbildung, November 14, 1927, p. 
3, BArch, R4901/1445. 
33 Orlow, Weimar Prussia, 1925-1933, 30. 
34 Reichministerium des Innern to DHfP, December 8, 1927, BArch, R1501/125661. 
35 Martin Spahn to Hans Simons, April 21, 1928, BArch, R118/28, Hans Simons to Martin Spahn, April 24, 
1928, BArch, R118/28, and Hans Simons to Martin Spahn, April 24, 1928, BArch, R118/28. 
36 Martin Spahn to Staatssekretär Otto Meißner, February 14, 1929, BArch, R1501/125661, Hans Simons to 
Ministerialrat Werner Hoche, February 21, 1929, BArch, R1501/125661, and Hans Simons to Werner 
Hoche, March 7, 1929, BArch, R1501/125661. 
37 Ministerium des Innern, Vermerk, November 5, 1928, BArch, R1501/125661. 
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the PK regularly published.38 Thus, tensions punctuated the cooperation between the two 
institutes from the beginning. 
More importantly, the acrimonious debates that had involved the PK and the 
DHfP in the immediate aftermath of the war were now replicated within this working 
relationship. The conservative members of the PK attacked the pro-republican attitude of 
the DHfP and, as the only program explicitly supporting the democratic state, the “Civics 
Seminar” was inevitably at the center of these attacks. An unsigned article published in 
the conservative magazine Der Tag accused that, besides some few concessions to the 
right, the lecturers of the “Civics Seminar” were “more or less known propagandists” of 
the left.39 A few days later, Spahn reported additional complaints about the lack of 
“objectivity” and the discrimination against the right in the courses of the DHfP in a letter 
to Hans Simons.40 In addition, Kleo Pleyer recounted the hesitations of a “conservatively-
minded father” to send his son to the “Civics Seminar.”41 In reaction to these attacks, 
Johann Strunz stressed the cross-partisanship of the “Civics Seminar,”42 whereas Simons 
pointed out that civic education courses for young teachers by definition supported the 
republican state.43    
The Board of Trustees of the DHfP ended its cooperation with the PK in the 
summer of 1930. Declaring his agreement with the decision, the Reich Interior Minister 
Joseph Wirth saw the reasons of the break in the political positions of the PK, whose 
activities had focused on “certain right-oriented circles,” had excluded the DHfP, and had 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Hans Simons to Martin Spahn, October 12, 1928, BArch, R 118/28 and Hans Simons to Martin Spahn, 
27 April 1929, GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 303 Nr. 176. 
39 “Hochschule für Partei-Politik?” Der Tag, 19 March 1929, GStA PK, I.HA Rep. 303 Nr. 176.  
40 Martin Spahn to Hans Simons, March 23, 1929, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303, Nr. 176.  
41 Kleo Pleyer to Johann Strunz, May 10, 1929, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303, Nr. 166. 
42 Johann Strunz to Kleo Pleyer, May 11, 1929, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303, Nr. 166. 
43 Hans Simons to Martin Spahn, March 28, 1929, GStA PK, I.HA, Rep. 303 Nr. 176.  
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involved personalities who were known for their opposition to the government.44 Wirth 
referred to Spahn’s old associate Eduard Stadtler, who after his exclusion from the “June-
Club” had gravitated toward the Stahlhelm, which was a paramilitary organization close 
to the DNVP. In public speeches, Stadtler had compared the republican state to a “dung 
pile,”45 and had allegedly called for a “national revolution” that would overthrow the 
government, which he described as “the enemy” of the people.46     
The ensuing negotiations between Spahn and the DHfP leadership evolved around 
the notion of Überparteilichkeit. Spahn bewailed that the Board of Trustees had ended 
the relationship between the two institutes in the absence of representatives of the 
political right. Furthermore, he accused the DHfP of “political one-sidedness” and argued 
that Stadtler’s involvement in the activities of the PK had responded to the attempt to 
give space to all political perspectives.47 The Board eventually decided to hire Spahn and 
Pleyer, offer a temporary position to Karl Hoffmann, and provide Spahn with the 
necessary funds to cover the costs resulting from ending the cooperation.48 In addition, 
Adolf Grabowsky, Max H. Boehm, and Georg Cleinow remained associated with the 
DHfP as directors of research seminars. Significantly, the leadership of the DHfP insisted 
on the presence of representatives of the DNVP on the Board of Trustees, thus 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Joseph Wirth to Martin Spahn, May 5, 1930, pp. 2-3, BArch, R 118/28 
45 Generalstaatsanwalt to Preussischer Justizminister, December 13, 1928, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 
54143. Indicted through the Law for the Protection of the Republic, Stadtler successfully argued that his 
statements had been wrongfully reported and a lower court acquitted him. Upon the appeal of the public 
prosecutor, however, a second court revised the earlier ruling and fined Stadtler. Schoeffengericht zu 
Gollnow, Urteil, Geschaeftsnummer 2 M. J. 2089/28, January 31, 1929, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 
54143 and Landgericht in Stargerd, Urteil, Geschaeftsnummer 2 M. J. 2089/28, March 28, 1929, GStA PK, 
I. HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 54143. 
46 Transcript of Stadtler’s Speech, p. 11. Enclosed in Generalstaatsanwalt to Preussischer Justizminister, 
January 31, 1929, GStA PK, I. HA Rep. 84a, Nr. 55155. 
47 Martin Spahn to Joseph Wirth, May 9, 1930, BArch, R 118/28. In an earlier draft of this letter, Spahn had 
also explicitly decried the lack of Überparteilichkeit at the DHfP. Politische Kolleg, Entwurf. An den Herrn 
Reichsminister des Innerns, May 9, 1930, p. 3, BArch, R 118/23/Heft 5. 
48 Protokoll der Kuratoriumssitzung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, n.d., pp. 2-3, GStA PK, VI. HA 
Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 1103. 
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confirming the importance of preserving an equal presence of all political parties in the 
leading organ of the School.49 Nonetheless, Quaatz protested the decision to end the 
cooperation, argued that the DHfP was abandoning an inclusive, nonpartisan education, 
and – in protest – renounced his seat on the Board.50    
These developments paralleled the progressive involvement of U.S. philanthropic 
foundations with the DHfP. To a certain degree, therefore, the School’s outward 
projected image of being a democratic stronghold did not reflect the increasing influence 
of conservatives within its ranks and liberals’ growing skepticism toward the 
parliamentary system. At the same time, the DHfP gradually shifted from being an 
institute devoted to vocational training and civic education to an academic center that 
emphasized research and foreign affairs. American grants made this transformation 
possible, which initially reflected the School’s leadership conviction that its domestic 
objectives had been successfully fulfilled. From this perspective, the cooperation with the 
PK testified to liberals’ trust in the stability of political institutions and the belief that 
anti-parliamentary forces could be successfully integrated in the political process.  
Against the background of a new radicalization of the socio-political conflicts in 
the late 1920s, the public intellectuals associated with the DHfP again multiplied their 
efforts to address Germany’s crisis, as they had done during the war and in its immediate 
aftermath. Hans Simons and Carl H. Becker were part of the leadership of the Abraham 
Lincoln Foundation, which was initiated by the Rockefeller Foundation and soon 
developed as a private initiative that complemented the efforts of federal agencies to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Arnold Wolfers to Kleo Pleyer, June 6, 1930, BArch, R 118/23/ Heft 4 and Kleo Pleyer to Arnold 
Wolfers, June 18, 1930, BArch, R 118/23/Heft 4. 
50 Protokoll der Kuratoriumssitzung der Deutschen Hochschule für Politik, n.d., GStA PK, VI. HA Nl 
Becker, C. H., Nr. 1103. 
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support a genuinely democratic spirit in Germany.51 In addition, Jäckh became the 
driving force behind the establishment of a Stresemann Memorial Foundation and a 
Peace Academy, which confirmed the gradual turn toward research and international 
relations of the leadership of the German School of Politics. 
The Abraham Lincoln Foundation relied on the work and support of many of the 
personalities that had been involved with the DHfP. In fact, Becker became president of 
the foundation and a Presidential Committee appointed Hans Simons and Reinhold 
Schairer as executive directors. With the help of around one hundred confidential 
advisers throughout Germany and committees of selection, Simons and Schairer 
identified and supported gifted persons who, because of the difficulties of the times, were 
not able to fully develop their potential.52 The list of confidential advisers included 
Bäumer, Bergstraesser, Bonn, Haas, Heller, Hoetzsch, Mennicke, and Walter Simons and 
thus confirmed the involvement of numerous personalities associated with the DHfP.53  
Although initially an American project, the Abraham Lincoln Foundation soon 
became a German endeavor. The LSRM had appointed Geoffrey W. Young to study the 
development of the humanities in Europe. In October 1926, Young had submitted his 
study with a proposal to establish a foundation in Germany that aimed to support 
potential future leaders in the humanities.54 The Executive Committee of the LSRM put 
thirty thousand dollars at Young’s disposal for a three-year period, but stressed that the 
new organization should be “an indigenous one” and hence insisted on the Memorial’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 For a full account of the history and background of the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung see Malcolm 
Richardson, Jürgen Reulecke, and Frank Trommler, eds., Weimars transatlantischer Mäzen: die Lincoln-
Stiftung 1927 bis 1934. Ein Versuch demokratischer Elitenförderung in der Weimarer Republik (Essen: 
Klartext Verlag, 2008).  
52 Project History, n.d., folder 159, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
53 Mitglieder des Vertrauenskreises, folder 159, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
54 Project History, n.d., folder 159, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
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“complete anonymity.”55 Nonetheless, the founding committee decided to acknowledge 
the American support as well as the intention of the new organization by naming it after 
Abraham Lincoln.56  
Simons and Schairer were able to impose their organizational approach, 
notwithstanding Young’s energetic leadership style.57 Simons and Schairer explicitly 
favored a flexible style based on informal contacts.58 They argued that this approach was 
valuable because, with the weakening of Germany’s social fabric, there was a “particular 
readiness to make trials of new ideas, and a greater eagerness to uncover new forces and 
new social forms.”59 Consequently, they asserted the need to support talented individuals 
who “are the better able to accommodate themselves to serving society,”60 and whose 
work was of “practical and profitable service to the community.”61 The leadership of the 
Abraham Lincoln Foundation aimed to support individuals who had a natural attitude for 
the engagement for the broader community. The goals of the Abraham Lincoln 
Foundation therefore paralleled the efforts of the DHfP. 
Like the DHfP, the Abraham Lincoln Foundation developed at the critical 
intersection between private and public initiatives. The explicit aim of the foundation was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Beardsley Ruml to Geoffrey W. Young, June 13, 1927, folder 159, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF 
Archives, RAC. 
56 Reinhold Schairer, Niederschrift. Über den Verlauf der von Minister Dufour-Feronce einberufenen 
Sitzung zwecks Schaffung eines deutschen Komitees für die Amerikanische begabte-Stiftung, n.d. 
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58 Hans Simons to Carl H. Becker, February 10, 1928, BArch, R 4901/1155.  
59 Reinhold Schairer and Hans Simons, “Report,” in Abraham Lincoln Stiftung, First Year’s Report, p. 1, 
folder 160, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC.   
60 Reinhold Schairer and Hans Simons, “Report,” in Abraham Lincoln Stiftung, First Year’s Report, p. 5, 
folder 160, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
61 Reinhold Schairer and Hans Simons, “Report,” in Abraham Lincoln Stiftung, First Year’s Report, p. 2, 
folder 160, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
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to serve a “vast complementary area” to the one covered by public institutions and take 
“risks upon which a State System may not venture.”62 To this end, it aimed to support 
“the type of personality … which is born for original thought or active leadership, but is 
deprived by circumstances of the opportunity to develop the one, or assert the other.”63 
The foundation developed a close relationship with the Reich Ministries of Education and 
of the Interior. Becker reportedly regarded it as “an auxiliary cultural agency, filling a 
gap of which he was already cognizant,” whereas Carl Severing saw its value in 
supporting social mobility.64 Accordingly, Young concluded his first year’s report by 
stating that the Foundation had “become a ‘quasi-State’ organization.”65 The Abraham 
Lincoln Foundation and the DHfP typified organizations developing at the crucial 
intersection between private initiative and public action.  
The relationship with German philanthropists and American philanthropic 
foundations guaranteed a certain level of political independence. The case of the German 
School of Politics, however, shows that U.S. foundations influenced the development of 
the DHfP through their grants. In part, the School’s increasing emphasis on research and 
foreign relations paralleled the interests of American financial supporters. While 
establishing the Stresemann Memorial Foundation and the Peace Academy, Jäckh was 
well aware of the interest of the Rockefeller Foundation in the development of institutes 
devoted to the study of international problems. He therefore strategically contacted the 
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folder 160, box 17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC.  
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European representatives of American foundations in order to secure funds for his new 
endeavors. Paradoxically, however, the relationship with American financial supporters 
also caused tension with German political elites, who believed that they had been by-
passed by Jäckh.  
On October 2, 1930, a Founding Assembly put Jäckh in charge of developing two 
new organizations devoted to the scientific study of international relations, the 
Stresemann Memorial Foundation and the Peace Academy.66 The Foundation aimed to 
“serve the balancing of international tensions and to form among the nations mutual 
understanding for foreign nature and interests” by supporting both directly and indirectly 
scientific research.67 In Jäckh’s intentions, the goal of the Stresemann Memorial 
Foundation was to stimulate and support endeavors in the field of foreign relations and 
facilitate the interaction of personalities interested in peace studies. Consequently, he 
conceived the Peace Academy as a working group of personalities (rather than an 
institute) investigating political problems.68 Since the inception, the Founding Assembly 
had, however, decided to avoid publicity and to keep the activities of the Peace Academy 
“quiet” because of Germany’s contentious political environment.69 
In a well-established strategy, Jäckh had unofficially contacted the European 
representatives of the Rockefeller Foundation in the spring of 1930. John van Sickle had 
met with August W. Fehling in Berlin in February 1930 with the goal of exploring the 
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possibility to establish an Institute of International Studies. Although he stressed that the 
“time was not yet ripe,” Fehling announced that an “important person had consulted him 
confidentially” regarding similar plans.70 In mid-April, Fehling revealed that Jäckh was 
the driving force behind this initiative.71 Notwithstanding these initial contacts, however, 
the RF was not involved in the establishment of the Stresemann Foundation and the 
Peace Academy, which – as Fehling communicated to Sickle – were nonetheless 
launched with American support.72 
Jäckh had also established contacts with Nicholas M. Butler who facilitated the 
establishment of the Stresemann Memorial Foundation. Jäckh’s regular updates to Butler 
confirm the deep interest of the president of the CEIP in the plans for the establishment of 
the Peace Academy.73 In a broadcasted appeal in the United States on June 21, Julius 
Curtius, Germany’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, stressed the “community of purpose” 
that existed between Germany and the United States and announced the intention to 
establish a Peace Academy.74 In a letter to the editor of the New York Times, Butler 
celebrated Curtius’s “splendid and epoch-making words” and asked for public support to 
the Peace Academy.75  
Butler established an American “Stresemann-Memorial-Committee,” which had 
the goal of raising funds for the German institute and included an impressive list of 	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diplomats and politicians.76 These plans, however, collapsed in the wake of the economic 
crisis.77 In fact, already before Curtius’s address, Butler had warned that the economic 
crisis would likely impact the American Committee’s fundraising efforts.78  Nonetheless, 
Butler made possible a one-time grant of M 100,000 from the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.79 With the failure of Butler’s Committee, the founding circle of the 
Stresemann Foundation turned back to the RF.80 Aware that an Institute of International 
Relations was an old plan of RF officers, Jäckh expressed his confidence that the RF 
would welcome the new Foundation.81 In fact, the RF appropriated a grant of $25,000.82    
Germany’s political elites manifested their interest in Jäckh’s new endeavor. In 
November 1930, Chancellor Heinrich Brüning congratulated Jäckh’s success in 
establishing an independent institute that was named after Stresemann.83 Surprised by 
Brüning’s knowledge about the Stresemann Memorial, Jäckh asked for a phone meeting 
with Hermann Pünder (State Secretary in the Reich Chancellery) to discuss the “political 
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development” of the Peace Academy.84 By the end of the year, Jäckh reported that both 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Foreign Office had declared their agreement with the 
by-laws of his new organizations.85 A year after, however, Reich Interior Minister Joseph 
Wirth protested against the exclusion of the his ministry from the activities of the 
Stresemann Memorial and threatened repercussions on the DHfP.86 According to Jäckh’s 
account, Wirth was dissatisfied with the exclusion of political figures from the activities 
of the Stresemann Memorial. In a letter to Wirth, Jäckh stressed that the Rockefeller 
Foundation had explicitly requested the exclusion of politicians and would have 
withdrawn its support in front of “political names.”87 While he justified his actions with 
RF policies, Jäckh shared the approach of his American financial supporters that viewed 
“objective” research as a guarantee for his two new endeavors’ nonpartisanship.         
The Abraham Lincoln Foundation, the German School of Politics, and the 
Stresemann Memorial Foundation and Peace Academy exemplify German public 
intellectuals’ attempt to influence public affairs through private initiatives. In a 
development that is typical of German voluntary organizations, these organizations relied 
on private philanthropy but maintained a high degree of interaction with the state, and 
often this relationship fluctuated between a tacit form of coercion and a voluntary one of 
cooperation. The contrasts between Wirth and Jäckh also point to the limits of these 
intellectuals’ conception of nonpartisanship. By rejecting the involvement of politicians 
and political institutions, Jäckh aimed to secure his organizations amid the rapid 	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radicalization of German society. In so doing, however, he favored the progressive 
penetration of conservative and right-wing forces in liberal and democratic institutions.         
The Withering Away of Civil Society and the End of the “Politics of Civility.”  
 
Germany’s political society shifted to the right even before the economic crisis of 
1929. The stabilization of the Weimar Republic had paved the path to a reorganization of 
conservative forces. Elected chairman in October 1928, the industrialist and supporter of 
both the Politische Kolleg and the “June-Club,” Alfred Hugenberg, guided the DNVP on 
a course of opposition to the republic. At the same time, changes in the chairmanship of 
the DVP and the Catholic Center Party testified to a general shift to the right. 
Furthermore, the emergence in the second half of the 1920s of special interest parties 
signaled the inability of Germany’s more established bourgeois parties to contain the 
contrasting interests of their constituencies. These transformations signaled the gradual 
dissolution of the parliamentary system.88      
In the second half of the 1920s, the DHfP became the venue for an emblematic 
debate over the form of the German state. In several lectures held at the DHfP, the 
conservative Carl Schmitt and the social democrat Herman Heller proposed radically 
contrasting analyses of the Weimar Republic, although both accused an earlier generation 
of legal scholars of ignoring crucial questions on the legality and legitimacy of political 
institutions.89 Two of their most original contributions – Schmitt’s “The Concept of the 
Political” and Heller’s “Political Democracy and Social Homogeneity” – appeared in a 
volume edited by Arnold Wolfers, which was emblematically titled Problems of 	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Democracy.90 Heller regularly taught at the DHfP, where he was part of a younger 
generation of pro-democracy scholars.91 By contrast, Schmitt was not directly associated 
to the School, although an attempt had been made to hire him.92  
Schmitt’s critique of the parliamentary system became extremely influential in the 
second half of the 1920s. Democracy, he argued, rested on a series of identities that could 
be subsumed under the defining one between the people and the law. Societies were an 
integrated unity of identical individuals, and therefore the restoration of the unity 
between rulers and the ruled was possible only if the identity of the collectivity inspired 
those in command.93 Schmitt, however, decoupled democracy from parliamentarism. 
Based on openness and discussion, parliamentarism, Schmitt observed, contradicted mass 
democracy, which had made public discussion an “empty and trivial formality.”94 Mass 
democracy had made liberal institutions obsolete because they could not embody the will 
of the people (and hence ensure the identity between governed and governing).95 
Consequentially, Schmitt concluded, “dictatorial and Caesaristic methods not only can 
produce the acclamation of the people but can also be a direct expression of democratic 
substance and power.”96 Schmitt’s emphasis on the legitimization of authority by 
acclamation thus represents a justification of authoritarian rule based on social 
homogeneity.  
Heller also recognized the general crisis of democracy, which he rooted in the 
tension between political unity and social multiplicity. He rejected Schmitt’s assertion 	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that the basic criterion of politics was the distinction between “friend” and “enemy,”97 
because doing so would dismiss the formation of unity out of multiplicity as 
“nonpolitical.”98 Rejecting Schmitt’s definition, he grounded the parliament in “the belief 
in the existence of a common discussion ground and, with it, the possibility of fair play 
with the opponent in domestic politics, with whom it is believed possible to reach an 
agreement with the elimination of naked violence.”99 Democracy, Heller concluded, 
required a certain level of “social homogeneity,” which would create a common ground 
for a civil debate with the enemy and hence not be aimed at the physical destruction of 
the opponent. He defined “social homogeneity” as a “socio-psychological condition,” in 
which an “us-consciousness” integrated the contrasting interests that necessarily exist in a 
modern society.100            
Heller drew attention to the intrinsic limit of a conception of civil society based 
on civility. Like Jäckh and his closest associates, he grounded the good working of a 
liberal democracy in the praxis of accepting the enemy as a political adversary. If 
intended as the “politics of civility,” the concept of Überparteilichkeit pointed to the need 
to create a common ground regulating and containing socio-political conflicts. By 
conceptualizing Überparteilichkeit as an equal presence of political parties, however, 
these intellectuals renounced efforts to bridge German society’s socio-political tensions 
and trusted political society’s ability to integrate all political positions. In doing so, they 
participated in public debates seeking new democratic forms that would better ensure – to 
use Schmitt’s terminology – the identity between governing and governed. 	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Consequentially, they would support governments that, in their view, could legitimately 
bypass the gridlocked parliament because they were rooted in the extraordinary powers 
that Article 48 granted to a democratically elected Reich president.               
The leadership of the DHfP had initially trusted the republic’s ability to provide 
such common ground. Theodor Heuss had voiced this confidence and ridiculed the 
leadership principle. 101 Although aware of parliamentary critics’ call for “action,” Heuss 
argued that these anti-parliamentary movements would faint by participating in 
democratic processes because “the ‘deed’ … loses its suggestive power if entombed in 
manifests and speeches, in statutes and brochures.”102 Heuss thus expressed liberals’ 
common belief that political praxis and the sharing of responsibility would inevitably 
neutralize anti-parliamentary forces. At the same time, however, Heuss linked the 
stability of a democratic state to the solidity of its political institutions rather than to the 
pre-conditions of democracy, that is, civil society.     
Conservative members of the Jäckh circle, however, had renewed the criticism of 
the parliamentary system and the resulting fragmentation of German society already in 
the mid-1920s. Liberal political institutions appeared unable to bridge the tension 
between private interest and the common good, hence creating a “formal” rather than a 
“real” democracy.103 Voluntary associations reinforced societal fragmentation because 
they were trapped in “the hypnosis of juxtapositions,”104 whereas “vulgarity and 
meanness” dominated the political discussions in public assemblies.105 These intellectuals 
stressed the need to search for new forms of societal organization by pointing to the 	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failure of both voluntary associations and political institutions to bridge socio-political 
conflicts.  
In the last years of the Weimar Republic, the intellectuals associated with the 
DHfP (like most Germans) participated in a public debate over the future form of the 
German state. Heller wryly noted that most Germans agreed on the necessity to reform 
the Constitution,106 yet he continued to stress its successes and warn against the risks of 
dictatorial systems.107 Without the hesitations of his Social Democratic colleague, Otto 
Hoetzsch pointed to the difficulties of forming stable governments in Germany, and 
concluded, “We Germans are still in search of a system of government entirely suitable 
for us and adapted to all presuppositions which determine, once for all, our political 
being.”108 Even more explicitly, the Spahn group argued that the identity between ruler 
and ruled had to be created “from above,” that is, the government must seek the approval 
of the nation after acting because only an independent conduct of the state could free 
Germany from chaos and anarchy.109 The conservative faculty members of the DHfP thus 
voiced the general turn toward plebiscitary forms of democracy.  
In March 1930, President von Hindenburg entrusted Heinrich Brüning, leader of 
the Catholic Center Party, to form the new government. Although previous governments 
had ruled by presidential emergency decrees, the Brüning governments from the fall of 
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1930 to May 1932 signaled the clear intention to reform Germany’s political system in an 
authoritarian way. The results of the September 1930 elections confirmed the crisis of the 
parliamentary system. Liberal parties’ share of the popular vote fell from 23 percent in 
the national elections of 1919 to 8.4 percent in September 1930. By comparison, the 
NSDAP moved from a mere 2.6 percent in 1928 to a startling 18.3 percent in 1930, 
which made it the second largest party in the parliament after the SPD (with 24.5 
percent). The electoral successes of both the NSDAP, whose significant successes in 
regional elections had anticipated the September landslide, and of the Communist Party 
(with 13.1 percent) confirmed the radicalization of German society.110  
Emblematically, the liberal circles around the DHfP and Jäckh supported 
Brüning’s reliance on presidential authority, thus confirming the general authoritarian 
turn of political culture. Already before Brüning’s nomination to chancellor, Heuss and 
Friedrich Meinecke had voiced liberals’ call for a strong head of state who would counter 
parliament’s factionalism. In a discussion that had followed a lecture by Alexander 
Rüstow at the DHfP in July 1929, Heuss expressed his support to a strong president who 
was endowed with a direct political function rooted in its plebiscitary nature.111 Similarly, 
Meinecke stressed the necessity to strengthen state’s power and pointed to the role of the 
president in countering “party egoism.”112  
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Most explicitly, in his role of unofficial envoy of the “New Germany,” Jäckh 
defended Brüning’s authoritarian turn by stressing that his authority was grounded in the 
Constitution and based on the consent of the people.113 He described Brüning as a 
“philosopher-statesman,” whose leadership was rooted in a genuine internationalism and 
a “Christian ethic.”114 During one of his journeys in the United States, the German 
Consulate in San Francisco noted that Jäckh’s positive analysis of the Brüning 
government served to reassure the American audience in regard to the stability of 
Germany’s democracy.115 Also in his correspondence with Rockefeller Foundation 
officers Jäckh voiced his “confidence in Germanys [sic] order and development.”116     
The leadership of the DHfP had gradually lost faith in a pluralistic civil society 
supporting the liberal parliamentary system. Jäckh also viewed President von 
Hindenburg’s decision to dismiss Brüning in May 1932 as a necessity for a nation that 
appeared on the edge of a civil war. Under the influence of a small group of conservative 
notables and personalities, von Hindenburg entrusted Franz von Papen to form the new 
government. Papen ruled through emergency decrees and consciously aimed to transform 
the republic into a plebiscitary dictatorship. Jäckh rejected, however, the notion that the 
new government was reactionary and argued that it was “conservative” in the sense of “a 
government aiming at conserving, consolidating, fortifying the existing state, the 
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republic.”117 In a confidential memorandum, he detailed the plan of general Kurt von 
Schleicher and von Hindenburg to “eliminate” parliamentary democracy “for a short 
time” in order to resist the combined pressures of National Socialism and bolshevism.118  
In an address at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Wolfers similarly 
rejected gloomy visions of Germany’s transformation and defended the authoritarian 
political turn. He linked the weakness of the Weimar Constitution to the proportional 
system of representation, the hostile opposition of the nationalist parties, and the 
perception that the Constitution was a product of the military defeat. He justified the 
decision to “govern by ordinance” by arguing that the president had to make a choice 
between “the non-working Democratic Parliament and the still unshaken Democratic 
authority of the President-elect.” Although he did not support dictatorship or a restoration 
of the monarchy, Wolfers did not believe in a return to the Weimar Constitution, which – 
he argued – had to be reformed by establishing a First Chamber able to balance the power 
of the parliament, solving the dualism between Prussia and the Reich, and modifying the 
electoral system.119 
The general authoritarian turn and the Cabinet Papen contributed to the new 
prominence of Heinrich von Gleichen and the Herrenklub. During the last months of the 
republic, observers described Gleichen as the “manager” who determined all political 
events in Germany.120 The Herrenklub was the center of a network of associations and 
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magazines that could not easily be aligned to a specific political party.121 By March 1926, 
it had around 250 members and focused on publishing activities, and aimed to influence 
both industry and academia.122 Although allegedly nonpartisan, the group was close to 
the wealthy elites and “right-leaning circles.”123 In fact, it “serve[d] the social gathering 
of nationally-oriented personalities” and was rooted in the willingness for a personal 
commitment for the common good.124   
Gleichen had been reorganizing extra-parliamentary opposition since the abrupt 
end of the “June-Club” and the downgrading of the Politische Kolleg. He dismissed 
democracy as the “organized influence of moody masses on the state without political 
sense and goal,” which embodied the influence of a variety of interests – mostly 
economic – on state affairs.125 Gleichen thus sought a conservatism of the Persönlichkeit 
that could overcome the limits of a mass democracy. Consequentially, he concluded, 
“State and nation require a system of domination, and indeed a rule of the few, who 
maintain in front of the mass their independence and superiority.”126 Gleichen stressed 
the need for a new independent and revolutionary leadership, which could restore the 
power of the state in a way that liberal political institutions could not. He argued that the 
relationship between state and nation was broken because the Weimar Republic was a 
foreign imposition and, at the same time, by evolving into a social state, did not represent 
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the entirety of the nation.127 Accordingly, he sought a new elite able to link the masses to 
the state, because the people required an upper class to become a nation.  
Gleichen and his long-time associate Walter Schotte viewed Papen as the 
personification of this independent political leadership. The total independence of the 
political leadership was at the center of their political worldview. From this perspective, 
they criticized Brüning who had not used his powers to radically reform Reich and 
Constitution,128 and had hence guaranteed the survival of the Weimar system by 
continuing to “play the comedy.”129 By contrast, they viewed the Cabinet Papen as free of 
the bounds of political parties and thus able to overcome party politics.130 Schotte, who 
Heller denounced as Papen’s “apologist,”131 celebrated the new government as something 
“fundamentally new” that fought against the parties and therefore against the Weimar 
Republic and was solely grounded in state’s authority, that is, in the responsibility for its 
actions out of its power.132   
In the second half of the 1920s, Heller and Schmitt had conceptually clarified the 
debate over the relationship between civil society and democracy. The intellectual circles 
that had formed around Gleichen and Jäckh interpreted, mediated, and adapted these 
political constructs. Drawing on Schmitt, Gleichen and Schotte viewed Papen as the 
independent leader that could impose the identity between ruler and ruled from above and 
thus isolate the detrimental influence of intermediary organizations. By contrast, Heller 
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was part of a group of younger scholars including Hans Simons, Sigmund Neumann, and 
Albert Salomon close to the SPD whose influence within the DHfP gradually declined.133 
At the same time, Jäckh and his associates turned toward authoritarian solutions to 
Germany’s socio-political crisis and supported the government by emergency decrees 
under Brüning and von Papen. 
While Gleichen’s endorsement of Papen responded to a deep-seated skepticism of 
civil society’s pluralistic nature, Jäckh’s support to Brüning and Papen pointed to the 
intrinsic limits of civil society. Gleichen and Schotte negated the premises of civil 
society, that is, a pluralistic conception of society that, through the institutionalization of 
conflict, allowed all social strata’s participation in public affairs. By contrast, the circle 
around Jäckh grew aware that associations, political institutions, and the “politics of 
civility” were unable to bridge socio-political conflicts and effectively resist the pressure 
of extremist propaganda. In their view, the emergency decrees were the threatened 
republic’s last defense and not – as Gleichen and Schotte explicitly argued – a tool to 
dismantle the Weimar Republic of its liberal, and thus pluralistic, institutions. As a 
concept based on civility, tolerance, and compromise, civil society had rested on the 
stability of the political framework, that is, the ability of the political system to provide a 
common ground for the negotiation of socio-political conflicts. Civil society was 
defenseless if not provided with the means to resist powerful threats. The support of 
extraordinary powers of the president responded to the awareness of civil society’s 
weakness.  	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The November 1930 celebration for the ten-year anniversary of the School 
revealed the ambivalences of the School’s leadership in addressing Germany’s problems. 
Celebrated by the liberal press,134 for the last time, the School restated the centrality of 
the “politics of civility,” although aware that it was doing so from inside the “parliament 
of political passion.”135 Jäckh again rejected the notion of politics as a “nasty song or 
buzzword phraseology,”136 and Wolfers reaffirmed Überparteilichkeit as a “valuable 
delving” into one’s own point of view through the analysis of all other “serious 
viewpoints.”137 At the same time, however, Brüning celebrated the School as the “focal 
point … for Germany’s intellectual and spiritual reconstruction,”138 and Richard Schmidt 
from the University of Leipzig gave the keynote address on “The Leadership Problem in 
the Modern Democracy.”139 
The DHfP was able to guarantee the peaceful interaction among increasingly 
politicized university students. Like in other German universities, students organized 
along party lines, although the leadership of the DHfP forbade membership in political 
parties to students of some of the School’s programs.140 Nonetheless, all political 
directions were represented in the Student Assembly’s elections between 1930 and 1933. 
In contrast to other universities, however, the Nazi Student Party was unable to make 	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significant inroads in the student body and left-oriented groups maintained a clear 
majority.141 The Nazi Student Party’s weakness is not surprising since the DHfP had been 
identified with the republic since its establishment in October 1920.142 The absence of 
riots between Communists and Nazis could have also depended – as some 
contemporaries suggested – on the fact that, because of the School’s low academic 
standing, enrolled students were genuinely interested in the study of politics.143 
Nonetheless, the Nazi Student Party increased its activities and compelled other student 
groups to react,144 hence forcing the leadership of the School to counter students’ rapid 
radicalization.145   
The DHfP was an exception against the background of violent clashes at German 
universities. The liberal press celebrated the School as a place where students learned that 
it was possible to find a common ground for discussion even with the most radical 
political or ideological adversary.146 The RF officers also noted that the School did not 
witness the riots and disturbances of other universities.147 This was a remarkable success 
considering that enrollments in the main course of study had steadily increased since the 	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reorganizations of the academic program.148 According to the School’s leadership, this 
responded to the general interest in political education and testified to the high regard of 
all parties, “from the Communists to the National Socialists,” for the DHfP,149 although 
high levels of unemployment surely contributed to the increased levels of enrollment.150 
The DHfP therefore claimed success in instilling in its students a spirit of “scientific 
Überparteilichkeit.”151  
While Jäckh and the leadership of the DHfP were able to maintain a level of 
perceived normality within their institute, civility swiftly broke down in Germany’s 
public sphere. Paramilitary groups and street fights became new forms of socialization,152 
and violence served as a creative force by creating a moral distance between militants and 
a despised bourgeois civil society.153 These dynamics were part of a political culture that 
legitimized violence and, by labeling as outcasts political opponents, restricted the public 
space. While arguably political violence remained limited, the discourses surrounding it 
paved the path for a slow but progressive radicalization.154 Quite consequentially, this 
celebration of militant associational life narrowed the gap with the activism of the Nazi 
movement.155  
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By the late 1920s, and in particular with the worsening of the economic crisis, 
National Socialists rapidly penetrated all spheres of social life across Germany. In some 
areas, such as the Black Forest, the collapse of the organizational infrastructure of the 
bourgeois camp created an associational vacuum that favored the successes of the 
NSDAP.156 By contrast, in the case of the city of Marburg, Rudy Koshar described the 
infiltration of social organizations by Nazi activists as a “routine social process” that 
reproduced general patters of joining associations.157 Similarly, also William Allan 
detailed the poisonous mixture of mass meetings, paramilitary parades, entertainment 
evenings, and auxiliary organizations that transformed the Nazi party from a fringe 
faction into a well-organized group in the city of Northeim.158 The Nazi party thus 
manifested a high degree of adaptability to the local context. 
In a time of heightened social and political conflict, attempts to limit and contain 
political factionalism with social organizations became hard. In this context, the 
distinction between political discussion and political passion became more difficult to 
maintain. While the School of Politics was relatively successful in doing so within its 
four walls, it had clearly taken on too large of a task at the national level. Celebrating its 
successes, Jäckh suggested expanding the model of the DHfP and organizing with other 
universities special courses that could counter political radicalization across Germany.159 
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At the same time Heuss in his typical, dispassionate style, analyzed the rise to power of 
Hitler’s movement.160  
In this context, research and foreign affairs had an integrative political function. 
With the political radicalization and the increasing tensions within the DHfP, both 
research and foreign policy were less controversial than civic education and practical 
training. Objective research was deemed politically neutral and therefore above political 
factionalism. Furthermore, foreign affairs provided a common ground for both liberal and 
conservative faculty members who, to a large degree, agreed on the ultimate goals of 
foreign policy. As a result, those programs that directly supported the democratic state 
(such as Strunz’s “Civics Seminar”) were at the center of conservatives’ attack.  
With the stabilization of the Weimar Republic, Germany’s intellectual elites had 
turned their attention to foreign affairs. They aimed to promote national objectives that 
would satisfy both the German and the international audience. At the same time, 
however, this emphasis on foreign policy goals facilitated the inclusion of intellectuals 
from all German parties, who all shared the commitment to the recovery of Germany’s 
international status. Jäckh recognized that most parties agreed on Germany’s general 
foreign policy goals.161 The emphasis on the international tasks thus could create bridges 
between the liberal leadership of the DHfP and its conservative faculty members. 
The case of Otto Hoetzsch epitomizes the integrative function of foreign affairs. 
Hoetzsch had first symbolized the gradual alignment of the PK to the DNVP and now 
personified conservatives’ penetration in the DHfP. Like Jäckh and his associates, 
Hoetzsch linked Germany’s fate to Europe’s destiny and argued that World War One had 	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transformed Europe into a “beggar.”162 While Hoetzsch stressed the necessity to revise 
the Treaty of Versailles in order to “establish real and lasting peace in Europe,” he 
reassured his international audience that this must be achieved “by peaceful means and 
[in] a peaceful way, of course.”163 Hoetzsch personified the distrust in the League of 
Nations, which he rooted in the injustices of the Versailles Treaty.164 With the liberal 
leadership of the DHfP, Hoetzsch participated in the efforts to present the “New 
Germany” abroad and, as a member of the DNVP, symbolized the integration of all 
political parties in the DHfP and – by extension – in the political system of the Weimar 
Republic.  
By the late 1920s therefore the relationship between foreign and domestic policy 
changed. In the aftermath of World War One, German intellectual elites had focused on 
domestic relationships. Internal stabilization was conceived as the precondition for a new, 
energetic foreign policy. Adolf Grabowsky restated the theoretical primacy of foreign 
affairs over domestic policy against a younger generation of scholars who pointed to the 
domestic function of foreign policy.165 The shift in the meaning of Überparteilichkeit, 
however, stresses that the re-affirmed primacy of foreign affairs did not exclusively 
depend on the faith in domestic stabilization. Rather, foreign policy goals became the 
common ground for the integration of intellectuals with radically contrasting perspectives 
on Germany’s political organization.  
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In the second half of the 1920s, the initial focus on domestic politics and political 
education paved the path to a primacy of foreign affairs, which increasingly became the 
field of competency of radical nationalist scholars.166 Grabowsky, Boehm, and Cleinow 
(respectively directors of the Geo-Political Seminar, Deutschtumseminar, and Euro-Asian 
Seminar) developed an aggressively nationalist approach to foreign affairs, which was 
grounded in the ambiguous concept of Germandom and in the relationship between Volk 
and “space.”167 Emblematically, these conservative faculty members authored numerous 
contributions in a volume celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the DHfP, and thus 
symbolized conservatives’ successful penetration in the School of Politics.168 
The shift in the meaning of Überparteilichkeit points to the gradual abandonment 
of a conception of civil society based on civility. By providing practical knowledge, 
courses in public affairs could not only free Germans from the blinders of ideologies, but 
also instill in them an ethos that would help viewing the political enemy as an opponent 
with an equal right to participate in the political process. From this perspective, the good 
working of a liberal democracy depended on the development of the “politics of civility.” 
This conception of civil society recognized the unavoidability of conflicts in a modern 
society, and even encouraged them within the framework of liberal political institutions. 
The penetration of party politics in the DHfP and the inability to bridge these contrasts 
led to an emphasis on foreign affairs. The focus on foreign policy and on 
Überparteilichkeit as equal presence of political parties symbolized the shift towards an 
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attempt to by-pass conflicts, hence renouncing the idea of institutionalizing them because 
of the fear that they would tear apart Germany’s tenuous political equilibrium.  
Ernst Jäckh between the Nazi Regime, American Philanthropy, and Exile 
 
In the months before the Nazi seizure of power, Germany’s elites did not find a 
political solution to the economic crisis. The governments under Brüning and von Papen 
were unable to win popular support. By contrast, in the election of July 31, 1932, the 
Nazi party confirmed its electoral success of September 1930 and became the largest 
political party with 37.3 percent of the votes. The NSDAP remained Germany’s most 
powerful political force, although its share of the votes declined to 33.1 percent in the 
November elections following von Papen’s failure to form a new government. In fact, 
even President von Hindenburg’s close aide, General Kurt von Schleicher, was unable to 
form a broad government coalition in December 1932. As a result, after negotiations 
between von Papen and Hitler, President von Hindenburg nominated Hitler chancellor 
and von Papen vice-chancellor on January 31, 1933.  
In his analysis of German political scientists during these fateful months, Rainer 
Eisfeld has reserved pages of acerbic criticism to Ernst Jäckh. He denounced Jäckh’s 
efforts to portray himself as an uncompromising bulwark of liberalism and detailed his 
readiness to compromise with Germany’s new political leadership.169 Jäckh’s egotistical 
personality and his self-celebratory accounts explain the sharpness of this criticism. 
Jäckh’s ambivalent attitude to the new regime, however, was more than a personal 
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attitude to accommodation or an example of individual, political bankruptcy. In fact, 
Jäckh personifies the weakness of a conception of civil society grounded in the “politics 
of civility.”           
Like most of the intellectuals at the center of this study, Jäckh trusted the capacity 
of political institutions to neutralize oppositional political forces by forcing them to take 
political responsibility. Speaking at London’s Chatham House on February 6, 1933, he 
explained that the Hitler-Papen government had forced Hitler to assume political 
responsibility, as had been done in the past with Gustav Stresemann and the SPD.170 
Consistently, he pursued the same strategy within the DHfP.171 Emblematically, Jäckh 
wrote Sickle,     
there is the fact that the political situation has so developed that we have 
now to win over and convince only one more political party, viz. the 
National Socialists. We have been successful to date in convincing each 
pafty [sic] as it came into power of the scientific importance of our work. 
We shall be equally successful with the Hitler Party if we can work with 
concentrated power.172  
 
Accordingly, Jäckh gradually moved to the right and attempted to secure the survival of 
his School by increasing the number of both students and instructors who were part of the 
Nazi movement.173 Hans H. Lammers, State Secretary and Chief of the Reich 
Chancellery under Hitler, had been teaching at the DHfP since the late 1920s, and since 
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December 1932 Jäckh had allegedly been preparing his institute for the possibility of a 
Nazi seizure of power.174 
At the same time, Jäckh tried to narrow the distance between his political position 
and National Socialism. In line with the notion that political differences could be split 
and negotiated, he sought commonalities between two apparently irreconcilably political 
perspectives. Rooting his endeavor in the war, he juxtaposed the DHfP to the 
revolutionary turmoil of 1918-19.175 In a private letter to the Führer, Jäckh celebrated 
Hitler’s emphasis on the primacy of politics, which – he argued – was also one of the 
tenets of the DHfP.176 At the same time, in an address given at the beginning of the new 
semester, he argued that the DHfP – like the Nazi Party – was rooted in the common 
attempt to unify all national political forces. He stressed that the DHfP had trained Nazis, 
counted among its faculty well-known Nazi leaders like Lammers, and represented a 
bridge between the national socialism of Friedrich Naumann and the one of Hitler.177 
Shortly after, Jäckh and Walter Simons were among a group of liberal-oriented Germans 
that, on the pages of the Berliner Tageblatt, stressed the necessity to “work together” 
with the “new state.”178 The readiness to negotiate and to compromise, which was rooted 
in the “politics of civility,” and the eagerness to cooperate with the state apparatus thus 
led Jäckh down the slippery path of accommodation.    
Within a few months, however, the belief in the neutralization of the Nazi 
movement was revealed to be illusory. Rapidly, Hitler and the NSDAP abrogated 	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democratic and civil rights, and established a dictatorship. After the Reichstag Fire of 
February 27, 1933, President von Hindenburg had provided Hitler with broad emergency 
powers. Less than a month later, on March 23, 1933, the parliament, with the exception 
of communists and Social Democrats, voted the Enabling Act, which suspended the 
Constitutions and gave Hitler unchecked political powers. De facto, Germany’s political 
elites – including Heuss and the other delegates of liberal parties – voted for a 
dictatorship. With the alleged reason of strengthening Germany’s inner unity and 
countering domestic fragmentation, the new regime swiftly moved to outlaw opposition 
political parties and organizations. As part of the “policy of coordination,” the new 
regime purged organizational life at all levels of politically and racially non-reliable 
members.179 On March 31, after a meeting with Wolfers, Babcock reported on the 
political transformations in Germany and on the self-imposed censorship of Bonn, 
Prittwitz-Gaffron, and Wolfers in their letters to foundation officers.180  
Notwithstanding his willingness to compromise, Jäckh was unable to secure the 
survival of the DHfP, although Sickle voiced the faith in Jäckh’s capacity to win over the 
new Chancellor on the eve of a decisive meeting with Hitler.181 On April 1, 1933, Jäckh 
met with Hitler in the Reich Chancellery, but upon Hitler’s decision to subordinate the 
DHfP under the control of the Ministry of Propaganda he resigned his position of 
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president of the School.182 After Jäckh’s meeting with Hitler, Babcock reported the 
impression of Prittwitz-Gaffron that the meeting “did not produce as good results as we 
had hoped.”183 Indeed, in May, the School ceased to exist as an independent organization, 
the Ministry of Propaganda took over five of the sixteen full-time faculty members who 
would teach in the “coordinated” School, and put Jäckh in charge of liquidating the 
remaining costs of the old DHfP.184    
Unable to save the DHfP, Jäckh tried to establish an independent research center. 
In an address given on June 1, 1933, Jäckh stated that, although the Propaganda Ministry 
now controlled the DHfP, the research department “has remained a free organization, 
with express consent of the new State.”185 In line with the approach that had 
characterized the last years of the DHfP, he tried to guarantee the independence of a new 
research institute by including in the board of trustees Lammers and Otto Meissner as 
representatives of Hitler and von Hindenburg. In addition, next to Haas, Heuss, and 
Sigmund Neumann, the permanent staff also included the ultra-conservatives Boehm and 
Fritz Berber.186 With the coordination of the DHfP, Jäckh believed that research would 
provide a common ground on which opposing political perspectives could be successfully 
integrated.  
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The concept of Überparteilichkeit had led Jäckh and his associates to a gradually 
closer alignment with the state’s political elites. The loyalty toward the German state thus 
had paved the path to the convinced support of the authoritarian governments of Brüning 
and von Papen. During the last months of the republic, Jäckh had become an unofficial 
envoy for the republican government and presented himself as the public advocate of the 
“New Germany,” hence requesting meetings with the chancellor to discuss his travels 
abroad, as well as the topics to address in his public talks.187 Jäckh was a respected 
commentator on German affairs because of his role as founder and president of the DHfP, 
which the Anglo-Saxon world regarded as one of Germany’s few truly democratic 
institutions.188 Although he maintained his political independence, Jäckh was close to the 
Republic’s political elites and defended Germany’s political leadership.  
Jäckh presented himself as an indispensable asset for Germany’s cultural 
diplomacy after the Nazi seizure of power. He boasted about his contacts in Great Britain 
and his propaganda successes in the United States,189 and pointed to his efforts to 
“produce understanding for the new Germany” abroad.190 In a letter to Lammers he 
stated, “independently on whether this Germany is called a first, second, or third one, I 
am decided even now to serve our common Fatherland and the German nation.”191 
Although this comment cannot be disentangled from Jäckh’s attempts to secure his 
position in Germany, it stresses these intellectuals’ peculiar mentality that made it 
difficult to take a route of radical opposition to the state. In fact, since World War One 
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the influence of Germany’s public intellectuals was based on their ability to place 
themselves at the critical intersection between private and public initiatives.  
Jäckh’s erratic maneuvering, however, failed to convince RF officers. In line with 
his attempt to make himself invaluable to the Nazi regime through his international 
connections, Jäckh tried to make his new research institute the center of the activities of 
the Rockefeller Foundation.192 Sickle, however, reported impressions “that Jäckh was 
manoeuvering, or was being manoeuvered into the post of an intellectual ambassador for 
the new regime,” and stated that he “had cause to wonder in the last few months at the 
extraordinary capacity of adaptation shown by Jaeckh.”193 The RF therefore refused to 
support the new Institute in the conviction that objective research was not possible 
anymore in Germany, although it appropriated a special grant of $10,000 to Jäckh for the 
liquidation of the DHfP.194   
At the same time, the CEIP struggled to come to terms with the political 
transformations in Germany. Emblematically, Butler wrote Babcock, “I simply do not 
understand it in view of the completeness with which it contradicts my conception of the 
German mind and German history.”195 A few days later, he characterized the German 
developments as “a madly emotional outburst, manifesting itself in psychopathic fashion 
in various directions.”196 This uncertainty also depended on the difficulties of getting 
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information from German representatives both within and outside the country.197 Like 
they were doing with the Rockefeller Foundation, however, Jäckh and Prittwitz-Gaffron 
tried to convince the CEIP to continue its work in Germany. After informing Babcock of 
the re-organization of the DHfP, Prittwitz-Gaffron reassured that these developments 
affected the Carnegie Chair only on a “purely formal level” and pointed out that the new 
regime had explicitly expressed its appreciation for the Carnegie Chair and its incumbent 
Hajo Holborn.198   
Like the RF, the leadership of the CEIP was confronted with the clear political 
implications of continuing its German programs. In May, after a meeting of the Board of 
Trustees, Butler informed Babcock on the decision to “preserve silence” regarding 
Germany and “struck out of our appropriations” in Germany and Austria because the 
“work we would do would be offensive to the ruling group in Germany.”199 From 
Europe, however, Babcock argued,  
We must not forget that encouragement and support of the liberal 
elements[,] which remain in Germany are now more important than 
before. The problem is to assure ourselves that this encouragement and 
support is not diverted to other ends than those we have in mind.200  
 
Although after the summer Prittwitz-Gaffron suggested linking the Carnegie Chair to the 
Kaiser Wilhelm Society,201 the Endowment decided to terminate the Chair when Holborn 
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was obliged to leave Germany for London.202 Notwithstanding these developments, 
Babcock remained optimistic regarding the building “of the edifice of peace” in 
Europe.203  
At the same time, the other organizations that had been established with the 
support of American philanthropic foundations faltered. The RF terminated its support to 
the Abraham Lincoln Stiftung in January 1934,204 although Hans Simons, Geoffrey W. 
Young, and August W. Fehling insisted on the importance of the work done and the 
concrete possibility to influence the course of events in Germany.205 By contrast, the 
Stresemann Memorial Foundation continued its activities, although Jäckh and Walter 
Simons renounced their leading positions.206 Curtius discussed the restructuration of the 
Memorial with Germany’s new political leadership.207 The ensuing negotiations focused 
on the transformation of the Memorial into an “Institute for foreign relations,”208 which 
would continue its activities under a different name.209 Informed of these changes,210 
Butler expressed the Endowment’s disappointment for the elimination of Stresemann’s 	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name from the name of the organization.211 Eventually, in February 1940, the Prussian 
State Ministry decided for the liquidation of the organization.212 
After the failure to establish an independent research center and guarantee the 
survival of the Carnegie Chair in Berlin, Jäckh spent increasing time in London, although 
he regularly travelled to Germany where he maintained personal contacts with the new 
regime and participated in Nazi gatherings.213 In England he became involved with Lord 
David Davies’s New Commonwealth Society, which aimed to mobilize public opinion in 
support of the establishment of an international tribunal and police force.214 Jäckh and 
Davies established the New Commonwealth Institute, which investigated international 
issues by working with an international network of personalities.215 As the General 
Director of the New Commonwealth, Jäckh supervised the work of the Society and, in 
particular, organized its research committees.216 The New Commonwealth provided 
Jäckh with a venue to continue his efforts in support of international and supra-national 
organizations, which he had begun more than ten year earlier as a founding member of 
the German League for the League of Nations.  
Jäckh therefore re-affirmed European interconnectedness, as he had done in the 
immediate aftermath of World War One with the German League for the League of 
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Nations and in the late-1920s with the “New Germany” propaganda.217 In an address 
given at several meetings of the British New Commonwealth Society in February 1933, 
Jäckh argued that after World War One “the world had become a unit, not a mere 
geographical term, but a political, economic, moral reality.” It was therefore the task of 
mankind to establish a “New Commonwealth,” which through an international court and 
an international police could solve the “ills” arising from international crises.218 Even 
after the Nazi seizure of power, Germany – Jäckh optimistically argued – would pursue a 
policy of peace and cooperation because that was “A ‘necessity’ and a ‘law’ which none 
can evade when the obligation comes to exchange rhetoric for responsibility.”219 Jäckh 
viewed internationalism as a tool to re-insert Germany in the international community 
and, in doing so, hoped to force the Nazi leadership to take political responsibility in the 
international arena.   
In meetings with RF officers, Jäckh detailed the goals of the New Commonwealth 
Institute and requested financial support.220 Officers viewed the support to the New 
Commonwealth Institute as a way to strengthen Jäckh’s position within this institute.221 
Nonetheless, some officers voiced doubts not only about the “personal relationship 
involved” but also about the institute’s real research value.222 In the subsequent internal 
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discussions, officers pointed to Jäckh’s “extraordinary capacity as an organizer,”223 as 
well as to his peculiar position in Germany, where he was a “reasonably persona grata in 
German Government circles.”224 Notwithstanding legitimate doubts about the grant, the 
majority of officers familiar with the case supported the appropriations because of the 
special relationship with Jäckh, who seemed to have access to Germany’s political 
leadership. Through a series of special grants the Rockefeller Foundation complemented 
Jäckh’s salary from 1935 to 1938.225  
As had been the case during the Weimar Republic, however, the international 
connections between non-state actors served national goals and were part of the cultural 
diplomacy of Germany’s political elites. The New Commonwealth was in contact with 
leading National Socialists,226 and Jäckh established a German Committee that was 
chaired by Friedrich Haselmayr (a Nazi politician and leader of the SA).227 Jäckh’s 
ambiguous role emerged during the First New Commonwealth International Conference 
in Pontigny (France) in the summer of 1937. In the opening addresses, speakers 
contrasted individual rights in democratic societies to the all-powerful state in totalitarian 
systems, whereas Jäckh again stressed the interconnectedness of a post-World War One 
world.228 The German delegate Ottmar Bühler reported on the general interest for the 
German delegation, which was the only one from an “authoritarian state.” He noted, 
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however, that questions regarding Germany’s domestic policies were avoided and 
pointed out Jäckh’s role in limiting debates on Germany’s political system.229  
The tension between the nationalist goals of the German Committee and the 
internationalist aims of the New Commonwealth eventually led to the liquidation of the 
German Committee. The New Commonwealth Monthly celebrated the speech of its new 
president Winston Churchill,230 who in the eyes of the German committee personified an 
anti-German turn of the Society.231 In the following months, Albrecht von Freyberg – 
who had replaced Haselmayr at the head of the German committee – and Lord Davies 
discussed the broader goals of the New Commonwealth movement, German interests, 
and the nomination of Churchill and Wickham Steed to high-ranking positions in the 
British New Commonwealth Society.232  
The personnel policy of the British section of the New Commonwealth Society 
was heavily debated in Germany,233 and led to both the liquidation of the German 
committee and the break between Lord Davies and Jäckh. The Nazi Security Service 
closely followed these events,234 and Jäckh’s meetings with von Neurath, Schacht, and 
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Lammers became reasons of concern.235 A report by the Nazi Security Service described 
Jäckh as a “highly murky personality” who was “married with a Jew” and thus “certainly 
unqualified to defend German interests abroad.”236 The German committee had aimed to 
“clearly state Germany’s viewpoint on all international problems,”237 but the nomination 
of Churchill as head of the British Society made all forms of collaboration impossible and 
thus the German Committee ended its activities on June 30, 1938.238 Jäckh severed his 
relationship with the New Commonwealth when Lord Davies transformed the Society 
into a propaganda organization against the appeasement policy of the British government 
in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement.239 Arguing that British Prime Minister Neville 
Chamberlain had no alternative during the September crisis of 1938,240 Jäckh 
relinquished his position of Director of the International Section of the New 
Commonwealth, as well as of the New Commonwealth Institute.241   
The New Commonwealth Institute had embodied Jäckh’s approach, as well as his 
ambiguities. Jäckh used the Institute and his international connections to break 
Germany’s international isolation in the hope that the Nazi regime could be normalized 
by inserting Germany in the international community. His hopes thus met an abrupt end 
with the change of attitude of the British branch that also led to the closure of the German 	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section of the New Commonwealth Society. By then, however, he was not anymore a 
persona grata in Germany and at the same time his willingness to negotiate and readiness 
to compromise with the Nazi regime had tainted his international standing.  
Jäckh continued his activities in exile with the support of the Rockefeller 
Foundation. In a typical manner, Jäckh tried to insert himself at the intersection between 
official policies and academic endeavors. He received a RF one-year grant of $6,000 to 
study problems of regional federalism in Europe at the Geneva Graduate Institute of 
International Studies.242 With the outbreak of the war, however, he postponed these plans 
and organized the South-Eastern European Section of the Ministry of Information for the 
British government.243 Inevitably, however, Jäckh’s intermingling of research and politics 
created tensions within the Geneva Institute and with the RF.244 While the renewal of the 
grant was discussed,245 the expanding of the war forced Jäckh to flee to the United States 
via Portugal.246   
Jäckh moved to the United States where he became visiting research professor at 
Columbia University. Here both the RF and the CEIP contributed to his stipend.247 
Foundation officers considered financial support a moral responsibility since Jäckh had 
been the representative of the foundation in Berlin and thus a “certain pension protection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 Tracy B. Kittredge to Sydnor H. Walker, June 23, 1939, folder 941, box 104, series 100S, RG 1.1, RF 
Archives, RAC and Tracy B. Kittredge to William E. Rappard, July 24, 1939, folder 941, box 104, series 
100S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
243 Tracy B. Kittredge to Sydnor H. Walker, November 11, 1939, folder 941, box 104, series 100S, RG 1.1, 
RF Archives, RAC. 
244 William E. Rappard to Tracy B. Kittredge, May 30, 1940, folder 941, box 104, series 100S, RG 1.1, RF 
Archives, RAC, Tracy B. Kittredge to Joseph H. Willits and Sydnor H. Walker, May 23, 1940, folder 925, 
box 102, series 100S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC, and Tracy B. Kittredge to William E. Rappard, May 23, 
1940, folder 925, box 102, series 100S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC.  
245 Tracy B. Kittredge to William E. Rappard, April 25, 1940, folder 925, box 102, series 100S, RG 1.1, RF 
Archives, RAC.  
246 Tracy B. Kittredge to William E. Rappard, July 30, 1940, folder 926, box 102, series 100S, RG 1.1, RF 
Archives, RAC. 
247 Grant in Aid RA SS NO 4059, folder 3793, box 319, series 200S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
	   299	  
for him is justified at this time.”248 Nonetheless, Joseph H. Willits, the director of the 
Division of the Social Sciences, described Jäckh as “long a protégé and almost equally 
long a concern to the RF.”249 In 1944, although expressing his willingness to contribute to 
his stipend for the third year in a row, he pointedly noted, “I see no point to our 
increasing the amount on the fiction that he will write another book. I don’t think his 
book warrants support by us, but perhaps certain pension protection is justified.”250  
Officers were clear about the nature of the relationship with Jäckh, whose “talents lie 
more in the field of educational administration and public affairs than in scholarship in 
the narrower sense.”251 
Jäckh personifies the type of “in-between” figure at the center of this study. In the 
second half of the 1920s he had become the unofficial representative of the Rockefeller 
Foundation in Berlin and, after the Nazi seizure of power, he hoped to serve “as a middle-
man between the Foundation and isolated scholars in Germany working in the field of 
International Relations.”252 Although he always renounced an official political role, he 
cultivated his relationship with political elites and constructed for himself an in-between 
role at the intersection of a broad network of intellectuals, philanthropists, and political 
elites. His efforts to find a form of accommodation with the Nazi regime symbolized the 
weaknesses of a conception of civil society grounded in the “politics of civility.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248 Grant in aid, action no. RA SS 4410, Folder 3794, box 319, series 200S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
See also Joseph H. Willits to Thomas B. Appleget, August 30, 1940, Folder 3793, box 319, series 200S, 
RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
249 Joseph H. Willits to Raymond B. Fosdick, May 23, 1941, Folder 3793, box 319, series 200S, RG 1.1, 
RF Archives, RAC. 
250 Joseph H. Willits to Roger F. Evans, May 10, 1944, Folder 3795, box 319, series 200S, RG 1.1, RF 
Archives, RAC. 
251 Joseph H. Willits to Thomas B. Appleget, August 14, 1940, Folder 3793, box 319, series 200S, RG 1.1, 
RF Archives, RAC. 
252 John Van Sickle, Conversation of JVS with Dr. Jäckh, Paris July 17 and 18, 1933, July 18, 1933, p.1, 
Folder 178, box 19, series 717S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
	   300	  
Conclusion 
 
Paradoxically, in the years of Germany’s political stabilization the School of 
Politics underwent a series of changes that weakened the political independence of 
Jäckh’s institute. Jäckh and his associates saw a validation of their approach rooted in the 
“politics of civility” in the stabilization of republican institutions. The swift collapse of 
the “June-Club” and the downgrading of the activities of the Politische Kolleg seemed to 
confirm this optimistic view. A rapid decline of philanthropic support to the DHfP, 
however, accompanied the stabilization of the Republic. After having established the 
School and guaranteed its survival in the first years, philanthropists withdrew their 
financial support in the belief that it was now the task of public agencies to support the 
institute.   
The decrease of private financial support led to a penetration of party politics in 
the DHfP. These changes forced the leadership of the School of Politics to rely on public 
funds and, as a result, to broaden political representation within the institute. In 
particular, the working agreement with the PK testified not only to the penetration of 
party politics in the School but also to the new emphasis on cross-partisanship in order to 
attract public funds. This cooperation also paralleled the attempt to integrate oppositional 
forces into the political process in the belief that, by forcing them to share political 
responsibility, some of the divisions that had fragmented Germany’s political society 
could be bridged.  
Domestic stabilization also led to the increasing emphasis on foreign affairs, as 
the normalization of political relations made again possible a real foreign policy for 
German governments. Consequentially, the leadership of the DHfP emphasized 
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internationalism and Germany’s role in an interconnected world. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, this internationalism had, however, a clear nationalist orientation. In a 
globalized world, Germany’s problems influenced Europe’s fate, and only by solving 
Germany’s problems – that is, the Treaty of Versailles – Europe could be spared the fate 
of being the world’s “beggar.” This form of national internationalism facilitated the 
integration of conservative scholars into the DHfP.              
Eventually, the normalization of political relations in the mid-1920s led to a shift 
in the meaning of Überparteilichkeit. Überparteilichkeit increasingly came to signify an 
equal representation of political parties, as the integration of conservatives in the DHfP 
shows. Initially, this approach pointed to the trust in political institutions’ capacity to 
neutralize extremist political forces by involving them in the day-to-day political praxis. 
The integration of these oppositional political forces, however, did not always translate 
into an acceptance of liberal democracy. Inevitably, therefore, with the new radicalization 
of politics, Überparteilichkeit as equal presence of political parties became a void and 
passive form of the “politics of civility,” as both tensions within the School of Politics 
and the gridlocked parliament showed. Against this background, nationalist 
internationalism provided the DHfP with a common ground and conservative scholars 
monopolized foreign affairs courses by the early 1930s.     
The debates within the School of Politics testify to the gradual loss of trust in 
republican intermediary institutions’ capacity to institutionalize conflict. In its last year of 
independent existence, the DHfP became the venue for a public debate over the limits of 
parliamentary democracy. Jäckh and Wolfers defended the authoritarian turn under the 
chancellorships of Brüning and von Papen and, in so doing, voiced the general belief that 
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republic institutions were unable to bridge Germany’s socio-political fragmentation. As 
Heller clearly pinpointed, the crisis of democracy was rooted in its inability to translate 
social multiplicity into a minimum level of political unity. Heller’s voice in defense of 
the Weimer Constitution was, however, a lonely one and the leadership of the DHfP 
turned to authoritarian solutions to Germany’s crisis in the belief that a democratically 
elected president could preserve democracy by bypassing the conflicts of a gridlocked 
parliament.       
Civil society and the homogenizing ideologies that gained traction in the last 
years of the republic were thus rooted in identical social dynamics. Jäckh and his 
associates believed in the possibility to reform the Weimar system with the aim, although 
at times ambiguous, to preserve the democratic republic. They feared that the centrifugal 
forces of individuation and private interest would tear apart Germany’s political system. 
With the hardening of socio-political division, they viewed a strong head of state as the 
only viable alternative to the total dismantling of democratic institutions. In so doing, 
however, they dangerously narrowed the gap with radical authoritarian solutions to 
Germany’s crisis, which Gleichen and the Gentlemen’s Club personified. Gleichen and 
Schotte, as well as the circle around Spahn, called for a strong political leadership. They 
emphasized the contradictions between mass democracy and parliamentarism, and used 
Schmitt’s terminology to theoretically conceptualize the end of a liberal civil society 
while, on a personal level, joining the National Socialist movement.     
Notwithstanding the fundamental differences with the radical personalities around 
Gleichen and Spahn, Jäckh’s attitude toward the Nazi regime remained ambiguous as 
long as he believed in the possibility to secure his own position in Germany. He 
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ambiguously negotiated with the Nazi regime in the attempt to guarantee a certain level 
of independence for his organizations in the months of the rapid coordination under Nazi 
control of all levels of organizational life. These attempts symbolized the weakness of the 
“politics of civility.” Jäckh made numerous concessions to the new regime in the belief 
that compromise could mitigate political contrasts and reduce differences. He aimed to 
normalize the Nazi regime by involving high-ranking officials of the new regime in these 
ventures and thus force them to take political responsibility – whether this was within the 
leading organs of the School of Politics and the research center or in transnational 
societies such as in the framework of the New Commonwealth movement. Eventually – 
as RF officers noted – Jäckh almost became an unofficial spokesperson for the regime 
abroad.             
Since the early 1940s, Jäckh devoted much energy to portray himself as an 
uncompromising bulwark of liberalism during the tragic demise of the Weimar Republic. 
In 1943, he published a book emblematically titled The War for Man’s Soul, which he 
regarded his “contribution to our war effort.”253  In this book, he not only established the 
narrative of his firm stand against Hitler but also condemned those personalities 
associated with the DHfP who compromised with Hitler (Otto Meissner and Hjalmar 
Schacht) and those who eventually supported the new regime such as Fritz Berber and 
Otto Hoeztsch.254 
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, the Rockefeller Foundation supported Jäckh 
in his exile and complemented his salary first in England and then at Columbia 
University. The long-term relationship between the Foundation and Jäckh determined this 	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support, rather than his abilities as a scholar, as the dashing comments on his research 
work show.255 Jäckh and his associates had become key in-between figures for the 
Rockefeller Foundation, as the comments on Jäckh’s managerial capacities emphasized. 
It is therefore not surprising that these personalities were involved in the multiple projects 
that American philanthropic foundations supported. The School of Politics, the Abraham 
Lincoln Foundation, and the Stresemann Memorial Foundation testified to the emergence 
of a network of intellectuals who became crucial channels of communication between 
American philanthropic institutions and German cultural elites. American philanthropy 
thus guaranteed a certain level of political independence in the last, fateful years of the 
Weimar Republic, which was in part confirmed by Joseph Wirth’s angry protests. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
255 The Rockefeller Foundation also reserved a special treatment to Hans Simons. See Carl H. Becker to 
August Fehling, September 27, 1932, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 4559, Winthrop Young to 
Selskar Gunn, October 10, 1932, Folder 177, box 19, series 717S, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC, August W. 
Fehling to Carl H. Becker, 15 November 1932, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, C. H., Nr. 624, and Tracy B. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This study details the development of civil society in the Weimar Republic. It 
serves therefore as a historical case study for an understanding of civil society’s growth 
and eventual demise in a young, liberal republic with relatively weak democratic 
traditions. Against a background of crisis and dismay, civil society and philanthropy offer 
a good vantage point for a better understanding of the multifaceted efforts to establish 
democratic practices of governance in inter-war Germany, while at the same time 
pinpointing civil society’s intrinsic inability to resist powerful, alternative forms of 
societal organization.    
As part of the growing field of philanthropic and nonprofit studies, this study 
contributes to current debates focusing on the intersection of, and interrelation between 
civil society, philanthropy, and democracy. The relevance of this study therefore goes 
beyond the historical focus on inter-war Germany. While it expands the existing literature 
focusing on the socio-political background of civil society activities, this study’s original 
contribution to philanthropic studies lies in proposing a new approach to the analysis of 
civil society in action, that is, the praxis of civil society. In doing so, it pinpoints the 
intrinsic weakness of civil society, thus warning against today’s celebration of civil 
society as a panacea for all socio-political ills. Furthermore, it details the contradictory 
role of philanthropy in supporting a liberal civil society. In particular, the focus on the 
asymmetries between American ideals of democracy and the realities of German political 
culture draws attention to international philanthropy’s dilemmas in supporting democracy 
and civil society.    
	  	   306	  
The analysis of the thought-leaders that formed the German School of Politics and 
the other organizations at the center of this study contributes to some of the major debates 
in the field of philanthropic and nonprofit studies. The contrasting conceptions of 
democracy of the intellectuals at the center of this study serve as a prism for an analysis 
of the relationship between democracy, philanthropy, and civil society in a young liberal, 
republican state. In today’s politicized public debates, intellectuals and scholars have 
either presented civil society as an alternative to the expansion of state authority or, 
although stressing the interconnections between civil society and state, have pointed to 
the primacy of state action. Consequently, they have juxtaposed state and society and 
sought models for the present in the past.1  
This study shows that the intellectuals that formed the circle around Ernst Jäckh 
viewed civil society as neither opposing government action nor depending on the state in 
a classical Hegelian sense. In fact, civil society provided the means to integrate all social 
strata into the state. Friedrich Naumann had commented on the necessity of the 
monarchic state to do so in the decades leading to its downfall in the fall of 1918. During 
the early years of the Weimar Republic, both conservative and liberal intellectuals agreed 
that the collapse of the old state had been rooted in its inability to integrate the working 
classes. Civil society represented the link between society and state, thus at times 
supporting and at times opposing states’ actions.2    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On the debate see Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, “Making Sense of the Civic Engagement 
Debate,” in Civic Engagement in American Democracy, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina 
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 1-26. See also Theda Skocpol, Diminished Democracy. 
From Membership to management in American Civic Life (Norman: Oklahoma University Press, 2004).  
2 See also Bob Edwards and Michael W. Foley, “The Paradox of Civil Society,” Journal of Democracy, 
vol. 7, no. 3 (1996), 38-52.  
	  	   307	  
Scholars’ attention to civil society responds to a growing interest in democracy’s 
preconditions. In this context, this study expands and clarifies the relationship between 
civil society conceptualizations and periods of societal transformations. Traditionally, 
scholars have viewed civil society as “a way of coping with anxieties.”3 This link 
between civil society and anxiety was, however, centered on a negative notion of “crisis.” 
In fact, scholars view civil society conceptualizations as a reaction to times of crisis and 
as an attempt to contain its side effects. Recently, however, scholars investigating 
philanthropic foundations’ role in society have also pointed to the opportunities opened 
by periods of societal transformations. Political scientist Herfried Münkler argues that 
philanthropists established foundations in periods of societal change when it seemed 
possible to influence society’s transformations.4 Likewise, David Hammack and Helmut 
Anheier suggest that American foundations could play an unmatched role in the first half 
of the twentieth century because of American society’s fluidity.5  
The intellectuals at the center of this study interpreted the crisis as a “zero hour,” 
a tabula rasa, which required the civic and political engagement of the individual for the 
good of the commonality. Although grieving for the military defeat and political collapse, 
these intellectuals viewed philanthropy and self-organizing activities as the means to 
mold Germany’s future form of societal organization. From this perspective, it is 
noteworthy that still in December 1933 the leadership of the Abraham Lincoln 
Foundation urged the Rockefeller Foundation not to discontinue its financial support 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 John H. Hall and Frank Trentmann, “Contests over Civil Society: Introductory Perspectives,” in Civil 
Society: A Reader, edited by John H. Hall and Frank Trentmann (New York: Macmillan, 2005), 4. 
4 Herfried Münkler, “Anstifter, Unruhestifter – wie Stiftungen Veränderungen bewegen,” Merkur, vol. 61, 
no. 3 (2007), 200-209. 
5 David C. Hammack and Helmut K. Anheier, A Versatile American Institution. The Changing Ideals and 
Realities of Philanthropic Foundations (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 43-74. 
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because “aid for a certain number of younger men of unusual intellectual promise at the 
present juncture may have a quite disproportionate influence on the future trend of the 
present regime itself.”6 As a period ridden with economic, social, and political crises, the 
1920s offered the tangible opportunity to influence societal transformations, thus 
heightening the sense of personal engagement and responsibility.  
 Against this background, this study takes a different approach to the analysis of 
civil society than most of current scholarship. It focuses on the dynamics between the 
actions of institutions and organizations, and the broader social behaviors that constitute 
public life, hence pointing to the “praxis of civil society.” On the one hand, from the 
investigator’s perspective, the reference to “praxis” serves to draw attention to an 
empirical investigation of socio-political actions that is informed by civil society theory. 
On the other hand, however, the “praxis of civil society” refers to the conscious effort of 
the intellectuals at the center of this study to combine practice and theory.   
This study uses as a prism the activities of a circle of German public intellectuals 
who in the 1920s were strategically placed at the intersection between the spheres of 
action of philanthropists, theorists and academics, and political elites. Although not 
original scholars or theorists, these intellectuals played a central role in Germany’s public 
sphere. In the period covered by this study, Ernst Jäckh epitomized this type of in-
between figure. Colleagues, American foundation officers, and the press repeatedly 
characterized Jäckh as the “manager” and “organizer,” while his scholarly contributions 
were often dismissed. Similarly, most of these intellectuals interpreted unfolding events 
by simplifying complex theoretical constructs developed by those theorists who find a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tracy B. Kittredge, Memorandum on conversation with Dr. Fehling, December 12, 1933, folder 159, box 
17, series 717R, RG 1.1, RF Archives, RAC. 
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place in today’s histories of intellectual thought but whose public influence at the time 
was – with few exceptions – limited.  
Indeed, these public intellectuals played a crucial role in those years because of 
their capacity to carve out a room of maneuver at the intersection of private and public 
initiatives. In the fluid and crisis-ridden first German democracy, extra-political 
initiatives offered previously unavailable opportunities to influence both the nascent 
German state and its form of societal organization. In this context, voluntary 
organizations and philanthropic institutions provided these intellectuals with the 
possibility to work with political elites while maintaining a certain level of independence 
both from political parties and the shifting moods of the masses. Between 1920 and 1933, 
the German School of Politics, the Gustav Stresemann Memorial, and the Abraham 
Lincoln Foundation seemed to provide the means to influence Germany’s political future 
and mold a new, democratic German society.  
The analysis of these intellectuals’ activities during World War One shows how 
they grew dissatisfied with a narrow definition of civil society, which gradually came to 
encompass more than the concept of self-organization. Influenced by Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, most of today’s scholarship on civil society 
focuses on voluntary associations.7 As part of the booming field of philanthropic and 
nonprofit studies, this emphasis on organizational structures is part of attempts to 
measure nationally and compare internationally the size of civil society, which scholars 
often equated to the nonprofit sector.8 In addition, including hardly quantifiable data on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This approach has been popularized by Putnam, Bowling Alone andPutnam, Making Democracy Work.  
8 See for example the Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project by the Center for Civil Society Studies at the 
John Hopkins Institute for Health and Social Policy (http://ccss.jhu.edu/research-projects/comparative-
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civil society’s normative dimension in these quantitative analyses has presented an 
almost insurmountable challenge.9   
During World War One, German intellectuals viewed associations as able to 
bridge socio-political divides by cultivating an apolitical sociability. The cases of 
“German Society 1914,” the “Wednesday-Society,” and the “Free Patriotic Union” 
testified to German elites’ attempt to establish venues for a free exchange of ideas and for 
a social intercourse that was unhindered by considerations of rank, status, and political 
orientation. The architects of these organizations believed that through the day-to-day 
interactions with political opponents a sort of spontaneous sociability would arise and 
instill in members a culture of compromise, that is, Tocqueville’s “self-interest properly 
understood.”   
German intellectuals soon lost their faith in associations’ ability to bridge 
Germany’s inner divisions. In truth, since their inceptions, these associations had relied 
on the coagulating power of nationalism, which the outbreak of the war in August 1914 
had inflamed. Similarly, these elites could momentarily revive cross-partisan 
organizations in the winter of 1918-19 only against the background of the Bolshevist and 
Spartacist threat. Associations appeared therefore as viable means to unify Germans only 
if supported by powerful integrating ideologies. Emblematically, therefore, the 
intellectuals at the center of this study did not comment on the decision of a Special 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nonprofit-sector). See also Lester Salamon, “Putting the Civil Society Sector on the Economic Map of the 
World,” Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, vol. 81, no. 2 (2010), 167-210.  
9 See for example the methodological and theoretical framework developed by Helmut K. Anheier, “The 
Civil Society Diamond: The Basics,” in Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management and Policy, edited 
by Helmut K. Anheier (New York: Routledge, 2004), 14-42. The CIVICUS Civil Society Index has 
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Members’ Assembly to revamp the “German Society 1914” in 1932 because, by not 
being supported by any strong integrative ideology, it appeared inadequate to the crisis of 
the times.10 The case of associational life in interwar Germany shows that, without a set 
of civic values or the backing of a powerful integrative ideology, voluntary organizations 
alone could not support the development of democratic practices of governance.11   
These intellectuals sought other means to counter German society’s 
fragmentation. Consequently, they developed a conception of civil society that, by being 
grounded in civility, could retie social bonds and counter the brutalization of politics 
characteristic of the post-World War One years. The “politics of civility” was based on 
the recognition that conflicts between multiple socio-political interests were unavoidable 
in a modern society. Thus, it was grounded in an ethos that viewed the political enemy as 
an opponent with an equal right to participate in the political process. The German 
School of Politics therefore serves as an example for an attempt to build civil society by 
teaching the practice of civility. The focus on the “politics of civility” helps to clarify 
civil society’s boundaries, as scholars still debate the distinction between an allegedly 
good and bad civil society,12 as well as on its moral or ethical dimension.13  
The focus on civility allows a distinction from what may be called an “un-civil 
society.” The case of the circle that gradually formed around the Gleichen, Moeller-
Bruck, and (at the beginning) Stadtler shows how, by resorting to a religious vision of 
politics and at times violent means to foster their political, economic and cultural/moral 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Deutsche Gesellschaft 1914, Circular Letter to Members, January 1, 1932, GStA PK, VI. HA Nl Becker, 
C. H., Nr. 186. 
11 This study therefore expands Sheri Berman’s work. Berman, “Civil Society and the Collapse of the 
Weimar Republic,” 401-429. 
12 Chambers and Kopstein, “Bad Civil Society,” 837-865. 
13 Don Eberly, “Civic renewal vs. moral renewal,” Policy Review, issue 91 (1998), 44-47. 
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goals, certain groups may disqualify themselves from the civil society family, although 
relying on associational networks and voluntary forms of self-organization. Scholars have 
defined such groups as “segmented societies,”14 or have viewed them as characterized by 
high levels of “bonding social capital.”15 Crucially, these groups place themselves outside 
the public sphere, thus refusing to participate in the free exchange of rational arguments. 
They denied equal right of existence to political opponents, and rather aimed for their 
complete defeat, or even physical elimination. In doing so, they consciously dismissed 
the notion of civility, as it assumed the acceptance of the liberal political system.  
These public intellectuals therefore represented the transmission belt between a 
conception of civil society centered on the notion of civility and practical 
experimentations aiming to transform these visions of a civil society into reality. 
Research on civil society has disproportionally focused either on civil society’s 
associational structures or on the great political theorists who are part of civil society’s 
intellectual history. The case of the circle that gradually formed around Jäckh shows that 
an analysis of civil society that goes beyond the intrinsic limitations of current 
scholarship should focus on such in-between figures. In so doing, scholars can detail the 
praxis of civil society, that is, a social practice and action for the common good that is 
informed by theoretical reflection. 
The intrinsic weakness of civil society is rooted in the paradoxical modernity of 
civil society itself. In fact, as a political concept that is part of modernity, civil society is 
not only the precondition for democracy but is also one for the homogenizing ideologies 
that have dominated the twentieth century. Civil society is grounded in the processes of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Letizia Paoli, “Crime, Italian Style,” Daedalus, vol. 130, no. 3 (2001), 157-185.  
15 Putnam, Bowling Alone.  
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individuation characteristic of modernization, that is, the transformation of traditional 
societies based on ascribed identities to commercial and industrial ones characterized by 
achieved identities. As a modern phenomenon, civil society recognizes the existence of 
conflicts in society, it accepts and even encourages them. This process is part of the 
gradual formation of an individual who is able to break the ascribed boundaries to human 
action. This multiplicity of conflicts can be negotiated, however, only on the basis of a 
common ground established by the “politics of civility.” Without a set of shared civic 
values, the multiplicity of interests risks tearing society apart. As “Chapter 6” has shown, 
the inability to bridge these conflicting interests increased the attractiveness of 
homogenizing ideologies that sought allegedly pre-political forms of unity able to 
transcend societal divides.  
The Weimar Republic represents the case par excellence of a society unable to 
harmonize the internal fragmentations that the widening of the public sphere had caused. 
The progressive exclusion of an “outcast civil society” from a “respectable civil society” 
became paradigmatic of the effects of exclusion on the development of a democratic 
public space.16 Either part or outside the public space, “outcast civil society” appeared to 
challenge the stability of both society and its institutional supportive framework. 
Emblematically, even Theodor Heuss supported the 1926 Law to Protect Youth from 
Trashy and Filthy Writings, which attempted to shield the public from obscenity and 
indecency.17 National Socialism also profited from the perceived moral collapse of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Julia Roos, “Prostitutes, Civil Society, and the State in Weimar Germany,” in Paradoxes of Civil Society. 
New Perspectives on Modern German and British History, edited by Frank Trentmann, revised edition 
(New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 263-280.    
17 Klaus Petersen, “The Harmful Publications (Young Persons) Act of 1926: Literary Censorship and the 
Politics of Morality in the Weimar Republic,” German Studies Review, vol. 15, no. 3 (1992), 505-523 and 
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bourgeois society, as Weimar’s greatest achievements and freedoms came to be deeply 
contested. The National Socialist regime organized German society around the principles 
of inclusion and exclusion and re-established those traditional values that democracy, 
identified with the disruptive forces of modernization and urbanization, had destroyed.18 
The demise of Weimar civil society thus points to civil society’s peculiar nature. 
In fact, civil society is a lukewarm concept. It is based on willingness to negotiate, 
readiness to compromise, acceptance of differences, and openness to rational 
argumentation. As Ralf Dahrendorf noted in regard to the European revolutions that 
ended Communist regimes in East Europe, 
It can take six months to create new political institutions, to write a 
constitution and electoral laws. It may take six years to create a halfway 
viable economy. It will probably take sixty years to create a civil society.19  
 
Paradoxically, civil society’s strength derives from its relentless slowness. Civil society 
does not produce swift and radical political changes, but rather contributes to the gradual 
deterioration of the edifice of political authority and its supporting ideologies in what 
Antonio Gramsci famously characterized as a “war of position.”20 Emblematically, the 
leadership of the DHfP had trusted in political processes’ power to neutralize, and thus 
integrate, extra-parliamentary forces into the system. The threat to the republican system 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See David Welch, “Nazi Propaganda and the Volksgemeinschaft: Constructing a People's Community,” 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 39, no. 2 (2004), 213-238. “Asocial” and “degenerate” elements 
could not fit the “people’s community.” After 1933, workhouses, relatively empty during the Weimar 
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came, however, from political forces that rejected the premises of the liberal system and 
used the participation in the political process to overthrow the political system itself.        
The organizations at the center of this study serve as examples for a better 
understanding of the political role of philanthropy in a democratic state. Current public 
debates often de-politicize philanthropy and assigned to it an economic, charitable, and 
ethic-moral value. As the case of Robert Bosch shows, however, philanthropy became a 
form of political engagement and an act of taking political responsibility. Many of the 
projects and organizations described in “Chapter 2” were possible because of Bosch’s 
support. Conversely, Bosch sealed the fate of the “National Union for Freedom and 
Fatherland” when he withdrew his financial support to the organization. Scholars should 
therefore consider philanthropy and voluntary organizations major ways in which 
individuals participate in democracy.  
By supporting voluntary and private organizations, however, philanthropy also 
guarantees the existence of extra-political or nonpolitical avenues for political 
participation. This study shows that private philanthropy guaranteed the political 
independence of the German School of Politics, which was able to play a crucial role at 
the intersection of private and public initiatives as long as it remained free of the 
contrasting political influences. Philanthropy thus supports the developments of a diverse 
set of avenues that allowed for forms of civic participation and political engagement in 
periods of societal crisis and transformation.  
Conversely, however, philanthropy may also foster specific political interests, and 
be used to co-opt organizations and institutions to pursue such goals. Alfred Hugenberg 
used his philanthropies to support and expand his political influence. He had attempted to 
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gain control of the School of Politics through a financial contribution that would have 
covered 51% of the budget of Jäckh’s institute. After the failure of this project, through 
Hugenberg’s substantial support, the Politische Kolleg moved away from its initial 
nonpartisanship to a close alignment to the DNVP, thus leading to the rupture with 
Gleichen. By the mid-1920s, the PK had become Hugenberg’s creature, and was 
drastically re-dimensioned with the falling of his financial support. Emblematically, 
therefore, reduced to only three members, it would cease its activities in 1935 after the 
brief cooperation with the DHfP.21 Just as it could guarantee political independence, 
philanthropy was also a form of political patronage, thus dismissing easy conclusion in 
regard to its intrinsic benefit to society and political neutrality.  
The relationship between the leadership of the School of Politics and American 
philanthropic foundations serves as a historical case study for the understanding of the 
development of an international civil society. Transnational civil society and its actors 
have often been criticized. Historians and sociologists have used Gramscian and 
Foucaultian paradigms to analyze the impact of philanthropic foundations and to point to 
the power dynamics that develop between grantor and grantee.22 Similarly, over the last 
decade, scholars have debated the real impact of international aid and humanitarianism, 
and pointed to harmful effects of international organizations on economic and political 
development.23 Whether we accept these critics or not, these post-colonial and post-
modernist approaches undoubtedly have the merit to draw attention to the critical 
encounters between local and international actors.    	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 [?] Dittler to Amtsgericht Charlottenburg, August 1, 1935, Landesarchiv Berlin, B Rep. 042, Nr. 8993.  
22 As a recent example see Parmar, Foundations of the American Century. 
23 See Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009) and, from a broader perspective, Angus Deaton, The Great Escape: 
Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
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The relationship between the School of Politics, as well as of the Abraham 
Lincoln Foundation and the Gustav Stresemann Memorial, with U.S. foundations was, 
however, complex and not an exclusively bilateral process. Philanthropic relationships do 
not develop in a historical, political, and social vacuum. Rather, disturbing factors must 
be taken into account. Indeed, the noteworthy influence of German advisors to U.S. 
foundations and the key role of Germany’s political elites, particularly of Carl H. Becker, 
complicated this relationship. As discussed in “Chapter 5,” the Special Correspondents 
for Germany of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace had a clear political 
agenda, which in the case of Friedrich W. Foerster and Hellmut von Gerlach contrasted 
while in the case of Erich von Prittwitz und Gaffron overlapped the one of Germany’s 
political elites. Philanthropic foundations and international philanthropy must thus be 
seen at the center of a complex cultural diplomacy, which served a broader circle of 
interests than those of donors and recipients.  
This historical case study serves as an example for a better understanding of the 
political dimension of international philanthropy. As noted above, scholars have detailed 
the negative and counterproductive impact of international aid and philanthropy on the 
development of receiving countries. Furthermore, historians have pinpointed the close 
cooperation between American foundations and official U.S. foreign policy in the Cold 
War period.24 Philanthropic institutions can serve as conduits for an unofficial foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Berghahn, America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe, Kai Bird, The Chairman. John J. McCloy, 
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Foundation and Europe (1950’s-1970’s). Cross-fertilization of Learning in Social Science and 
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policy, and in this the United States is not an isolated case.25 Without doubts, both the 
CEIP and Rockefeller philanthropic institutions were central actors of an American 
cultural diplomacy in inter-war Germany. German intellectuals and elites were, however, 
well aware of the semi-official political role of foundation officials and trustees. 
Consequently, these relationships should be viewed as complex interactions, which often 
served German actors’ (national) agenda.   
Indeed, a clear asymmetry developed around the meanings, goals, and 
understandings of internationalism. U.S. foundations had aimed to fight European elites’ 
parochialism by facilitating international encounters and trans-national cooperative 
endeavors. Jäckh and his associates, however, viewed internationalism and the 
prestigious relationship with international organizations as both a personal asset and a 
tool to break Germany’s international isolation. In the eyes of the School of Politics’ 
leadership, the relationship with U.S. foundations served multiple purposes, which only 
in part overlapped those of American foundation officers. In truth, U.S. foundations were 
aware of the difficulties in selecting local partner organizations and trust persons. 
Paradoxically, in fact, the democratic credentials of Foerster and Gerlach had hindered 
rather than helped the work of the CEIP in Germany. Jäckh’s cautious mix of liberalism 
and nationalism made him an ideal contact person for American foundations. 
Foundations sought out organizations and individuals that, by being politically connected, 
could enhance the impact of programs, although at the same time automatically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See for example Dorota Dakowska, “German Political Foundations: Transnational party go-betweens in 
the process of EU enlargement,” in Transnational European Union, edited by Wolfram Kaiser and Peter 
Starie (London: Routledge, 2005), 150-169, Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, “Foreign Political Aid: The 
German Political Foundations and Their US Counterparts,” International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1 (1991), 33-
63, and James M. Scott, “Transnationalizing democracy promotion: The role of Western political 
foundations and think-­‐tanks,” Democratization, vol. 6, no. 3 (1999), 146-170.  
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multiplying the interests at stake. Conversely, this alignment to political elites also 
opened the door to risky ambivalences and ambiguities.  
The analysis of the relationship between the German School of Politics and 
Rockefeller philanthropic institutions details international philanthropy’s unintended 
negative impact. Although RF officers recognized that the School’s relevance lied in its 
efforts to instill a culture of civility in its students, in line with the goals of the RF, they 
attempted to develop its research-oriented programs. Thus, a second basic asymmetry 
developed around the relationship between objectivity and democracy. The progressivist 
faith that had provided the background to the establishment of large, multi-purpose 
American foundations had influenced American elites’ trust in the possibility to form a 
culture of the expert, who could bypass contentious politics by relying on objective social 
and economic research. By contrast, Jäckh and his associates were convinced that 
political processes could not be de-politicized, thus believing in the possibility to teach 
the objective working of democratic, political institutions, which then could provide the 
common ground on which political contrasts could be negotiated.      
This asymmetry was, however, not confined to a difference of priorities. Rather, 
the School’s leadership’s emphasis on the “politics of civility” responded to the 
awareness that civicness, democratic values, and sense of political responsibility (in 
short, a civic religion) were the conditio sine qua non for any effective public policy in a 
young republican state with relatively weak democratic traditions. In fact, core values, 
such as liberty and equality, and the political systems that were grounded in them, such as 
democracy, could have radically different meanings, as the discussion of the contrasting 
understandings of democracy in “Chapter 3” has shown. The development of an objective 
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public policy then requires a set of shared civic values. The goal of the School of Politics’ 
pedagogical view of politics was to instill such a civic religion through the teaching of 
the objective working of political institutions and processes. 
The acrimonious debates between the leadership of the DHfP and the founders of 
the Politische Kolleg point to the intrinsic dangers of a culture of experts and policy-
makers in the absence of a set of shared civic values. The intellectual thought of Heinrich 
von Gleichen shows how the invocation of the “expert” was often only the first step of a 
celebration of social and political elites, whose expertise served to set them apart from 
the “masses” and enabled them to govern free of liberal republican institutions’ political 
constrains. The celebration of both the expert and objective political research could serve 
to by-pass liberal intermediary institutions that guaranteed political pluralism, thus 
responding to an understanding of democracy that was based on an organic unity and 
stratification of the national body (rather than on the existence of a multiplicity of 
individualities, and thus of interests). In addition, the culture of experts and objective 
public policy could easily be used to foster specific interest under the guise of an alleged 
nonpartisan pursuit of the common good.  
The focus on the praxis of civil society has pointed to civil society’s ambiguous 
modernity. The lessons of Weimar go beyond recognizing the “dark side” of social 
capital and civic associations,26 or pointing to associational life’s democratic 
“neutrality.”27 Civil society’s inability to bridge societal conflicting interests by 
establishing a set of civic values, the “politics of civility,” questions its capacity of 
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growth in heterogeneous societies that are unable to find a common ground on which 
differences can be negotiated and solved by compromise.       
This weakness of democracy and civil society has led to conceptions of a 
“vigilant democracy” (Wehrhafte Demokratie), which found its full embodiment in the 
German Federal Republic. The German émigré and political philosopher Karl 
Loewenstein argued in two essays published in the American Political Science Review in 
the late 1930s that fascism was a political technique “for gaining and holding power,” 
thus concluding that “If democracy is convinced that it has not yet fulfilled its 
destination, it must fight on its own plane a technique which serves only the purpose of 
power. Democracy must become militant.”28 In fact, the German case had shown that 
Fascist and Nazi groups could seize power by misusing the extraordinary circumstances 
created by democratic tolerance and only formally adhering to democracy’s rigid 
legalism. While Germany remains the best example of a “militant democracy,” scholars 
have described the development of multiple mechanisms to protect the democratic 
system.29      
The awareness of democracy’s intrinsic weakness and the necessity to protect it, 
however, were not a post-World War Two novelty. Already during the constitutional 
debates of 1919, Max Weber and Friedrich Meinecke had supported the establishment of 
a head of state with broad political powers. The Weimar Constitution had included 
Article 48, which granted to the Reich President extraordinary emergency powers, which 
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Weimar governments repeatedly used. In 1922, the Law for the Protection of the 
Republic also provided the state with an additional tool to resist the violent attempts to 
overthrow the republic. Nonetheless, between 1930 and 1933, conservative elites 
effectively used Article 48 to transform Germany’s parliamentary republic into an 
authoritarian plebiscitary democracy. Paradoxically, therefore, the tools that had been set 
in place to defend democracy contributed to its eventual downfall.      
Any investigation of civil society’s development during the Weimar Republic is, 
to a certain extent, paradoxical in itself. In fact, the history of Weimar’s civil society is a 
history with a well-known end. Germany’s first democracy was unable to develop strong 
roots in a socially, as well as politically, fragmented society, and thus could not integrate 
all sections of society into the new political system. Civil society represents the link 
between politics and society. In other words, civil society is the transmission belt 
between social dynamics and political institutions, and its failure of doing so explains 
Weimar’s collapse. While associational networks can provide individuals with extra-
political opportunities of political engagement, the “politics of civility” plays the crucial 
role of establishing, maintaining, and strengthening the connection between society and 
politics. As Jürgen Kocka has written, therefore, civil society is a “utopia,” a promise that 
will never be fully fulfilled.30 Civil society, as a form of socio-political action (that is, the 
“politics of civility”), is the precondition for the good working of the democratic system.  
The intellectuals at the center of this study fluctuated between high hopes in the 
democratic state and disillusion with liberal institutions’ working. In doing so, they 
epitomized democracy’s wavering in inter-war Germany. The German School of Politics 	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was thus in many ways an emblem of Weimar’s young democracy. Notwithstanding its 
failure, the School of Politics also indicates the possibility to teach and learn the “politics 
of civility,” as its ability to contain violent clashes between its students has shown. In this 
context, private philanthropy provided the School’s leadership with a remarkable 
freedom of maneuver, whose importance was evidenced by the negative impact of the 
School of Politics’ politicization after the falling of private donations in the late 1920s. 
The Weimar Republic thus testifies to the constantly unfinished nature of the civil society 
project. 
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Graduate Student Research Grant  Fall 2013                                                                                         
Awarded: $1,000 
 
The Dickinson-Stone-Ilchman Fellowship for  
Graduate Education  Fall 2013                                                                                         
Awarded: $5,000 
 
IU-OVPIA Free University of Berlin Exchange Spring 2013 
Awarded: One year with EUR 14,000;  
Accepted: One semester with EUR 7,000          
 
Rockefeller Archive Center Grant-in-Aid                       Spring 2013 
Awarded: $1,000 
 
Center on Philanthropy Travel Grant Summer 2012                                                           
Awarded: $800  
 
Teaching Assistantship,  
IU Lilly Family School of Philanthropy  2010/11—2012 
Total awarded: $30,000  
 
IUPUI Graduate School Travel Grant Summer 2011 
Awarded: $500 
 
IUPUI Graduate School Travel Grant Summer 2010 
Awarded: $800 
  
Graduate Assistantship,  
Lake Institute on Faith and Giving at IUPUI                                      2008—2010 
Total awarded: $24,000   
 
ZEIT-Stiftung Fellowship 2006—2007 
Awarded: EUR 12,000 
 
CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS 
 
“Conceptualizing Global Civil Society in Inter-War Europe: The Nationalist Goals of 
Internationalism.” 2014 ISTR 11th International Conference, Münster, Germany.                                                                                                             
 
	  	  
“Panel 3: Changing the Landscape of Debate: Foundations and Education after Crises.”  
2014 Conference on “U.S. and European Philanthropy in Europe after 1945. Historical 
Research and the Role of Foundations.” Berlin, Germany.  
 
“Panel 4: Archives and Documentation in an Age of E-mail.” 2014 Conference on “U.S. 
and European Philanthropy in Europe after 1945. Historical Research and the Role of 
Foundations.” Berlin, Germany. 
 
“Associational life in an era of political turbulence: German political clubs in World War 
One and the limits of Tocquevillian civil society.” 2013 ARNOVA Conference, Hartford, 
United States. 
 
“American Philanthropic Foundations in Weimar Germany: Asymmetries and 
Misunderstandings.” 2013 ARNOVA Conference, Hartford, United States. 
 
“Higher Education and the Public Sphere: The ‘German College of Politics’ and Civil 
Discourse in the Weimar Republic.” 2012 ARNOVA Conference, Indianapolis, United 
States.                                            
 
“Conceptions of Civil Society in the Weimar Republic.” 2012 Conference on “German 
Philanthropy in Transatlantic Perspective,” Indianapolis, United States.                                                                               
 
“Civil Society and International Philanthropy in the Weimar Republic: The Deutsche 
Hochschule für Politik and American Philanthropic Foundations.” 2012 ISTR 10th 
International Conference, Siena, Italy.                                                                                                            
  
“The Limits of Private Philanthropy: The Pacifism of Edwin Ginn and Andrew 
Carnegie.” 2011 ARNOVA Conference, Toronto, Canada.  
 
“Islamic terrorism and Mafia-kind organizations. Extreme examples of social 
entrepreneurship?” 2010 Nitte International Conference, India. Co-authored with Paolo 
Palenzona.   
 
“Civil Society as a metaphor of the ‘Good Society.’ The limits of a normative concept 
and the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.” 2010 ISTR 9th International 
Conference, Istanbul, Turkey.  
 
“American philanthropic foundations and the Weimar Republic. First hesitant steps 
toward a global civil society?” 2010 ISTR 9th International Conference, Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
“The Turnverein in Indianapolis and the Impact of the Great War: German-Americans 
Toward Integration in American Society.” 2010 SGAS Symposium, New Harmony, 
Indiana, United States.   
 
	  	  
“The Deutsche Hochschule für Politik and American Philanthropic Foundations: The 
Weimar Republic between Fragmentation and Unity.” 2010 SGAS Symposium, New 
Harmony, Indiana, United States.   
 
“Terrorism and Philanthropy. Counter Terrorism Financing Regimes, International Civil 
Society, and Religious Fundamentalism.” 2008 ISTR 8th International Conference, 
Barcelona, Spain.  
 
CONFERENCE REPORTS  
 
“Conference report: German Philanthropy in Transatlantic Perspective, 09/30/2012-
10/02/2012, Indianapolis, IN.” H-Soz-u-Kult, 02/02/2013, http://hsozkult.geschichte.hu-
berlin.de/tagungsberichte/id=4653   
 
“Conference report: German-Italian Conference on Community Foundations, January 16-
18, 2006.” organized by the Maecenata Institut and the Fondazione Cariplo. Villa Vigoni 
(Como), Italy 
 
“Research Report: U.S. Foundations in Weimar Germany: Asymmetries and 
Misunderstandings.” Rockefeller Archive Center Research Reports Online, 2013, 
http://www.rockarch.org/publications/resrep/    
 
SERVICE 
 
Co-developer of H-Net Associations and Philanthropic Studies  2013—present                               
 
ARNOVA Values, Religion, Altruism,  
and Drawbacks Section (VRADS) 2013—present 
 
Co-director of Workshop in Multidisciplinary  
Philanthropic Studies  2010—present    
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy                                                         
 
Undergraduate Faculty Learning Community  2010—present    
Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy                                                         
  
Research Assistant  2007—2010 
Lake Institute on Faith and Giving, Indiana University Lilly Family School of 
Philanthropy 
 
Student Orientation 
Academic Department, Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy 
  
Reviewer  2009 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly   
 
	  	  
MEMBERSHIP 
 
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and  
Voluntary Action (ARNOVA)  2011—present 
 
International Society for Third Sector Research  2008—present 
 
H-Net German  2009—present 
 
H-Net Soz-U-Kult  2013—present 
 
ARNOVA Values, Religion, Altruism,  
and Drawbacks Section (VRADS) 2013—present 
 
LANGUAGES  
 
English – speak fluently and read/write with high proficiency 
 
Italian – speak fluently and read/write with high proficiency 
 
German – Native speaker 
 
RELATED EXPERIENCE 
 
Friedrich-Meinecke-Institute, Free University, Berlin, Germany 2013 
Visiting Researcher  
 
European Union-United States Atlantis Program 2007—2008 
Researcher for the Benchmarking NonProfit Organizations and Philanthropy Educational 
Programs (BENPHE) Project   
 
University of Bologna   2007—2008 
Research fellow at the Master in International Studies in Philanthropy   
 
ZEIT-Stiftung, Hamburg, Germany Fall 2006 
Intern   
